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RÉSUMÉ 
Au cours des dernières années, le domaine de la consommation a grandement 
évolué. Les agents de marketing ont commencé à utiliser l’Internet pour influencer les 
consommateurs en employant des tactiques originales et imaginatives qui ont rendus 
possible l’atteinte d'un niveau de communication interpersonnelle qui avait précédemment 
été insondable. Leurs interactions avec les consommateurs, en utilisant la technologie 
moderne, se manifeste sous plusieurs formes différentes qui sont toutes accompagnés de 
leur propre assortiment de problèmes juridiques. D’abord, il n'est pas rare pour les agents 
de marketing d’utiliser des outils qui leur permettent de suivre les actions des 
consommateurs dans le monde virtuel ainsi que dans le monde physique. Les 
renseignements personnels recueillis d'une telle manière sont souvent utilisés à des fins de 
publicité comportementale en ligne – une utilisation qui ne respecte pas toujours les limites 
du droit à la vie privée. Il est également devenu assez commun pour les agents de 
marketing d’utiliser les médias sociaux afin de converser avec les consommateurs. Ces 
forums ont aussi servi à la commission d’actes anticoncurrentiels, ainsi qu’à la diffusion de 
publicités fausses et trompeuses – deux pratiques qui sont interdites tant par la loi sur la 
concurrence que la loi sur la protection des consommateurs. Enfin, les agents de marketing 
utilisent diverses tactiques afin de joindre les consommateurs plus efficacement en utilisant 
diverses tactiques qui les rendent plus visible dans les moteurs de recherche sur Internet, 
dont certaines sont considérés comme malhonnêtes et pourraient présenter des problèmes 
dans les domaines du droit de la concurrence et du droit des marques de commerce. Ce 
mémoire offre une description détaillée des outils utilisés à des fins de marketing sur 
Internet, ainsi que de la manière dont ils sont utilisés. Il illustre par ailleurs les problèmes 
juridiques qui peuvent survenir à la suite de leur utilisation et définit le cadre législatif 
régissant l’utilisation de ces outils par les agents de marketing, pour enfin démontrer que 
les lois qui entrent en jeu dans de telles circonstances peuvent, en effet, se révéler 
bénéfiques pour ces derniers d'un point de vue économique. 
  
 
ii
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ABSTRACT 
The evolution of consumerism in recent years has been nothing short of remarkable.  
The unprecedented use of the Internet by marketers to influence consumers in original and 
imaginative ways has rendered possible a level of communicative efficiency that had 
previously been unfathomable.  Their interaction with consumers using modern technology 
manifests itself in several different forms – all of which are accompanied by their own 
assortment of legal issues.  To begin with, it is not unheard of for marketers to use tools 
meant to track the behaviour of individuals throughout both the virtual and physical worlds. 
The personal information collected in such a manner is often utilized for Online 
Behavioural Advertising purposes – a use which does not always respect the boundaries of 
privacy law.  It has also become rather common for marketers to utilize online social media 
to promote conversations with consumers.  It has occurred, however, that these forums have 
also been utilized to further the anti-competitive ambitions of companies while also serving 
as an outlet for false advertising – two eventualities that are prohibited by both competition 
laws and consumer protection laws.  Finally, marketers utilize various tactics in order to 
more successfully reach consumers through online search engines – a practice known as 
Search Engine Marketing – some of which are considered to be dishonest and could present 
issues from both competition law and trademark law perspectives.  This thesis essentially 
provides a detailed description of these tools and the manners in which they are utilized and 
then proceeds to illustrate the legal issues that may arise as a result of their use.  In doing 
so, it outlines the legal boundaries within which marketers must use these tools so as to 
ultimately demonstrate that the laws that come into play under such circumstances may, in 
fact, prove to be beneficial to marketers from an economic perspective.   
Keywords : Online Behavioural Advertising, Privacy, Social Media Marketing, Consumer 
Protection, Search Engine Marketing, Black hat, Keyword advertising, Unfair Competition, 
Trademarks    
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INTRODUCTION 
The evolution of consumerism in recent years has been nothing short of remarkable.  
The unprecedented use of the Internet by marketers to influence consumers in original and 
imaginative ways has rendered possible a level of communicative efficiency that had 
previously been unfathomable. Not only does the Internet provide an innovative means of 
presenting consumers with all the possibilities that the market has to offer them, but it also 
endows marketers with an increased ability to satisfy those consumer desires which may 
not necessarily be mainstream.     
Internet marketing makes use of the World Wide Web to promote and facilitate the 
exchange of goods and services from merchants to consumers, ultimately providing 
consumers with what they need and want
1
.  The significance of Internet marketing, 
however, lies not only in the new medium itself, but also in the possibilities it presents.  
Contrary to the physical world, the World Wide Web possesses no boundaries.  
Consequently, while the physical world is adept at fulfilling solely those desires which are 
mainstream, the virtual world is capable of satisfying all consumer desires, no matter how 
precise and rare they may be. 
This phenomenon can be explained by a theory coined by economist Chris 
Anderson and known as the “Long Tail theory”2.  The Long Tail theory outlines the 
insufficiency of the physical world in today’s market, and the manner in which the Internet 
provides incredible possibilities for the exploitation of this gap.  On account of its spatial 
limitation, the physical world is only able to provide what can be sold in sufficient quantity 
to ensure profitability.  As a result, brick and mortar establishments tend to limit 
themselves to the provision of mainstream products that will attract a significant number of 
consumers, while ignoring the more pointed tastes, referred to as niche products, of a 
                                                 
1
Kent A. GRAYSON, Jonathan D. HIBBARD and Philip KOTLER, “Marketing”, in Encyclopædia Britannica 
Online Academic Edition, 2011, online: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/365730/marketing> 
(site consulted on November 19, 2011). 
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smaller percentage of the population.  This is due to the fact that niche products are so 
numerous and fulfill such a vast assortment of tastes for various people, that it would not be 
economically sound for a physical establishment, afflicted with a limitation on space, to 
carry all of these different items so as to satisfy such diverse desires.  The lack of benefit 
for carrying niche products in a brick and mortar establishment results directly from the 
inability to sell each of these items in sufficient quantity that would justify the cost of their 
occupation of shelf space
3
. 
In a world where shelf space is not an issue, however, the profit that could be 
incurred through the sale of niche products is significant as the number of niche markets is 
never-ending.  This reality is depicted by Chris Anderson as a power law distribution graph, 
where the “head” of the graph represents the mainstream products that are sold in large 
quantities, and the “tail” of the graph, which extends infinitesimally never quite reaching 
zero, represents the niche products (see Image 1).   This graph essentially illustrates the fact 
that, while “[…] individually, none of these [niche products are] popular, [...] there are just 
so many of them that collectively they represent a substantial market”4. 
Image 1:  The Head and the Long Tail
5
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
2
 Chris ANDERSON, The Long Tail:  Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More, New York, Hyperion, 
2006. 
3
 See:  Id., p. 15-26. 
4
 Id., p. 21-22. 
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This is where the Internet provides all of its possibilities.  Unlike brick and mortar 
establishments, the Web is not limited with respect to the number of products it can 
provide.  It is thus possible for online retailers to satisfy the niche desires in a manner that 
would never be feasible for physical ones, ultimately serving to create a seemingly endless 
market for online vendors
6
.  The Internet has therefore opened up a world of unlimited 
choice in which businesses no longer need to fixate solely on profitable mainstream 
demands, but can rather exploit a multitude of low volume niche opportunities
7
.  Chris 
Anderson sums this phenomenon up in the following manner: 
“The theory of the Long Tail can be boiled down to this:  Our culture 
and economy are increasingly shifting away from a focus on a 
relatively small number of hits (mainstream products and markets) at 
the head of the demand curve, and moving toward a huge number of 
niches in the tail.  In an era without the constraints of physical shelf 
space and other bottlenecks of distribution, narrowly targeted goods 
and services can be as economically attractive as mainstream fare.”8   
As a result of the ability to provide individuals with niche products, not only were 
existing markets expanded beyond what had ever been thought possible, but entirely new, 
more targeted and less mainstream markets were discovered as well
9
.  The creation of these 
markets was accompanied by an entirely new assortment of marketing tactics, which were 
developed to exploit these new markets to their highest possible extent, and revolve around 
two main elements.  The first element consists of targeting consumers based on their 
interests demonstrated through their online behaviour, which is achieved by using an 
assortment of technological devices to track their browsing habits and determine their 
preferences and market to them based on this data.  The second element, on the other hand, 
entails reaching consumers in more innovative ways through the World Wide Web, which 
                                                                                                                                                    
5
 Id., p. 25. 
6
 Id., p. 22. 
7
 Jon HOWARD, “Wagging the Tail”, July 20, 2006, online: 
<http://jonhoward.typepad.com/livingbrands/2006/07/wagging_the_tai.html> (site consulted on July 6, 2011). 
8
 C. ANDERSON, prev. cited, note 2, p. 52. 
9
 Id. 
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is accomplished by both conversing with consumers through the use of various forms of 
social media with the goal of determining their interests and marketing to them based on 
this data, as well as ensuring the visibility of businesses in online search engines in order to 
render it simpler for consumers to find what they are searching for. 
While these tactics are beneficial to marketers, as they provide them with an insight 
into the personality of each consumer, allowing them to market to these individuals based 
on their personal interests and ultimately leading to greater market efficiency
10
, these 
techniques may not necessarily be legally sound and pose significant issues in several areas 
of the law.  To begin with, the online marketing tactic whereby users are targeted based on 
information acquired through tracking them, present numerous problems with regards to 
privacy protection.  These tools essentially serve to track users throughout the Internet
11
, 
and even in the physical world through cellular telephones
12
, so as to determine patterns in 
their preferences and habits and then utilize that data to target consumers with advertising 
that would most appeal to them on a personal level, based on their interests as well as their 
                                                 
10
 Ari JUELS, “Targeted Advertising…And Privacy Too”, in David NACCACHE (dir.), Topics in Cryptology:  
The Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference 2001, Berlin, Springer, 2001, 408, at page 409. 
11
 See: Angela DALY, “The Legality of Deep Packet Inspection, June 17, 2010, online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1628024 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.1628024> (site consulted on January 19, 2012); Justin 
P. JOHNSON, “Targeted Advertising and Advertising Avoidance”, July 28, 2009, p. 1, online: 
<http://www.econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/12543/Johnson_20091027.pdf> (site consulted on November 24, 
2011); Janet LO, “A ‘Do Not Track List’ for Canada?”, December 3, 2009, online: 
<www.piac.ca/files/dntl_final_website.pdf> (site consulted on November 24, 2011); OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY 
COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, “Cookies – Following the crumbs”, 2011, online: <http://www.priv.gc.ca/fs-
fi/02_05_d_49_01_e.cfm> (site consulted on November 24, 2011); Andrea N. PERSON, “Behavioral 
Advertisement Regulation:  How the Negative Perception of Deep Packet Inspection Technology May be 
Limiting the Online Experience”, (2010) 62-2 Federal Communications Law Journal 435; Arnold 
ROOSENDAAL, “Facebook Tracks and Traces Everyone:  Like This!”, November 30, 2010, online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1717563> (site consulted on January 19, 2012). 
12
 See:  Nancy J. KING, “Direct Marketing, Mobile Phones, and Consumer Privacy:  Ensuring Adequate 
Disclosure and Consent Mechanisms for Emerging Mobile Advertising Practices”, (2007) 60-2 Federal 
Communications Law Journal 239; Stephanie LOCKWOOD, “Who Knows Where You’ve Been?  Privacy 
Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators”, (2004) 18 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 307; 
April A. OTTENBERG, “GPS Tracking Technology:  The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme 
Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment”, (2004) 46-3 B. C. L. Rev. 661.   
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location at the time the advertisement is targeted to them
13
.  The use of such tools to 
basically stalk consumers throughout both the physical and virtual worlds is often viewed 
as a severe invasion of privacy
14
, and therefore inevitably causes conflicts with regards to 
the protection of the privacy of these individuals, which is unequivocally guarded by 
Quebec
15
 and Canadian
16
 law alike. 
Furthermore, the social media tools used to converse with users, such as blogs and 
social networks, are often also tackled with legal issues, more particularly from the 
perspectives of trade libel and consumer protection laws.  To begin with, these forms of 
social media serve as forums which can often provide outlets for anti-competitive 
behaviour.  These are venues upon which individuals are able to adopt an identity other 
than their own – a level of anonymity that is used by business officials to commit trade libel 
in an attempt to ruin the reputation of their competitors through defamatory comments
17
.  
                                                 
13
 See:  A. DALY, prev. cited, note 11; J. P. JOHNSON, prev. cited, note 11; A. JUELS, prev. cited, note 10; N. J. 
KING, Id.; J. LO, prev. cited, note 11; S. LOCKWOOD, Id.; OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF 
CANADA, prev. cited, note 11; A. A. OTTENBERG, Id.; A. N. PERSON, prev. cited, note 11; A. ROOSENDAAL, 
prev. cited, note 11. 
14
 A. DALY, Id.; J. P. JOHNSON, Id.; A. JUELS, Id.; N. J. KING, Id.; J. LO, Id.; S. LOCKWOOD, Id.; OFFICE OF 
THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, Id.; A. A. OTTENBERG, Id.; A.  N. PERSON, Id.; A. ROOSENDAAL, 
Id. 
15
 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, L.R.Q., c. C-12, art. 5; Civil Code of Quebec, L.Q. 1991, c.64, art. 
35-41; An Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, L.R.Q., c. P-39.1; An 
Act to establish the Legal framework for information technology, R.S.Q., c. C-1; Consumer Protection Act, 
R.S.Q., c. P-40.1. 
16
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part 1 of the Constitution Act of 1982, [schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)], art. 8; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46; Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, L.C. 2000, c. 5; An Act to promote the efficiency and adaptability 
of the Canadian economy by regulating certain activities that discourage reliance on electronic means of 
carrying out commercial activities, and to amend the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications 
Commission Act, the Competition Act, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
and the Telecommunications Act, S.C. 2010, c. 23. 
17
 See: Michael A. ALBERT and Robert L. BOCCHINO JR., “Trade Libel:  Theory and Practice Under the 
Common Law, The Lanham Act, and the First Amendment”, (1999) 89 Trademark Rep. 826; Thomas G. 
CIARLONE JR. and Eric W. WIECHMANN, “Cybersmear May Be Coming to a Website Near You:  A Primer for 
Corporate Victims”, (2003) 70 Def. Counsel J. 51; Jonathan T. FEASBY, “Who Was That Masked Man?  
Online Defamation, Freedom of Expression, and the Right to Speak Anonymously”, (2002) 1-1 C.J.L.T, 
online: <http://cjlt.dal.ca/vol1_no1/articles/01_01_Feasby_defam.pdf> (site consulted on January 20, 2011); 
Peter Carmichael KEEN, “Anonymity and the Supreme Court’s Model of Expression:  How Should 
Anonymity be Analyzed Under Section 2(b) of the Charter?”, (2005) 2-3 C.J.L.T 167; Michael L. RUSTAD 
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These types of environments also serve as a threat to consumers.  In effect, the nature of the 
content written in these forums is not sufficiently regulated to ensure consumer protection 
and is sometimes used by companies to impersonate consumers so that they may more 
effectively convince other consumers that their products and services are desirable in the 
eyes of the average person.  This may ultimately violate numerous principles adopted by 
the laws that exist to protect these individuals against being misled with regards to the 
products or services being offered
18
. 
Finally, there are certain tools that are used to make sites more easily accessible 
online with the ultimate goal of reaching as many users as possible – a practice which is 
commonly referred to as Search Engine Marketing.  This practice effectively requires the 
employment of various techniques that serve to increase the visibility of businesses in 
online search engines and may pose certain issues from both competition and trademark 
law perspectives.  There are certain instances in which these tools are used in a dishonest 
fashion with the goal of diminishing the online presence of competitors, and as such, the 
back-handed use of these tools can be viewed as an anti-competitive practice
19
.  With 
regards to the issues these tools raise in light of trademark law, on the other hand, several 
                                                                                                                                                    
and Thomas H. KOENIG, “Cybertorts and Legal Lag:  An Empirical Analysis”, (2003) 13 S. Cal. Interdisc. 
L.J. 77; Kim VON ARX, “LitOral:  A New Form of Defamation Consciousness”, (2002) 1-2 C.J.L.T 63. 
18
 See:  Alex W. CANNON, “Regulating AdWords:  Consumer Protection in a Market Where the Commodity 
is Speech”, (2009) 39-1 Seton Hall Law Review 291; Christian HOEDL, “How to Market Services:  
Advertising Consumer Protection and Personal Data”, (1998) 3 Int’l Bus. L.J. 285; Nicole LADOUCEUR, 
“Calibrating the Electronic Scales:  Tipping the Balance in Favour of a Vigorous and Competitive Electronic 
Market for Consumers”, (1999) 25 Can.-U.S. L.J. 295; Gregory E. MAGGS, “Internet Solutions to Consumer 
Protection Problems”, (1997) 49 S. C. L. Rev. 887; David WAITE, “Consumer Protection Issues in Internet 
Commerce”, (1999) 32 Can. Bus. L.J. 132; Spencer Weber WALLER, “In Search of Economic Justice:  
Considering Competition and Consumer Protection Law”, (2004) 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 631. 
19
 See:  Cédric ARGENTON and Jens PRÜFER, “Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities”, April 
11, 2011, online: <http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/files/center/prufer/search_engines.pdf> (site 
consulted on January 25, 2012); James GRIMMELMANN, “The Structure of Search Engine Law”, (2007) 93 
Iowa Law Review 1; Rossa MALAGA, “Worst Practices in Search Engine Optimization”, (2008) 51-12 
Communications of the ACM 147, 149; Frédéric RAYNAL and François GASPARD, “Small treatise about e-
manipulation for honest people”, (2010) 6-2 Journal in Computer  Virology 143; Daniel F. SPULBER, “The 
Map of Commerce:  Internet Search, Competition, and the Circular Flow of Information”, (2009) 5-4 Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics 633; Herbert ZUZE, The Crossover Point Between Keyword Rich Website 
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online tools used to increase the visibility of companies in response to specific queries in 
search engines make use of trademarks owned by other entities – a practice which could be 
viewed as a form of trademark infringement
20
.  Due to this, the legal world has been 
afflicted with constant debates regarding the manner in which to treat this issue, mostly 
trying to apply traditional principles of trademark law to determine a solution
21
. 
Although these marketing techniques suffer from numerous legal issues in the areas 
of privacy law, trade libel law, competition law, trademark law and consumer protection 
law, all of which will be discussed in detail throughout this thesis, certain measures may be 
taken to ensure that their continued use remains within the boundaries of the law without 
necessarily hindering the success of their use.  In the present day and age, these areas of the 
law are the ones that Canadian marketing businesses are most confronted with when it 
comes to online marketing and this knowledge can therefore be extremely useful to them by 
permitting them to be aware of the legal boundaries within which they must function and 
ensuring that they do not surpass that which is permissible by the law, ultimately 
preventing them from having to face future legal action from this perspective.   
While compliance to these laws may appear to be an onerous task for Internet 
marketers, as they impose several rules which they must obey without fault, many 
                                                                                                                                                    
Text and Spamdexing, Master’s thesis, Cape Town, Faculty of Business, Cape Peninsula University of 
Technology, 2011. 
20
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TAN, “Google Adwords:  Trademark Infringer or Trade Liberalizer?”, (2010) 16 Michigan 
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 473; Reed W. TAUBNER, “Google AdWords and Canadian 
Trademark Law”, (2010) 7-2 C.J.L.T. 289; Kevin ZECK, “Referential Fair Use & Keyword Advertising:  The 
Necessity of Product Placement to our Domestic System of Free-Market Enterprise, (2008) 44-3 Gonzaga 
Law Review 519. 
  
 
8
marketers fail to see the economic benefits that are enabled by these laws, which can be 
properly illustrated using Economic Analysis of Law. 
Economic Analysis of Law essentially  
“seeks to trace the reason for the existence of judicial institutions.  It 
postulates that [the writings of positive law] exhibit a uniform 
underlying rationality and provides the conceptual tools with which 
to update them […] in order to permit jurists to better comprehend 
and, by the interpretation of concepts, to extend their logic to novel 
disputes that may arise.”22 (our translation) 
This analysis will thus be used throughout this thesis by illustrating the prevailing 
reasons for which the laws applicable to the area of Internet marketing were developed to 
ultimately demonstrate the effects of existing legal rules on this practice, whether or not 
these effects are socially desirable, and what changes must be incurred to ensure an 
outcome that is advantageous from both a consumer and a business perspective
23
.  The 
reason for which this tool of legal analysis was chosen is due to the fact that marketing is 
often used to encourage economic efficiency, by both attracting consumers and serving as a 
basis for competition, and as such, we believe that any laws that apply to the regulation of 
this practice ought to be analyzed in a manner that promotes this particular purpose. 
We will therefore begin by (I) illustrating the various marketing techniques used 
online to efficiently exploit the new and varying niche markets which the Internet has 
rendered possible to develop.  After setting forth a comprehensible basis of the tools used 
for Internet marketing, we will then proceed by (II) discussing the legal implications of 
these techniques so as to ultimately determine a legally and economically sound middle 
                                                                                                                                                    
21
 See:  R. N. ENG, Id.; J. JACOBY and M. SABLEMAN, Id.; J. MOSKIN, Id.; R. PFEFFERKORN, Id.; K. M. 
SAUNDERS, Id.; G. SHEA, Id.; A. TAN, Id.; R. W. TAUBNER, Id.; K. ZECK, Id. 
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nd
 ed., Montreal, Éditions 
Thémis, 2008, par. 22. 
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 Louis KAPLOW and Steven SHAVELL, “Economic Analysis of Law”, February 1999, p. 4, online: 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/251> (site consulted on February 20, 2012). 
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ground between the respect of existing legal principles and the achievement of socially 
desirable outcomes with regards to the practice of Internet marketing. 
PART I  MARKETING TECHNIQUES:  EXPLOITING THE NICHES 
The ultimate success of online marketing, and the result of the highest possible 
turnover rate, is based on the accomplishment of two elements:  tracking consumers to 
determine their preferences and specifically targeting them based on this data
24
, as well as 
rendering it significantly simpler for consumers to easily find what they are searching for, 
either through conversing with marketers
25
 or performing a search engine query
26
.   These 
elements are achieved by both (1) tracking users and (2) reaching users. 
Chapter 1  Tracking Users 
In the modern age of the virtual world, the ability to discover details about 
consumers and then target them with ads relevant to their preferences is unparalleled and 
quickly improving, thus exponentially increasing the price tag attached to the information 
                                                 
24
 EMARKETER, “New Ways to Target Your Customer”, April 20, 2006, online: 
<http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?id=1003937&R=1003937> (site consulted on September 9, 2012); 
Heather OSBORN NG, “Targeting Bad Behavior:  Why Federal Regulators Must Treat Online Behavioral 
Marketing as Spyware”, (2009) 31 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 369, 371; Pierre TRUDEL, France ABRAN and 
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<http://collections.banq.qc.ca/ark:/52327/bs1565476> (site consulted on September 9, 2012). 
25
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40a4323b9ff1/Social_Media_white_paper.pdf> (site consulted on September 9, 2012); MINISTRY OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE, “Social Media Marketing”, 2011, p. 1, online:  
<http://www.ontariocanada.com/ontcan/1medt/smallbiz/sb_downloads/ebiz_social_media_marketing_en.pdf
> (site consulted on September 9, 2012). 
26
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Website Through Search Engine Optimization (SEO) Techniques”, 2011, p. 1-2, online: 
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that renders this possible
27
.  This amplified capacity to determine the particular inclination 
of consumers arises from the ability to track the behaviour of individuals in (1) the virtual 
world as well as (2) the physical world.    
Section 1  Tracking in the Virtual World:  Online Behavioural Advertising 
The ability to track consumers throughout the virtual world is enabled by the use of 
certain technological tools, which are employed to trace user browsing activity and then 
utilize that information to target users with advertisements based on the preferences they 
exhibit while surfing the Internet – a practice known as Online Behavioural Advertising28.  
The tools often utilized for this purpose are (1) cookies, (2) Deep Packet Inspection and (3) 
Social Network Websites, all of which will be discussed in further detail heretofore in light 
of the manner in which they are used for Online Behavioural Advertising purposes.      
Subsection 1  Cookies 
A Web cookie is a small piece of text that a Web server places on an individual’s 
Internet browser when they visit a website which saves information regarding that 
individual’s visit to the site until the next time he decides to frequent it29.  Cookies collect 
                                                 
27
 J. P. JOHNSON, prev. cited, note 11, p. 1.   
28
 EMARKETER, prev. cited, note 22; FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, “FTC Staff Revises Online Behavioral 
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 ed., 2009, 
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th
 ed., vol. 1, Boca Raton, Auerback Publications, 2007, 2133, at page 
2134 and 2137; Joe KISSELL, Mac Security Bible, Indianapolis, Wiley Publishing, 2010, p. 343; OFFICE OF 
THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, prev. cited, note 11; Emmaneul PAQUETTE, “Touche pas à mes 
cookies!, November 19, 2001, online: <http://archives.lesechos.fr/archives/2001/LesEchos/18533-512-
ECH.htm> (site consulted on September 10, 2012); Pierre REBOUL and Dominique XARDEL, Le Commerce 
électronique:  Techniques et Enjeux, Paris, Éditions Eyrolles, 1997, p. 122; Pierre TRUDEL, France ABRAN, 
Karim BENYEKHLEF and Sophie HEIN, Droit du cyberespace, Montreal, Éditions Thémis, 1997, p. 11-44; 
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and store information about individuals based on their browsing patterns as well as any 
information the individual provides willingly, such as language preferences or passwords, 
in order to save the user from being obliged to enter this information upon each of his visits 
to the website in question
30
.  Once a cookie is shared between a Web server and a user, 
each time the user requests content from that particular server, the cookie will be activated 
along with that request
31
. 
Moreover, Web cookies have become a great deal more versatile with the adoption 
of third-party cookies.  Essentially, rather than cookies only being shared between a 
website’s server (the “first-party”) and a user (the “second-party”), cookies can now be 
transmitted to users from third-parties, such as advertising companies that display ads on 
certain websites
32
.  The ability of third-parties to share cookies with users, however, exists 
only if they have content placed on the site that is being requested by the user
33
.  When the 
user solicits this website, the content placed on it by the third-party is also entreated, 
making it possible for the third-party to send a cookie to the user along with the 
information requested
34
.   
Attached to each third-party cookie is a unique identifier, an element which makes it 
possible to identify the user in question and link together information regarding his visits to 
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various websites upon which the advertising company in question possesses content
35
. 
Thus, when the user revisits the same website through which the cookie was initially issued 
to him, or other websites upon which this same advertising company displays ads, the third-
party cookie that was initially transmitted to the user may be read by the advertising 
company
36
 and new information may be added to that cookie.  It is important to point out, 
however, that only the Web server from which the cookie was sent may have access to the 
information stored therein
37
; the provider of the website itself therefore does not have 
access to all the third-party cookies emitted while a user visits their site
38
. 
As a result of their ability to store a significant amount of information about Internet 
users, cookies are invaluable when it comes to the practice of targeted marketing.  Cookies 
are able to keep track of information ranging from the websites visited by a user to the 
click-through responses of the user to various advertisements, and everything in between, 
such as the duration of those visits, the searches performed by the user, the user’s IP 
address
39
, the purchases the user has made online, the geographical location information of 
the user using his IP address or GPS technology, should he be connecting through a mobile 
device with an embedded GPS
40
, and the website which led the consumer to another site 
monitored by a particular ad network
41
. 
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The information obtained through the use of cookies is utilized to create extremely 
detailed consumer profiles that provide an in-depth look at each individual
42
.  The 
unbelievable detail with which these profiles are endowed results from the hoard of 
information available through cookies as well as other tracking tools.  To begin with, data 
obtained through cookies is not only limited to a consumer’s use of a single website at one 
particular moment, but is rather extended to his use of all the websites that are served by a 
particular ad network over a significantly long period of time
43
. 
Once collected, the user information contained within the cookie, as well as the 
“clickstream” information obtained through a user’s use of various websites served by the 
same ad network
44
, can be pooled together with other demographic and psychographic data 
that is available from third-party sources (such as from Internet Service Providers through 
their use of Deep Packet Inspection technology) or with information voluntarily supplied by 
the consumer himself (such as on his profile on a Social Network Website
45
), both of which 
will be discussed in further detail below
46
.  This creates a rather detailed profile
47
 of the 
consumer which ultimately makes it possible for ad networks “to predict the individual 
consumer’s tastes, needs, and purchasing habits and enables the advertising companies’ 
computers to make split-second decisions about how to deliver ads directly targeted to [a] 
consumer’s specific interests”48. 
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The creation of such consumer profiles has often been viewed as a privacy 
violation.  It is upon this basis that a lawsuit was filed on January 27, 2000 against a 
company by the name of DoubleClick, one of the largest users of cookie technology for 
advertising purposes. This enterprise is basically an ad network that “is affiliated with over 
11,000 Web sites for which and on which it provides targeted banner advertisements”49, 
1,500 sites of which produce the most traffic on the World Wide Web
50
.   
The chances of an Internet user coming across a site upon which DoubleClick has 
content is therefore rather significant and, as such, it is rare to find an individual’s browser 
that does not possess a cookie emanating from this company.  The users upon whose 
browsers the cookies are placed can be identified by the specific user ID attached to the 
cookie in question.  These cookies generally contain a range of data including “names, e-
mail addresses, home and business addresses, telephone numbers, searches performed on 
the Internet, Web pages or sites visited on the Internet and other communications and 
information that users would not ordinarily expect advertisers to be able to collect”51. 
Each time a user visits a site affiliated with DoubleClick, the consumer’s browser is 
triggered to send a request to this company’s network – a request which includes the user 
identifier of the cookie saved on that individual’s computer as well as the browser type and 
the name of the websites associated with DoubleClick that the user is attempting to 
access
52
.  At this point, the ad network identifies the consumer profile attached to the 
cookie’s user identifier and then places advertisements upon the web page that the 
individual is viewing that most appeal to his interests.   
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Due to the fact that DoubleClick is affiliated with such a significant number of 
websites, the profiles it is able to create tend to be rather detailed as it follows consumer 
behaviour across their use of these sites.  As such, the advertisements it targets to 
individuals are often very well suited to their wants and needs.  For example, if 
DoubleClick’s client sells golf paraphernalia – a sport that is generally associated with 
wealthy individuals – the network will target this client’s ads to “high-income people who 
follow golf and have a track record of making expensive online purchases”53.  When the 
consumer fulfilling these criteria views this ad, it will often draw his attention, as it so 
directly appeals to his interests, causing him to click on it in most cases
54
.  For the ad 
network, this means that their mission of targeting the consumer with advertisements 
relevant to his interests and desires has been successfully accomplished.    
Despite the Plaintiffs’ view that DoubleClick’s creation of detailed consumer 
profiles violated their privacy, however, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York ultimately dismissed the action following a lengthy analysis whereby 
they did not consider that DoubleClick’s practices violated American federal laws55.  
Whether or not such practices would be prohibited by Canadian laws, on the other hand, 
will be discussed in further detail in the next part of this thesis.   
Nevertheless, it is evident that the consumer information available to advertisers 
through the use of cookies is rather significant.  However, while the accrual of the personal 
data of individuals through cookies is considerable, the nature of Web cookie technology 
puts the ability of marketers to utilize this information at risk.  All Web cookies, whether 
they are first-party cookies or third-party cookies, are stored in a user’s browser, thus 
providing users with the option to delete cookies should they so wish.  This would 
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ultimately render all the data contained within the cookies lost to the website or entity that 
shared the cookie with the user.  Web cookies therefore require some sort of minimal 
participation on the part of users to be able to fulfill their purpose, thus providing the user 
with the choice of whether or not they want to enable cookies to store their personal data.  
In response to this problem, another type of cookie was created that renders the 
user’s choice regarding whether or not they want their browsing habits to be tracked 
entirely obsolete as options to control or delete them are usually absent or virtually 
impossible to find
56
.  These types of cookies are commonly referred to as Flash cookies or 
zombie cookies, which fulfill the same purposes as Web cookies, but are rather stored on a 
user’s hard drive instead of his browser57, rendering them invisible to users58.  Due to the 
difficulty of deleting Flash cookies, users are essentially stripped of the choice regarding 
whether or not they desire their movement on the Internet to be tracked
59
.  Furthermore, not 
only are Flash cookies difficult to delete, but they also serve to recreate Web cookies that 
have already been deleted by a user
60
, thus stripping users of the choice offered to them 
with regards to Web cookies by association.   
The use of such cookies by some of the most prominent sites on the World Wide 
Web was documented by researchers at UC Berkeley in 2009
61
, and includes the sites run 
by MTV, ESPN, MySpace, Hulu, ABC, NBC and Scribd, all of whose Flash cookies 
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emanate from a company called Quantcast
62
.  As a result of their use of Flash cookies, a 
lawsuit was filed against these companies in the United States District Court of Central 
California on July 23, 2010 which was settled only a few months later.  While this leaves us 
at a loss regarding the manner in which such a case would be treated in a court of law, 
Quantcast’s immediate action to remedy this situation and preserve consumer privacy is 
most definitely an indication that advertising companies may agree that the use of such 
technology is invasive
63
. 
Regardless of the type of cookie that may be used by websites or ad networks, 
however, it is clear that this type of technology renders these entities privy to a significant 
amount of consumer information to which they would not otherwise have access.  Thus, 
between the information contained about the user in the cookies issued by the websites he 
visited, as well as the cookies issued by the ad networks that serve these websites, a 
significant amount of information is able to be inferred about the consumer’s preferences – 
information which is then used to target him with advertisements that would comply to his 
interests and that would mostly likely result in him clicking on the advertisement.   
Subsection 2  Deep Packet Inspection 
Deep Packet Inspection
64
 is a networking technology that is also employed to 
aggregate data regarding Internet users.  It is used by both businesses and Internet Service 
Providers
65
 to monitor network traffic as well as examine the information being transmitted 
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by users throughout the Internet
66
.  DPI technology was created to protect ISPs from threats 
inherent to the Web, such as viruses and spam email, which have the ability to affect its 
proper functioning
67
.  However, while permitting them to protect themselves from such 
threats, this form of technology also renders it possible for ISPs to collect all the 
communications made by consumers over the Internet
68
 and ultimately “monitor, analyze, 
and potentially manipulate Internet traffic”69. 
DPI technology functions by collecting information viewed by consumers on the 
Internet – data which flows through the Web in the form of packets70.  Packets are often 
compared to mailed letters in that each one contains both a header, which is akin to an 
address that directs the packet to its final destination in the same way as an address placed 
on an envelope directs that mail to a particular domicile, as well as payload data, which 
holds the actual content detained within the packet similarly to the letter found within the 
envelope
71
.  The only distinction between the contents of a packet and a letter is that, while 
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reading the latter provides sufficient information about an individual, the former is rarely 
useful unless it is combined with the data contained in the other packets emanating from the 
same individual’s device at a given time as online communications are often subdivided 
into several packets upon transmission
72
. 
The payload data contained within each packet can range from information 
regarding web browsing habits, to the content contained in emails or information transfers, 
and even to what was said during voice conversations held over the Internet
73
 – all of which 
is made available to ISPs through DPI technology.  The amount of information available to 
ISPs will, however, differ depending on the type of DPI technology employed
74
. Some DPI 
technologies render it possible to track all information going to, and leaving from, a 
specific Internet Protocol address
75
, while pinpointing and accessing any type of 
information desired
76
.  Such technology would render it possible to identify traffic leading 
to and from a particular user’s email account, and even allow for the possibility of 
reassembling an email message as it is being typed out by the user
77
.  
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Other DPI technology, on the other hand, is not nearly as invasive, only being used 
to recognize trends in user behaviour by analyzing their use of the Internet based on the 
queries they make, the content they download and the applications they use.  Regardless of 
the type of DPI technology employed, however, it is clear that this type of technology 
basically makes it possible for any information being transmitted over the Internet to be 
visible to uninvolved third parties thus allowing them to gain access to more detailed 
information regarding Internet users
78
. 
Thus, contrary to cookies, DPI technology is not an element that is shared between a 
user’s computer and a website’s or ad network’s server, but is rather an elaborate system set 
up by the product’s developer in collaboration with an ISP79.  DPI is a great deal more 
dynamic
80
 and is actually able to track everything a user is doing on the Internet, as 
opposed to only specific pre-programmed elements
81
.  The information acquired through 
DPI by intercepting, copying and reading packets of Internet traffic thus render ISPs privy 
to hoards of information regarding consumer online activities and communications
82
.  In 
addition, ISPs have access to all the Internet users that make use of their services.  Thus, 
rather than requiring a user to go on a specific website so that a cookie may be stored in his 
browser or hard drive, allowing information to be collected about him, ISPs can gather 
information about Internet users simply through the use of their services
83
.   
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The utilization of this type of technology by two different companies, Phorm and 
NebuAd, met with severe criticism.  To begin with, Phorm, an advertising company, signed 
agreements with three of United Kingdom’s largest ISPs whereby it would install its 
advertising system and apply it to the clients of these providers
84
.  The advertising system 
used DPI technology to intercept all of the web pages viewed by the customers of these 
ISPs and scan them all for keywords
85
, while at the same time tracking them throughout the 
World Wide Web using cookies assigned with user identifiers
86
.  A customer profile would 
be constructed using the keywords that appear with a high frequency on these Web pages, 
and would be constantly updated simultaneously to his use of the Internet
87
.  This data was 
then utilized by Phorm to target these individuals with advertisements on websites that also 
possess agreements with the advertising company
88
.  In such a manner, if a customer was 
found searching for exotic summer getaways, Phorm would be aware of this and they 
would then target these individuals with advertisements for hotels in destinations like 
Hawaii or Fiji, for example
89
.   
It was revealed in April 2008 that Phorm deployed its DPI technology for trial 
purposes on tens of thousands of individuals without their knowledge or consent, which led 
to quite an uproar
90
.  Their unauthorized use of this technology was severely criticized, 
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causing the European Commission to intervene following a lack of action on the part of 
British Authorities
91
.  Phorm experienced what was described by one of the ISPs it was 
associated with as being “a year of the most intensive personal-reputation-destroying PR 
trench warfare” which ultimately resulted in the desertion of Phorm by its investors and 
partners and a crumbling of their company within the United Kingdom
92
.  Rather than 
attempting to re-establish its reputation in that part of the world, Phorm is now 
endeavouring to create a new name for itself in Turkey, China and Brazil
93
. 
Even closer to home is the case of the American company NebuAd who partnered 
with American, and even some Canadian, ISPs to access the data they acquire through the 
use of DPI in order to be able to use that data for the behavioural advertising technology 
that NebuAd developed
94.  The advertising company’s technology functioned by amassing 
the information of the customers of the ISPs through installing a hardware device within the 
provider’s network95.  All the data that was acquired in this fashion was associated with the 
user’s IP address, and all of the traffic emanating from a particular IP address was 
monitored and analyzed based on “the pages visited, the search terms entered, and the 
keywords that appear on those pages.  This information [was] distilled to about 1000 
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categories representing various purchase interest: shopping for a mortgage, researching 
lawnmowers, and so on”96. The frequency with which a particular user viewed a specific 
web page was also examined by the advertising system.  In such a manner, when a user 
“[visited] a Web page, NebuAd [could] check which categories the user [appeared] to be 
interested in and display a message from an advertiser interested in that sort of product”97. 
The practices of NebuAd were severely criticized by privacy advocates in the 
United States, which ultimately led to hearings being held in Congress regarding the 
potentially invasive technology developed and used by this company
98
.  As a result of the 
less than flattering attention NebuAd was receiving, the ISPs with which it had partnerships 
reneged on their agreements.  A class action lawsuit was later filed against NebuAd, for 
which it agreed to a $2.4 million settlement as well as to testify against the ISPs it was 
previously partnered with so that their testimony may be used in cases instituted against 
these entities
99
.  The ill effects suffered by NebuAd as a result of all of this negative 
publicity ultimately led to the company being shut down on May 15, 2009
100
. 
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Subsection 3  Social Network Websites:  Consumer Profiles 
Social Network Websites
101
 are yet another one of the tools employed by online 
marketers to gather consumer data.  These sites are web-based services that permit 
individuals to create personal profiles
102
 which they use to connect with other people, be it 
their friends, acquaintances, or simply individuals who possess profiles that are of interest 
to them
103
.  Most SNWs are made up of various user profiles, often consisting of a picture 
of the user, and containing personal data which typically includes his name, date of birth 
and location, as well as a section where the user can provide more detailed information 
about himself, such as his education or personal preferences
104
.  This data is rendered 
available to other users on the network and permits them to identify their friends and add 
them to a list of contacts
105
.  This ultimately leads to the creation of online communities 
where people can share user created content
106
. 
Users of SNWs keep in contact with their friends and acquaintances through the use 
of these profiles by befriending them on these sites and connecting with them.  Connections 
between users on such sites are enabled through mechanisms provided by SNWs that allow 
users to leave publicly visible comments or even send private messages
107
.  It is also 
possible for users to connect with one another by displaying their interests, their likes, their 
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dislikes, and various other elements that further describe them as a person
108
.  The data 
available about individuals on SNWs is therefore nearly unlimited.   
Aside from connecting with individuals with whom the user is acquainted, a good 
number of SNWs enable various other elements that permit users to enhance their social 
experience on the Web.  In the cases of many such sites, this is achieved through allowing 
users to interact with various applications such as games, birthday calendars, trivia 
applications and countless others
109
.  One of the most popular SNWs, Facebook, even 
extends the social experience of its users beyond its own website and onto other sites.  It 
achieves this by enabling social enhancement tools known as “social plug-ins” which can 
be incorporated into a website and ultimately allow users to share their opinions regarding 
various websites with their Facebook friends
110
.   
The various connections and relationships formed between users in such a fashion 
results in the creation of a marketing tool known as the Social Graph, which is essentially a 
public display of connections linking people to one another based on their associations with 
each other
111, thus providing “rich sources of naturalistic behavioral data”112.  The 
                                                                                                                                                    
107
 M. FANELLI-ISLA, prev. cited, note 104, p. 17-18. 
108
 Id., p. 20 
109
 D. M. BOYD and N. B. ELLISON, prev. cited, note 104, 213. 
110
 See :  Abdelberi CHAABANE, Mohamed Ali KAAFAR and Roksana BORELI, “Big Friend is Watching You:  
Analyzing Online Social Networks Tracking Capability”, August 17, 2012, p. 8, online: 
<http://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2012/paper/wosn/p7.pdf> (site consulted on September 7, 2012); 
FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS, “Social Plugins”, 2012, online: <http://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/> 
(site consulted on September 10, 2012); A. ROOSENDAAL, prev. cited, note 11. 
111
 Michael BEYE, Arjan JECKMANS, Zekeriya ERKIN, Pieter HARTEL, Reginald LAGENDIJK and Qiang TANG, 
“Literature Overview - Privacy in Online Social Networks”, 2010, p. 3, online: 
<http://doc.utwente.nl/74094/1/literaturereview.pdf> (site consulted on January 29, 2012); Julia HEIDEMANN, 
Mathias KLIER and Florian PROBST, “Identifying Key Users in Online Social Networks: A PageRank Based 
Approach”, December 2010, p. 3-4, online: <http://www.wi-if.de/paperliste/paper/wi-301.pdf> (site consulted 
on January 29, 2012); Romain RISSOAN, Les réseaux sociaux –  Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Viadeo, 
Google+:  Comprendre et maîtriser ces nouveaux outils de communication, St-Herblain, Éditions ENI, 2011, 
p. 34-44. 
112
 D. M. BOYD and N. B. ELLISON, prev. cited, note 104, 221. 
  
 
26
connections linking individuals to one another that are exhibited in the Social Graph
113
 can 
simply be based on the fact that they are acquainted with one another, but they can also be 
further pinpointed to demonstrate the various traits and interests people have in common
114
.   
More importantly than the functioning of SNWs, however, is the extreme popularity 
of these sites, which has seen a significant increase since 2004
115
.  Facebook, for example, 
possesses over 687 million users
116
 – an increase of 287 million since 2010117 – and 
continues to grow each day.  The part Facebook plays in our everyday lives is extremely 
significant, so much so that 48% of 18 to 34 year olds check their Facebook accounts the 
moment they awaken in the morning
118
.  With the number of consumers connected to 
SNWs, the user data available through this medium is therefore tremendously extensive.  
The data that can be accessed about users through the use of SNWs, however, is not 
solely limited to their behaviour on the website itself, but is also expanded to the users’ use 
of the Internet as a whole.  One of the most refined methods of modern day technology is 
tracking users across the Internet with the use of social plug-ins emitted by SNWs.  Though 
the extensive ability of cookies emanating from ad networks to track users is rather 
impressive, as demonstrated above
119
, the tentacles of cookies emitted by social plug-ins 
reach far beyond those originating from ad networks. 
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Some of the most widely spread social plug-ins are those offered by Facebook, 
which are often incorporated on numerous websites throughout the Internet.  One of the 
most popular social plug-ins is Facebook’s “Like” button, which is depicted by a thumbs-
up image along with the word “like”120.  This button, which can be freely integrated into a 
website, enables Facebook users to demonstrate that they like a given web page by clicking 
on the “Like” button – information which will then appear as a link on their friends’ news 
feed, allowing them to share this information with their friends, and ultimately holding a 
permanent place on the user’s own Facebook profile121.   
Despite the versatility of the “Like” button, however, this seemingly innocent plug-
in is used to place cookies, analogous to third-party cookies
122
, on the browsers of those 
people who frequent the websites who incorporate the “Like” button – whether or not they 
actually click on the button
123
.  This ultimately allows Facebook to collect information 
about these individuals by tracking and tracing their movement across any and all websites 
containing this button, which has, up to date, reached a total of 2.5 million websites – a 
number which is steadily increasing by about 10,000 sites each day
124
.  The amount of 
information regarding user browsing habits that is available to this company through the 
“Like” button is thus tremendously extensive.  Furthermore, while the data collected is 
generally traced back to an individual’s Facebook account, a person does not forcibly 
require such an account for information to be collected about him in this manner
125
.     
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The manner in which Facebook functions to collect information about individuals in 
this fashion will, however, differ depending on whether or not the individual in question 
possesses a Facebook account.  Those users who possess Facebook accounts are issued a 
cookie with a unique user ID which identifies a particular user throughout the Internet.  As 
a result, similarly to ad networks who access the cookie that it already shares with an 
individual whenever he frequents a site served by the network in question, each time the 
user either logs onto the Facebook website or goes onto a site that has incorporated 
Facebook content such as the “Like” button, the cookie is accessed and information 
concerning the user is immediately sent back to Facebook even if the individual did not 
actually click on the button and regardless of whether or not he happens to be logged on to 
Facebook at the time
126
.  This therefore enables Facebook to collect a significant amount of 
information regarding the browsing habits of Facebook account holders, especially 
considering the proliferation of the “Like” button throughout the Internet127.  
When a person does not possess a Facebook account, on the other hand, there is no 
cookie with a unique user ID that specifically identifies him, and the “Like” button does not 
emit cookies simply by being incorporated into a website.  However, another one of 
Facebook’s social plug-ins, known as the Facebook Connect button, which allows users to 
connect to a particular site through their Facebook account, does issue a cookie to those 
who are not account holders.  As a result, from the moment in which an individual browses 
through a site which contains the Connect button, they will be identified by this entity in 
the future, and each time they visit a website with the “Like” button, or any other Facebook 
content, data regarding the individual’s browsing history will be accessible to Facebook128. 
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The possibility of an individual browsing a site that contains the Facebook Connect 
application, causing him to ultimately end up sharing a cookie with this entity, is actually 
quite considerable.  Two years following its launch by Facebook, the Connect button was 
incorporated into over two million sites – a number which is increasing exponentially129.  
Many of the sites which integrate Facebook Connect are frequently utilized by Internet 
users for practical purposes, such as www.canada411.ca, where individuals often search for 
the telephone numbers of businesses or individuals.  The possibility of obtaining 
information regarding the browsing habits of individuals who do not possess a Facebook 
account is therefore quite substantial, simply due to the extensive incorporation of the 
Facebook Connect button into websites throughout the Internet. 
An individual who does not possess a Facebook account, and has his information 
gathered in the above described manner, but later decides to sign up to Facebook, will find 
all the data previously collected about him linked to the new cookie with the unique user ID 
issued by Facebook upon the opening of his new account
130
.  What happens is that, when 
this individual takes the necessary steps to open a Facebook account, the site will issue a 
cookie with a unique user ID to this new user, and the cookie in question will make the 
connection with the cookie previously issued by Facebook, thus ensuring that this entity 
does not lose all the data it has already collected about the individual in question
131
.   
Facebook, however, does not stop merely at tracking users through cookies on the 
browsers of their desktop computers; in the event that a user connects to this website 
through the use of his laptop or smart phone, these devices are recognized as belonging to 
that particular individual
132
.  Facebook is therefore able to track users in their daily routines 
by being connected to these individuals through devices they use on a constant basis.  This 
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ultimately results in the creation of very personalized profiles of these people, allowing the 
site to cater to their desires by targeting them with advertisements that are of particular 
interest to them
133
.  This SNW thus achieves the same goal as ad networks, but due to its 
proliferation, it has a much farther reach.    
Facebook is not the only entity that provides social plug-ins on other websites, 
however.  As for other plug-ins, such as Twitter’s Tweet button, the Digg button, and 
Google’s Buzz, their reach is not as extensive as that of Facebook134.  The reason for this is 
because they function differently.  The Digg button and Google’s Buzz, for example, do not 
possess a plug-in like the Facebook Connect button that can automatically issue a cookie to 
an individual without that person possessing an account on their site, therefore limiting 
their access solely to members of their websites
135
.  Twitter, on the other hand, only issues 
cookies to those individuals who have visited their homepage
136
.  Otherwise, this entity 
only has access to individuals who actually possess accounts on their site
137
.  Regardless of 
which SNW’s reach is greater, however, it is quite clear that cookies are extremely 
versatile, and their ability to gather data about individuals is quite extensive.   
While the plug-ins issued by SNWs emit cookies that have the ability to determine a 
rather significant amount of information about Internet users, this is not the only tool 
available to marketers through these types of sites that enrich them with this kind of data; 
the Social Graphs created by these types of websites also serve to provide information 
about individuals, but rather with regards to their entire social network.  These graphs 
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demonstrate an individual’s connections based on elements that he has in common with his 
friends and acquaintances, thus providing marketers with access, not only to information 
about that particular individual, but also about all of the friends that are included in this 
person’s Social Graph – whether or not this person’s friends consent to this use of their 
information
138
.  As such, even if marketers do not directly have access to the information of 
the person’s friends, a quick analysis of his Social Graph will demonstrate the elements he 
has in common with his acquaintances and thus provide marketers with data that will allow 
them to infer the preferences of these individuals as well.   
Furthermore, in addition to the data that is available to marketers through the Social 
Graph, they may also be in the position of viewing more excessive amounts of information 
on the profiles of individuals based on the degree to which the user enables his profile to be 
visible to third parties.  Essentially, depending on the SNW in question, the visibility of 
user profiles will differ.  Some websites make user profiles visible to everyone, whether 
they are connected to that network or not, while others only permit users who have 
befriended one another on the website to view each other’s profiles but leave information 
such as name and the photo of the individual publicly available, while others still, leave the 
user with the choice of whether or not he would like his profile to be made public or remain 
private
139
.  In cases where visibility is enabled, marketers thus possess access to a great deal 
of information that can aid them in determining the preferences of consumers. 
* * * 
Online tracking tools are therefore extremely efficient in their ability to determine 
large amounts of data regarding the desires and interests of Internet users, which is then 
utilized by marketers to target these users with advertisements that fit those preferences.  
While the use of these tools may be extremely beneficial to marketers as they enable them 
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to better circumscribe their audience, they do present certain implications with regards to 
privacy protection that we will address in further detail in the next part of this thesis
140
.   
Despite the privacy issues with respect to the use of such tools to aggregate user 
information, however, marketers do not often stop at collecting information regarding the 
personal preferences of users by tracking them online.  While this form of tracking can be 
efficiently used to advertise to individuals while they surf the Web, it can prove to be even 
more successful should the information acquired through online tracking tools be used to 
provide individuals with location-specific advertisements that appeal to their interests on 
their cellular telephones.  The next section of this chapter will therefore be dedicated to a 
thorough discussion of mobile advertising. 
Section 2  Tracking in the Physical World:  Mobile Advertising 
Similarly to online behavioural tracking tools, there exist certain tools that enable 
consumers to be tracked throughout the physical world
141
.  These are employed to follow 
the daily habits of consumers, ultimately using both their location and any data relative to 
the establishments they frequent in order to target them with advertisements on their 
Internet enabled cellular telephones based on this information – a practice known as mobile 
advertising. This section will thus be dedicated to providing a detailed description of the 
various mobile tracking tools that render it possible to track and target consumers in such a 
fashion, namely (1) GPS, (2) Signal Triangulation Systems and Wi-Fi Positioning Systems 
and (3) Location-Based Social Networks, in light of the manner in which these tools are 
used to efficiently market to consumers. 
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Subsection 1  Global Positioning Systems 
Nearly all cellular telephones in the present day and age are equipped with Global 
Positioning Systems
142
, which render it possible for the geographic position of individuals 
to be pinpointed anywhere around the globe within 3 metres
143
.  GPS makes use of 24 
different satellites that orbit the earth and serve to broadcast precise time signals
144
.  In 
practice, these signals are transmitted between the various satellites and the global 
positioning chips contained in mobile phones, calculating the amount of time it takes for 
these signals to travel between these two points
145
.  The determination of the point of 
convergence of four different satellite signals received simultaneously permits the cellular 
telephone’s three-dimensional location to be calculated almost precisely146, ultimately 
rendering it possible to pinpoint the various movements of the owner of that particular 
phone on a daily basis
147
. 
This particular tool for tracking individuals is used by Nimbuzz, a mobile instant 
messaging and voice over IP company, which is becoming increasingly popular with 100 
million users worldwide as at August 2, 2012, seeing an increase of 50 million users since 
the previous year
148.  Nimbuzz is a free application that “is available across all major 
platforms such as Symbian, iPhone, iPod touch, Android, BlackBerry, J2ME, as well as on 
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Windows and Mac desktop computers and enables users to enjoy free chatting, mobile 
[and] video calls, […] instant messaging and social networking”149.  Through its 
application, this company provides location-based advertising services by tracking an 
individual’s location through the GPS embedded in his mobile device and then targeting 
him with ads relative to his physical position as well as his personal preferences to better 
appeal to his desires and ensure that the ads presented to him are relevant
150
. 
Alternatively, GPS is also utilized for mobile advertising purposes by creating geo-
fences, which is the formation of geographical boundaries utilizing global positioning 
technology that “[allows] an administrator to set up triggers so when a device crosses a 
geofence and enters the boundaries defined by the administrator, [a text message] or email 
alert is sent”151.  This particular technology is one of the tracking tools utilized by the 
cellular telephone service provider, O2 Media, for its location-based advertising services
152
.  
The telecommunications company in question contracts with various businesses and 
ultimately serves advertisements on their behalf onto the mobile devices of over one 
million of O2’s clients who opted in to the service153.  Amongst the numerous entities to 
sign agreements with O2 are Starbucks and L’Oreal.  The customers of the 
telecommunications company that demonstrate an interest in food and drink will receive a 
text message on their cellular telephone when they enter Starbucks’ geo-fenced areas, 
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offering them a discount in the event that they purchase a beverage
154
.  The agreement 
signed with L’Oreal, on the other hand, involved the United Kingdom pharmacy chain 
Superdrug that carries L’Oreal beauty products155.  Similarly to the case of Starbucks, 
customers interested in beauty and hair care products will be targeted with a text message 
regarding L’Oreal’s merchandise when they enter Superdrug’s geo-fenced areas, offering 
them a buy-one-get-one-free voucher on L’Oreal’s Elvive hair care products156.   
Subsection 2  Signal Triangulation Systems and Wi-Fi Positioning Systems 
There are two other positioning systems that function similarly to GPS, but rather 
than using signals generated between satellites and GPS devices, these systems use signals 
generated by cellular receiving towers or Wi-Fi access points and are known as Signal 
Triangulation Systems and Wi-Fi Positioning Systems respectively.  To begin with, Signal 
Triangulation Systems “track the geographic locations and Web surfing behaviours of 
mobile phone users”157, using the signals generated between the unique Mobile 
Identification Numbers, which is an unchangeable number assigned by the manufacturer to 
each mobile phone
158
, and the cellular receiving towers
159
.  When two or more such signals 
are received by these cellular towers from the same cellular phone, meaning that the signals 
in question can all be linked back to the same unique Mobile Identification Number, the 
towers compare these signals, allowing the location of the mobile phone in question to be 
pinpointed
160
.  The process used to identify the location of the cellular phone using Signal 
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Triangulation Systems is thus very similar to the one that is used by GPS, but simply 
employs different signals. 
While the process used by Wi-Fi Positioning Systems is also rather analogous to the 
one used by GPS, in that it uses the signals transmitted between Wi-Fi access points and 
Wi-Fi enabled cellular telephones to determine the location of the devices in question
161
, 
this system requires additional steps to ensure its proper functioning
162
.   Essentially, while 
the locations of satellites and cellular receiving towers are known, the locations of Wi-Fi 
access points are not.  As a result, to be in the position of using this system to locate 
cellular telephone users, a database containing Wi-Fi access points must be created
163
.  This 
database is generally produced using a technique called “wardriving”, which is a practice 
whereby a portable computer or a Portable Digital Assistant is used to search a particular 
area for Wi-Fi networks while travelling by car
164
. At this point, the Media Access Control 
Address
165
, which is the particular number assigned to each network device as well as all 
other devices that are able to connect to a network
166
, of each Wi-Fi access point is 
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collected
167
.  This number is then linked to the precise location at which this signal became 
available, as well as the signal strength in that particular location, and this information is 
then uploaded to the database
168
.   
It must be pointed out, however, that while the technique of wardriving is used with 
the ultimate goal of being able to track the physical location of individuals, the process 
involved in the collection of Wi-Fi access points presents certain risks with regards to the 
acquisition of the personal information of individuals as well.  It is a rather recent 
occurrence with regards to Google that brought this risk to our attention when, in May 
2010, “Google discovered that it had [inadvertently] been collecting payload data from 
unsecured wireless networks as part of its collection of Wi-Fi data [though their intention 
had only been to collect publicly broadcast SSID information and MAC addresses]”169.  A 
large amount of the payload data that had been collected included “the full names, 
telephone numbers, and addresses of many Canadians [as well as] complete email 
messages, along with email headers, IP addresses, machine hostnames, and the contents of 
cookies, instant messages and chat sessions”170 and even certain “particular sensitive 
information, including computer login credentials (i.e., usernames and passwords), the 
details of legal infractions, and certain medical listings”171. 
These risks aside, it is only upon the accumulation of a sufficient amount of Wi-Fi 
access points within the database that this data can be employed to pinpoint the location of 
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various devices, including cellular telephones
172
.  The position of these devices is 
determined by establishing the various access points that are in the same general range as 
the device at that moment, then determining the MAC Addresses linked to each one of 
these access points, and finally, triangulating the device’s precise location using the 
positions associated with these addresses
173
.  The more Wi-Fi access points contained in a 
given database, the more accurate the determined position of the device will be
174
.   
The efficient use of Wi-Fi Positioning Systems for location-based advertising can be 
illustrated by the examples of O2 Media and JiWire.  To begin with, O2 set up a number of 
free public Wi-Fi hotspots across the city of London upon which it promoted the company 
Wall’s Ice Cream175.  Where this gets more interesting, however, is that these 
advertisements only appeared on O2’s Wi-Fi homepage throughout the summer months 
when the temperature reached a certain level, essentially “[combining] two fast-emerging 
trends in digital media: location-based and contextual marketing”176 to create a practice 
referred to as  Thermal Targeted Proximity Messaging
177
. 
Even more impressive is the campaign created by a location-based advertising 
company called JiWire.  This enterprise utilizes a Wi-Fi Positioning System to keep track 
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of the various locations frequented by individuals
178
 and create something called a Location 
Graph, which is “a revolutionary mobile solution that [assigns] audience profiles based on 
past and present locations. [The] data provides a unique look at how a person's behavior is 
interconnected with their locations and each other”179.  The location information of 
individuals is then combined with user data emanating from third-parties, in turn allowing 
them to determine various target audiences.  For example, JiWire’s Location Graph has 
demonstrated that   
“sixty percent of women eat at the same three restaurants each month[;] 
Moms who go to beauty salons are also likely to visit health clubs, child 
care centers, counseling services and restaurants[;] Twenty-three percent of 
people who go to Peet’s Coffee and Tea also go to Starbucks[;] Thirty 
percent of people who shopped at Best Buy also shopped at a competitor’s 
location.”180 
This information therefore allows JiWire to target individuals with advertisements that are 
relevant to both their desires as well as their location at a given moment in time
181
.  For 
example, if an individual who had previously frequented Peet’s Coffee and Tea happens to 
be located near a Starbucks, JiWire would target that individual with an ad for this coffee 
shop based on the correlation between the two demonstrated by its Location Graph.   
Subsection 3  Location-Based Social Networks 
Location-based Social Networks
182
 are very similar to SNWs
183
 in that they allow 
individuals to connect with one another.  LBSNs, however, take matters one step further.  
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Not only can users contact their acquaintances and share profile information, but these 
social networks also render it possible for individuals to share their particular location at 
any given moment with their network friends, as well as the location of any of their friends 
who happen to be accompanying them.  This thus permits people to connect, not only based 
on whatever information they provide regarding their personality and preferences, but also 
based on their location by “[allowing] users to see where their friends are, to search 
location-tagged content within their social graph, and to meet others nearby”184. 
These types of social networks are also extremely sophisticated and accurate in the 
location information they provide.  They function using GPS, Signal Triangulation or Wi-
Fi Positioning Systems to determine an individual’s precise location, allowing these users 
to share this data with their friends on their social network
185
.    With the increased use of 
smartphones containing Internet capabilities, these types of social networks have become 
much more accessible to users and thus tremendously popular
186
.  It has been estimated that 
by the year 2013, 82 million users will have subscribed to LBSNs worldwide
187
.   
One of the most popular LBSNs is Foursquare with over twenty million users, a 
number that doubled in less than a year, and two billion check-ins as at April 27, 2012
188
. 
This Social Network recently updated its application to include what it calls “Radar”.  
According to the company’s blog,  
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“Now, if you follow a list, like the 101 Best Dishes of 2011, foursquare will 
let you know when you’re next to one. Or you save that yoga studio to your 
To-Do List (because you really want to try it); we can remind you when 
you’re close. Or, better yet, if you’re driving home and three of your friends 
are getting together nearby, we’ll tell you so you can meet up. The app 
doesn’t even have to be open, it just works. We call it foursquare Radar, 
because it finds things nearby that you normally wouldn’t know about.”189 
* * * 
Mobile tracking tools thus make it possible for businesses to track the every move 
of individuals in the physical world, whether through data these users voluntarily provide 
through their use of LBSNs, or through their GPS enabled mobile telephones or the Signal 
Triangulation System or Wi-Fi Positioning System rendered possible through cellular 
phones.  The information concerning the various locations of users is combined with the 
data regarding their personal preferences collected using cookies
190
, DPI
191
 and SNWs
192
, 
so as to ultimately target them with location specific advertisements using this information.     
With the unbelievable proliferation of mobile tracking tools, it has become nearly 
effortless to locate individuals and target them with advertisements tailored to their 
interests, ultimately serving to “maximize [their] engagement with products and 
services”193. The ability to attract the business of customers in such a manner is therefore 
rather extensive, and the market resulting from this practice is expected to reach 2.5 billion 
dollars by the year 2015
194
.  However, despite the fact that the market for this form of 
advertising is gradually increasing, it does not change the fact that tracking the location of 
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individuals and targeting them with advertisements in such a manner may effectively 
violate their privacy, as we will discuss in further detail in Part II of this thesis
195
. 
* * * 
When taken together, both online tracking tools as well as mobile tracking tools 
make it possible to determine precisely what a consumer wants, and present him with an 
offer to acquire the object of his desire at the exact right moment – such as when he is near 
a location which can help him obtain what he wishes.  The versatility of these tools from a 
marketing perspective is therefore undeniable; they provide marketers with the precise 
information they require to successfully market to individuals and prevent them from 
having to waste their resources on people upon whom the products or services being 
advertised would be lost.  Due to its highly beneficial nature for enterprises, the use of these 
tools has therefore become rather common, as illustrated by the numerous examples 
provided throughout this chapter.  On the other hand, the issues with regards to the privacy 
protection of individuals that the use of such tools presents are also indisputable, as will be 
discussed in further detail below
196
. 
However, while tracking and targeting users using both online and mobile tracking 
tools is very valuable to marketers, the use of these tools for marketing purposes merely 
represents a single factor in the practice of Internet marketing.  Though the benefit of 
targeting users cannot be denied, it can only be used by marketers to find users and present 
them with what the marketers believe they want, as inferred by their use of the Internet.  In 
the event that consumers desire something that marketers have not endeavoured to present 
them with, on the other hand, the users must be in the position of finding what they are 
searching for.  Reaching users is therefore just as important as targeting them, and we will 
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thus dedicate the next chapter of this thesis to an in-depth discussion of the various Internet 
marketing strategies used to simplify a consumer’s search. 
Chapter 2  Reaching Users 
While tracking users is very useful in providing a certain insight into a consumer’s 
personality, the benefit of being able to reach users cannot be ignored from a marketing 
perspective.  Without maintaining a certain level of contact with a user, the efficiency of 
marketing is inevitably reduced.  This chapter will therefore be dedicated to an in-depth 
discussion of the various manners in which marketers may reach consumers, either through 
(1) using social media to converse with them or through (2) ensuring that they are 
accessible to users via search engines.  
Section 1  Conversing With Users:  Social Media Marketing 
The ability of users to participate through the use of social media, by both creating 
and sharing content, enables marketers to engage individuals on such platforms and to 
converse with them in the goal of increasing brand awareness and acquiring consumer input 
and ideas
197
 – a strategy known as Social Media Marketing198.  This form of marketing is 
tremendously useful to businesses.  While targeted marketing does provide marketers with 
a certain insight into the personality, preferences and habits of individuals, SMM provides a 
forum upon which consumers voluntarily provide marketers with a glimpse into their mind 
– their opinions, their thoughts and their true desires – simply by enabling a conversation to 
be created between both marketers and consumers. This section will therefore examine two 
particular tools used for this form of marketing, namely (1) blogs and micro-blogs, and (2) 
SNWs, and ultimately outline the various manners, both licit and illicit, in which these tools 
are utilized by businesses. 
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Subsection 1  Blogs and Micro-blogs 
A blog, a term which has arisen as a shortened version of the words “Web log”, is a 
form of social media that has been adopted by many corporations as a part of their 
marketing strategy.  Blogs are platforms upon which companies can post information about 
themselves and even provide links to other content on the Internet, such as web pages or 
videos and other rich media content, viewable to anyone on the web, and which are updated 
on a regular basis
199
.  All of the entries ever posted on blogs are accessible on the site and 
appear in reverse chronological order, meaning the latest entry appears first, with archived 
entries available through links at the bottom or sides of the page
200
.  Not only do blogs 
contain the entries posted by the originator of the blog in question, but they also allow for 
the possibility of individuals who read the blog to leave comments, either in the form of 
questions, opinions or suggestions
201
.   
Corporate blogging has become an extremely popular practice.  In 2011, the 
percentage of businesses that employed blogs for their marketing strategy was 65% – which 
represents a 27% increase from the year 2009
202
.  Approximately 57% of the companies 
that use blogs to interact with their customers have reported that they have acquired new 
customers directly from their blogs
203
.  While 85% of companies find that blogs are very 
useful to their business, 27% of them consider blogs to be critical to their business
204
.  
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While blogging is extremely popular in this day and age, another phenomenon 
known as micro-blogging is also on the rise.  Similarly to blogging, micro-blogging allows 
individuals to share opinions and ideas, but in a much more shortened format, often limited 
to 140 characters.  Additionally, contrary to blogs, which are generally updated once every 
few days, individuals using micro-blogs often post commentary several times a day
205
.  In 
such a way, micro-blogging “fulfills a need for an even faster [and more frequent] mode of 
communication”206.  The most common forum for micro-blogging is presently the social 
media service known as Twitter.  This service is currently provided to over 200 million 
subscribed users who post a combined amount of 110 million micro-blogs per day
207
.  
Micro-blogging is thus also quite a popular form of social media and is of as much use to 
corporations as are blogs. 
While blogs and micro-blogs are used by corporations to provide consumers with 
updates about matters that may concern them, they also supply a venue that promotes 
participation
208
 by enabling comments to be made by these individuals
209
. These comments 
are “integrated into a post, resulting in a themed conversation between the corporate, the 
user (consumer) and other users (consumers) who have posted a comment, forming an 
interesting supplement to the post hosted by the organization”210.  
This form of communication between corporations and consumers is becoming very 
common.  For example, many CEO’s and employees of major corporations have created 
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blogs as a means to maintain public relations, and they use these forums to permit their 
consumers to ask them questions or provide suggestions
211
.  This type of consumer 
participation is also promoted on many newspaper websites that permit their readers to 
comment on articles or blog posts written by their reporters
212
.  There are even many 
testimonial websites upon which consumers may rate various establishments and recount 
their experiences to their fellow consumers, which also serve to incite user participation.     
By communicating with individuals in such a manner, marketers are able to increase 
company and brand awareness
213, while also receiving feedback about a business’s 
products or services, or even exchanging ideas for new products or services with customers, 
ultimately rendering it possible for them to be in the position of providing users with what 
they truly want.  Not only does this manner of maintaining a conversation with consumers 
incite their loyalty by giving weight to their opinions thus motivating them to “help 
promote the company and get the attention of mainstream media”214, but it also enables 
businesses to remain relevant to their customers and ultimately ensures that their products 
or services move forward with the times and the ever-changing desires of their audience
215
.   
Yet, while social media is a primary tool that is often used by businesses to 
communicate with their audience, serving to increase brand awareness and reach out to 
consumers for brand ideas
216
, businesses do not always use this tool in a suitable manner.  
There are several examples where companies have utilized social media inappropriately, 
either to deceive consumers or to overturn their competitors.   
To begin with, there have been several cases where “some firms have [tried] to con 
the consumer by pushing their own propaganda on websites while pretending to be the 
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voice of the people”217.  An example of such an occurrence took place in April 2005 where 
a subsidiary of the cosmetics company L’Oreal Paris, Laboratoires Vichy, created a fake 
blog supposedly produced by a woman named Claire who spoke of her so-called positive 
experiences regarding her use of a Vichy anti-wrinkle product
218
.  Suspicions regarding 
Claire’s true identity began to arise as a result of the blog’s structure, which made it appear 
as if it had been fabricated by a professional rather than by an ordinary consumer
219
.  After 
a large number of individuals aired their doubts on various online blogs, a representative of 
Vichy finally came forth and admitted that Claire was a fictional character created by an 
advertising agency simply to promote Vichy’s products to other consumers220, ultimately 
asking for the forgiveness of both their clients as well as the members of the blogosphere 
for their deceitful behaviour
221
.  The consequences suffered by Vichy as a result of this 
occurrence revolve around the company being publicly ridiculed and labelled non-credible, 
thus experiencing a certain decline in their previously stellar reputation
222
.   
Unfortunately, this was not the last instance in which such a fiasco occurred – a year 
following Vichy’s creation of a fake blog, Wal-Mart decided to produce one itself223.  Their 
blog, called Wal-Marting Across America, was supposedly created by a couple, Jim and 
Laura, traveling across the United States and blogging about their positive Wal-Mart 
experiences along the way
224
.  When every Wal-Mart employee interviewed by the couple 
spoke only about how much they love working at the store, suspicions began to arise 
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simply because Wal-Mart’s history with employee relations is said to leave much to be 
desired
225
.  Eventually, it was uncovered that Jim was a photographer for the Washington 
Post and Laura was a freelance writer
226
, and not only did Wal-Mart fund their entire trip, 
but they also provided them with additional financial incentive on the side
227
.  Similarly to 
the case of Vichy, however, Wal-Mart did not suffer any adverse effects as a result of the 
fake blog that they funded
228
.  
Not too long after that, the popular electronics company, Sony, produced a fake 
blog upon which individuals, who were supposedly regular consumers, wrote about their 
adamant desire to receive a Playstation Portable game console for Christmas
229
.  It was 
quickly discovered that the individuals posting these comments were not ordinary 
consumers and that the blog was in fact created by a marketing firm hired by Sony for 
precisely this purpose
230
.  Aside from emitting an official apology, however, no legal 
consequences were suffered by Sony for their creation of this fake blog. 
These fake blogs were created by the companies in question so as to appeal to their 
customers by essentially providing them with false testimonials regarding the grandiosity of 
their products and services.  The use of social media in such a manner, however, presents 
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certain issues from a consumer protection law perspective, namely with regards to false 
advertising, which will be discussed in further detail in the next part of this thesis
231
. 
Subsection 2  Social Network Websites:  Business Profiles 
SNWs, as defined above
232
, are not only limited to the use by individuals through 
the creation of personal profiles allowing them to maintain contact with their friends and 
acquaintances, but can also be used by businesses to create company profiles that allow 
their customers to interact with them on a more personal basis
233
.  Similarly to personal 
profiles, the profiles they create describe their business and can be followed by other users 
who are members of the same SNW, should they so desire
234
.  This allows these users to 
follow the posts emitted upon the profile of the business in question and ultimately 
contribute their own comments and opinions
235
. 
While there are cases in which companies created fake blogs to appeal to their 
consumers, as discussed above
236
, it is not unheard of for businesses to join a SNW and 
create a page upon which it interacts with its consumers, while having their employees 
assume false identities and post positive comments about the company’s products or 
services.  This is precisely what was orchestrated by Kohl’s, whose Vice President of 
Marketing and the Group Director of the advertising agency working with Kohl’s were 
impersonating consumers and sharing tales regarding the significant amount of money they 
saved during their “shopping experiences” at Kohl’s237.  Thus, while creating fake blogs is 
more common than it should be, the act of high ranking company management assuming 
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the identity of consumers to promote their company is also quite a likely occurrence and, 
similarly to the case of fake company blogs, poses consumer protection issues as well
238
. 
In the past, however, business officials have not only assumed false identities with 
the purpose of deceiving their consumers, but have done so with the aim of denigrating 
their competitors as well.  Such an occurrence took place in 2007 where Whole Foods 
Market’s Chief Executive Officer participated in a Yahoo! chat forum under a false identity 
which he used to attack his company’s competitor, Wild Oats Markets, for which an offer 
to purchase was made by Whole Foods later on that year
239.  Comments such as “[t]he end 
game is now underway for [Wild Oats.] […] Whole Foods is systematically destroying 
their viability as a business – market by market, city by city”240 and “Bankruptcy remains a 
distinct possibility [for Wild Oats] IMO if the business isn't sold within the next few 
years”241 were made by Whole Foods’ CEO, ultimately attempting to devaluate Wild Oats 
shares and hurt their business
242
. This merger was, however, blocked by the Federal Trade 
Commission, whose lawsuit against Whole Foods is pending in United States District Court 
in Washington
243
.    
Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident, and has actually become quite an 
epidemic in some countries around the world, particularly China.  In the year 2010, 
“Chinese authorities […] uncovered several cases in which major companies paid members 
of [a group of people, known as the] online army[,] to flood influential message boards, 
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blogs and chat rooms with false information about competitors”244.  One such organization 
was used by Mengniu, China’s leading dairy company, who paid marketers to spread a 
rumour about its largest competitor, Yili, regarding their apparent use of deep-sea fish oil in 
their children’s milk products which could supposedly cause them to prematurely go 
through puberty
245
.  This rumour ultimately resulted in the swift plummeting of Yili’s sales 
of children’s products246.  The manager at Mengniu in charge of this scheme as well as the 
employees of the marketing agency involved in it were arrested
247
 and convicted to prison 
sentences ranging from 25 days to one year
248
. 
Even more recently, it was discovered that one of the world’s largest SNWs, 
Facebook, orchestrated such a scheme against Google’s Social Circles’ feature249.  
Facebook paid a public relations firm to supply bloggers with negative stories about 
Google’s new feature, apparently bringing forth certain alleged privacy concerns, and even 
offer to write those stories in their place
250
 – a scheme which came to light after one of the 
bloggers approached by the marketing firm in question publicized the issue online
251
.  
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Facebook claimed that it was merely further exposing information that was already public 
and as such was not faced with any further consequences
252
. 
This type of behaviour, whereby companies utilize social media platforms to create 
smear campaigns against their competitors, poses certain legal issues as these actions can 
be viewed as trade libel – an occurrence which companies are protected from by law.  
Those enterprises responsible for the communication and publication of negative statements 
against their competitors could therefore likely find themselves implicated in a lawsuit, as 
will be further discussed in Part II of this thesis
253
.  
* * * 
SMM is thus a double edged sword.  While it is true that many companies use this 
form of marketing honestly, simply to communicate with their consumers and increase 
brand awareness, there are many businesses whose presence in online social media forums 
is not nearly as forthcoming and transparent – as is evidenced by the various underhanded 
practices described in the examples provided above.  The use of SMM as a marketing 
strategy is thus one whose employment, while it has a great deal of potential, is not nearly 
as clear cut as consumers, as well as affected competitors, might like it to be. 
While SMM provides marketers with the opportunity to reach consumers by 
engaging in online conversations with them upon various platforms, it is not the only form 
of marketing that provides the possibility of reaching users.   The potential to reach users 
effectively is also provided through Search Engine Marketing, another form of marketing 
that will be discussed in further detail in the next section.    
                                                 
252
 Josh HALLIDAY, “Facebook paid PR firm to smear Google”, May 12, 2011, online:  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/may/12/facebook-pr-firm-google> (site consulted on August 
27, 2012). 
253
 Infra, p. 126-139. 
  
 
53
Section 2  Being Accessible to Users:  Search Engine Marketing 
As is well-known, search engines are platforms upon which millions of websites 
throughout the Web are indexed so that Internet users may search and find any data they 
like.  For businesses, being easily accessible to users through such platforms is one of the 
keys to their success.  This feat is often achieved through a practice known as Search 
Engine Marketing
254, which utilizes various tools to place the business’s website in a good 
position on the search engines’ index and ultimately increase both traffic to that site and its 
visibility on the Web
255
.  Though SEM tools are varied, we will limit our discussion to two 
main elements with respect to this practice, namely (1) those upon which the visibility of 
websites in search engines are based, and (2) the use of a particular tool known as keyword 
advertising in light of the manner in which companies use these tools for marketing 
purposes.  
Subsection 1  Visibility 
The success of businesses in the modern age of the Internet is often directly linked 
to their visibility in online search engines.  Regardless of their creation of the most visually 
attractive and user friendly website, it will be impossible for any business to relate to their 
customers should these individuals be unable to find them online
256
. That being said, 
however, the race to visibility on the Internet is a difficult one, as it has been discovered 
that users often only look at the first 20 postings listed by a search engine
257
.   
The order of appearance of search results, and thus the ultimate visibility of a site on 
the Internet, is based on the manner in which search engines function.  Search engines 
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index all of the Web pages throughout the Web based on two elements
258
: relevance to the 
search, which usually revolves around the correlation between the query performed and the 
keywords associated with the site
259
, and overall importance, which generally increases 
relatively to the number of links leading to that page from other sites or Web pages
260
.   
Both of these elements, and thus the ultimate visibility, of a business’s website are 
determined by the search engine’s algorithm.  As a result, should a business want to 
increase their visibility online, they must attempt to appeal to this algorithm, using various 
tactics, to “ensure that [it] gives the page a higher score in comparison to other pages that 
qualify to be displayed in the search-results”261.  The tactics that are able to achieve this 
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feat revolve around the proper choice of keywords
262
 and increasing keyword density 
throughout the content of the site
263
.   Additionally, increasing both the quantity
264
 and 
quality of links leading to a site will also serve to improve its position in search results, 
especially when those links originate from sites considered authoritative by search engines, 
such as those of government or educational institutions
265
.   
While modifying keywords and increasing the number of links leading to a site in a 
reasonable manner is considered an acceptable practice, there are certain abusive tactics 
that are used by website owners to attempt to manipulate a search engine’s algorithm into 
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providing them with a higher ranking using rather backhanded techniques, commonly 
referred to as black hat SEM methods.  These practices are generally used in the hopes of 
increasing a business’s website rankings at the detriment of its competitors, but can rather 
serve to negatively affect the position of a site on a search engine.   
There have been several examples of the use of black hat SEM tactics by companies 
that have come to light over the years.  For instance, it was discovered in early 2006 that 
BMW was using a particular black hat practice known as “doorway pages” to increase 
traffic to its website
266
 “which exist to attract search engines [by using various search 
terms] and then redirect traffic to a different site”267 essentially “[tricking] search engines 
into sending users to Web sites that are not directly related to the search terms they are 
searching for”268.  BMW’s use of this tactic resulted in its being removed from Google’s 
index and therefore not appearing in the search engine’s results269.   
With regards to the use of this technique, however, it is important to point out that 
while in this case BMW placed keywords such as “new cars” and “used cars” in the 
offending doorway pages, it has not been unheard of for sites to use the trademarks of other 
companies in these pages to direct the traffic of those companies’ sites onto their own.  
Since these doorway pages are designed solely for search engine ranking purposes, thus 
remaining invisible to Internet users, these individuals may be led to believe that the page 
they have landed on is associated with the trademark they have searched
270
.  The use of this 
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tactic in such a manner may thus present certain issues with regards to trademark 
infringement, as will be discussed in further detail below
271
. 
Another company, Overstock.com, was caught using black hat practices in February 
2011 when it attempted to increase the links leading to its site
272
 by “[offering] students and 
faculty discounts in exchange for posting links from college and university websites to 
Overtock.com”273.  Due to the authoritative nature of the sites of educational institutions274, 
these links managed to get Overstock.com a top spot in search results for several generic 
terms such as “vacuum cleaners” and “laptop computers”275.  While websites are permitted 
to increase the links leading to their site in an honest manner, such as by interlinking their 
own websites or the pages thereon, artificially increasing the number of links in order to 
enhance a site’s importance276 by remunerating the individuals who create them is 
forbidden by Google and considered to be a black hat practice
277
.  As such, Overstock was 
penalized by Google, resulting in them sinking low down in the list of search results
278
. 
  Even more recently, in September 2012, it was discovered that a string of nineteen 
websites run by the family members of a British politician, Grant Shapps, were using a 
black hat technique called “scraping”, which revolves around the duplication of the content 
of other sites that relate to keywords relevant to the topic of their site and the placement of 
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that material on their own website
279
.  The use of this practice was enabled by a software 
developed by a company owned by the politician in question
280
.  Their main goal in using 
this tactic was to rise higher in the search results appearing on Google and ultimately 
increase their advertising revenue by boosting traffic to their site, but only resulted in 
Google penalizing them and reducing their rank in the search engine results
281
.  However, it 
is important to note that the use of this tactic has also been known to result in the removal 
of the original site from the search engine’s index, as the indexing software is programmed 
to omit any duplicate site for the purposes of avoiding redundant listings
282
, and in so doing 
may inadvertently remove the original site from the list of results if it has been scraped
283
. 
These last two examples, whereby websites seek to artificially increase their 
rankings in search engine results or behave in a manner that may have another site removed 
from the search engine’s index, may consist of acts of unfair competition, as will be 
discussed in further detail in Part II of this thesis
284
.  Essentially, often times, these tactics 
tend to raise a site’s ranking at the detriment of its competitors by using these dishonest 
techniques
285
.  It is thus due to the unjust, and potentially illegal, nature of these tactics that 
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causes the use of black hat techniques to be frowned upon in the cyber society
286
, which is 
even more evident by the consequences emitted by Google to offending websites. 
Subsection 2  Keyword Advertising 
Keyword advertising is a form of SEM whereby a website owner purchases certain 
keywords upon which he will have an advantage over all other sites by “being presented 
together with – usually above and/or alongside – other unsponsored or “natural” search 
results concerning those keyword terms”287.  Keyword advertising is often compared to the 
practice of using meta-tags, which are keywords that are not visible to the user but are used 
to communicate terms relevant to a site to search engines
288
, as a means to increase a site’s 
ranking in the search results for particular keywords
289
.  The only difference between the 
use of meta-tags and keyword advertising is that the latter requires the payment of a fee.   
The most common example of the adoption of the new advent of keyword 
advertising is the paid listing program developed by Google, known as Adwords, the 
popularity of which is significant.  Its appeal to website owners is undeniable as “[b]y 
paying for a “sponsored link”, a seller improves [his] chances of attracting customers 
because [his] website may appear in a discrete sponsored links section rather than buried 
among organic results”290.  Though the ad format is left to the choice of the purchaser of the 
keywords, the most common format used is that of simple text ads that are similar in format 
to natural search results
291
 and thus seem to be an integral part of those results.   
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It must be pointed out, however, that while using black hat SEM techniques may be 
viewed as a manipulation, as discussed in the previous subsection
292
, it cannot be denied 
that keyword advertising “manipulates search results to artificially prioritize an advertiser’s 
website over other possible results”293 in a similar fashion.  Nevertheless, due to the fact 
that this form of manipulation is endorsed by the search engine itself, it is not viewed as 
negatively as the use of black hat techniques.   
As a result of the general acceptance of keyword advertising, the proliferation of its 
use has become extremely significant in the cyber world.  The most particular use of this 
tool, which has become increasingly popular since this form of advertising was introduced, 
is the purchasing by a website of its competitor’s trademark as a keyword.  As a result, each 
time a user types in that particular trademarked term, the website in question will appear 
higher up in the search results than the website of the company that actually owns the 
trademark in question
294
.  While, after several disputes
295
, Google altered its policy so that 
“[i]f a trademark owner files a complaint with Google about the use of their trademark in 
AdWords ads, Google will investigate and may enforce certain restrictions on the use of 
that trademark in AdWords ads and as keywords”296 the purchase of the trademarks of other 
companies as keywords is still a rather common occurrence.  As such, this practice may fall 
under the gambit of trademark infringement, as will be addressed in further detail below
297
. 
* * * 
The tactical uses of SEM are thus numerous and varied and can be used in many 
different fashions to increase a site’s visibility on search engines, and ultimately its ability 
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to reach its customers.  The success of any site in the virtual world is essentially based on 
its ability to properly use these tactics to garner an online presence.  At the same time, these 
techniques must be used within the boundaries of the law to ensure that the entities utilizing 
it are not ultimately faced with lawsuits for their online behaviour.   
* * * 
The first two chapters of this paper serve to demonstrate that Internet marketing is a 
very large and diverse domain, which includes the use of techniques allowing marketers to 
track individuals throughout both the physical and virtual worlds, while at the same time 
rendering it much simpler for them to be reached by these same individuals at all times.  
The use of such techniques are undoubtedly invaluable to marketers, as they serve to 
increase market efficiency by targeting all their advertising resources towards strategies 
aimed at an audience that is most likely to notice the product or service being offered
298
.   
Yet, while these methods are tremendously useful from a marketing perspective, 
their legal viability is much more questionable.  These tools must thus be used in a manner 
that would ensure the respect of the law, while still allowing the domain of marketing to 
flourish with their use.  In order to achieve this, however, a balance must necessarily be 
established between marketing goals and legal rules – a feat which is tremendously difficult 
to achieve when two such opposing interests are at stake.  The next part of this paper will 
therefore be dedicated to an in-depth discussion of the various legal implications that arise 
from the use of these digital marketing techniques and will ultimately attempt to strike a 
balance between the law and the use of Internet marketing tools.
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PART II THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIGITAL MARKETING 
TECHNIQUES  
The legal implications of the various digital marketing techniques described above 
are numerous and exist with regards to several domains of the law, namely privacy law, 
competition law, trademark law and consumer protection law.  This part will therefore be 
dedicated to (1) providing an outline of privacy laws and their application to the practice of 
targeted marketing, and (2) to illustrating the competition, trademark and consumer 
protection laws and their application to the practices of SMM and SEM, so as to ultimately 
demonstrate the benefits that these laws present to the practice of Internet marketing from 
an economic perspective.   
Chapter 1  Privacy Issues In Internet Marketing 
The right to privacy is a fundamental right that is unequivocally protected by both 
Canadian and Quebec law.  To begin with, while it is true that the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms
299
 does not apply to marketers, it is important to point out that 
sections 7
300
 and 8
301
 of this legislation have been broadly interpreted by the Courts as 
covering a right to privacy from the state
302
.  In Quebec, on the other hand, the right to 
privacy was initially inferred by the Courts based on the notion of fault enshrined in section 
1053 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada
303
, and was later given explicit protection by the 
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Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms
304
 as well as by the Civil Code of 
Quebec
305
.  Additionally, privacy is protected under Quebec law through the Act Respecting 
the Protection of Personal Information in the Privacy Sector
306
 which serves to set the 
parameters that must be respected by companies when dealing with the personal 
information of Quebec citizens. 
Unfortunately, the rise of Internet tracking technology that enables the gathering of 
unbelievable amounts of personal information
307
 has severely threatened the protection of 
this right as prescribed by both Canadian and Quebec legislation.  The existence of this 
technology has given rise to “cyber voyeurism”308, essentially allowing for the invasion of 
the private lives of individuals worldwide
309
 and thus “by this fact rendering possible 
intrusions or divulgations that would have otherwise been inconceivable”310 (our 
translation).  
In light of this new reality and in the hopes of responding to these threats, the 
Federal government adopted both the Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act
311
 and the Act to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian 
economy by regulating certain activities that discourage reliance on electronic means of 
carrying out commercial activities, and to amend the Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission Act, the Competition Act, the Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the Telecommunications Act
312
 as a means to 
further ensure the protection of the privacy of Canadian citizens.  Similarly, the Act to 
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Establish a Legal Framework for Information Technology
313
 was emitted in Quebec in 
order to adapt to the new position we find ourselves in as a result of modern technology and 
contains certain sections meant to ensure privacy protection.   
The possibility of an individual’s privacy being violated in this new technological 
age is significantly increased, especially since the Internet serves to amplify the number of 
situations in which privacy protection must be afforded.  Two such situations to which the 
right to privacy extends are (1) the right to control ones personal information
314
 and (2) the 
right to live in peace and solitude without intrusions nor interruptions
315
 – two violations 
which are enabled by the technological tracking tools used for targeted marketing purposes 
and which will be discussed in further detail heretofore.  
Section 1 The Protection of Personal Information in Canadian and Quebec 
Law and Its Application to the Practice of Targeted Marketing  
The protection of personal information is one of the elements that are safeguarded 
by the right to privacy.  Such a protection is necessary as it is considered as a prelude to 
free, open, and honest communication
316
 – all elements upon which marketers rely to 
acquire the behavioural data of individuals for the purposes of targeted marketing.  A lack 
of privacy protection could create a strain on the behaviour of individuals, resulting in a 
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much more subdued and less open manner, ultimately adversely affecting society as a 
whole
317
, and placing marketers at risk of losing access to this crucial data.   
This effect on the inter-personal communications of individuals could manifest 
itself in one of two ways, the second being more detrimental to marketers than the first, but 
both of which are still severe.  To begin with, minimal privacy safeguards may result in 
increasing preference falsification
318
, which is “the act of misrepresenting one’s genuine 
wants under perceived social pressures”319.  The knowledge that their personal data is not 
kept private, will often cause individuals to adhere to acceptable norms and reject their 
private preferences for the sake of blending in with the majority
320
, which could be harmful 
to the practice of targeted marketing as it would skew behavioural data
321
.   
Even more pressing than the possibility of preference falsification, however, is the 
second possible outcome, where individuals will limit their use of the Internet or mobile 
telephones as a result of privacy concerns, thus severely restraining the amount of 
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behavioural data available to marketers.  To provide an example, many individuals are 
apprehensive about making online purchases as they are concerned that their credit card 
information will not be properly protected, and “[with] additional instances of intrusion, 
that fear will increase.  The harm here is not simply commercial – for if […] individual 
users’ personal files [are targeted], people will reduce their connections to the Internet”322.  
Such an end result would be undesirable to marketers, as it is upon the use of the Internet 
that they depend to obtain the data they require for their purposes, and it is therefore crucial 
for them to adopt an approach that will assuage the fears of Internet users by properly 
protecting their personal information. 
The manner in which the personal information of individuals is protected is outlined 
by the PIPEDA
323
 and the new Anti-Spam Act
324
, on a Canadian level, and the 
ARPPIPS
325
, as well as the C.C.Q.
326
 and the AELFIT
327
, on a Quebec level.  This 
protection is limited to the collection, use and retention of what is considered by the 
PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS as personal information, therefore covering any data collected 
or used for the practice of targeted marketing.   
Depending on the nature of the enterprise or organization gathering the information 
considered by these laws to be personal, however, the law that will apply will differ.  The 
PIPEDA only applies in provinces that have not enacted substantially similar privacy laws, 
and in those that have, it will only apply to the federally regulated private sector and to 
personal information emitted in inter-provincial and international transactions by all 
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organizations engaged in commercial activities
328.  Quebec’s adoption of the ARPPIPS 
therefore renders the PIPEDA inapplicable upon the territory of that province except with 
regards to those two particular sectors.   
While the PIPEDA applies to any organization that collects information in the 
course of commercial activity
329
, the ARPPIPS applies to all private sector enterprises 
which is defined by article 1525 C.C.Q as “[t]he carrying on by one or more persons of an 
organized economic activity, whether or not it is commercial in nature, consisting of 
producing, administering or alienating property, or providing a service”, thus encompassing 
a much larger sphere of activities than the federal law.  The area of application of both of 
these laws, however, is commonly interpreted largely so as to ensure that the personal data 
of both Canadian and Quebec citizens alike is protected to the highest possible extent
330
.   
In light of the differing spheres of application of these laws, this section will (1) 
outline precisely what information collected through technological tracking tools is 
considered to be personal data by both the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS, in order to 
ultimately (2) be able to determine the protection afforded to the information aggregated for 
targeted marketing purposes by both of these laws. 
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Subsection 1 The Qualification of Information Collected Through Tracking Tools 
as Personal Data 
Both the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS provide very similar definitions of the term 
personal information.  The PIPEDA considers personal information to be any “information 
about an identifiable individual, but does not include the name, title or business address or 
telephone number of an employee of an organization”331.  The ARPPIPS, on the other hand, 
defines personal information as “any information which relates to a natural person and 
allows that person to be identified”332. Both of these definitions lack a certain specificity as 
to which precise forms of data could fall under this category.  Case law related to this 
matter, however, requires a broad and expansive interpretation of the term “personal 
information”333. As such, general consensus holds that, to qualify as personal information, 
the data in question need not specifically identify the person to whom the information 
relates, but must merely allow for the possibility of that person’s identity to be 
determined
334
.  With regards to the practice of targeted marketing, this definition thus begs 
the question of which data collected through the use of both online and mobile tracking 
tools renders it possible to identify individuals when combined, and can thus ultimately be 
considered to be personal information
335
.   
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As discussed above
336
, the forms of data collected with the use of such tools are 
varied in nature, but namely relate to data regarding an individual’s personal preferences 
and interests that may be inferred from browsing history, online purchases and search 
engine queries, and often include IP address, email address, online communications, and 
physical location.  The qualification of data regarding the personal preferences of 
individuals through the use of both Internet and mobile tracking tools as personal 
information is not so cut and dry, and must be analyzed in light of the characteristics of the 
technology utilized to acquire the data in question.   
When cookies are used to gather information relating to consumer interests, the 
cookies in question often contain a unique identifier that excludes the name and email 
address of the individual with whom the cookie is shared, ultimately allowing the person to 
remain anonymous
337
.  In this grain, one would believe that the data collected through 
cookies cannot be linked back to an identifiable person thus making it questionable as to 
whether such information can be classified as personal or not
338
.  Such an impression is, 
however, false, as “[t]he profiles derived from tracking online users’ activities on the 
Internet may be linked or merged with the [personally identifiable information] of these 
users”339 thus de-anonymizing these individuals by identifying them through data that is 
publicly available
340
.  There is therefore no guarantee that cookies which are programmed 
to maintain the anonymity of individuals will not ultimately serve to identify them.  It is 
due to this possibility to de-anonymize the information contained within cookies that the 
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Privacy Commissioner of Canada came to the conclusion that any data collected through 
the use of cookies is considered to be personal information
341
.     
Even in the event that the information collected through cookies is not combined 
with any personally identifiable data about an individual, however, the chance that this 
individual could be identified still exists.  To begin with, in most cases, cookies collect the 
IP address of the consumer upon whose computer the cookie resides – a piece of 
information which may be able to identify the individual
342
.  The consideration of an IP 
address as personal data would, however, most likely be based on whether the address in 
question is dynamic, meaning that it varies each time an individual connects to the Internet, 
or static, meaning that it is an address that uniquely identifies an individual’s computer or 
device
343
.  It is only in the latter case that an IP address could be qualified as personal 
information
344
, and if this type of address is collected by cookies, the data therein would 
ultimately fall under the spheres of application of both the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS. 
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Additionally, while it is true that cookies do not automatically store the email 
address of an individual
345
, there are certain situations in which individuals are prompted by 
websites to provide their email address and in such cases, the address typed in by these 
people is saved within the cookie, which could ultimately jeopardize the anonymous nature 
of the information collected by cookies should the email address in question allow the 
person to whom it belongs to be identified
346
.  Although not all email addresses can be 
linked to the individuals to whom they belong
347
, they have generally been considered to 
constitute personal information as they could allow for the possibility of a person to be 
identified
348.  Thus, since there is a serious possibility that individuals may be “identifiable” 
or “identified” through the data collected by cookies, whether it be because it could be 
linked to other identifiable data or because it could contain a static IP address or an email 
address that could lead to the identification of an individual, all the information contained 
within cookies must therefore qualify as personal information
349
.    
While the data aggregated through the use of cookies presents a certain debate with 
regards to the nature of that data, there can be no question that information collected 
through the practice of DPI qualifies as personal information.  Essentially, the practice of 
DPI “raises privacy concerns because it can involve the inspection of information […] sent 
over the Internet”350 by their users.  While many ISPs claim that the data they gather in this 
manner for targeted advertising purposes is anonymous
351
, they are still in the position of 
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identifying the users in question, thus rendering the individuals affected by this technology 
identifiable
352
 and causing the data collected in such a manner to be considered as personal 
information as prescribed by both the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS.   
It is not, however, only the data that is collected via online tracking tools that must 
be examined to determine its qualification as personal information, but also any data 
collected using mobile tracking methods, namely with regards to physical location.  As 
discussed above
353
, various positioning systems accessible through cellular telephones are 
used to locate individuals and target them with real-time advertisements based on their 
particular position at a given moment.  Since each cellular telephone has a unique Mobile 
Identification Number
354
, a number which can be captured and possibly linked back to the 
individual to whom the device belongs
355
, any data collected through cellular phones allows 
for the possibility of the identification of an individual, thus causing this data to be 
considered as personal information
356
.    
It must be pointed out, however, that the privacy risks associated with the use of 
tracking tools to collect data about individuals do not end with the information voluntarily 
collected in this manner, but also extend to the data that is accidentally aggregated 
throughout the procedures involved with the use of these tools – a risk that exists mainly 
with regards to the practice of wardriving used to create Wi-Fi Positioning Systems, as 
discussed above and illustrated with the example of Google’s involuntary aggregation of 
personal information using this method
357
.  In this case, it was considered by the Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner that “[w]hile the raw data collected by Google would not always 
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allow for perfect identification, the information collected was sufficiently capable of being 
linked to individuals through data matching or aggregation”358.  
The amount of data that qualifies as personal information that is collected, both 
purposely and inadvertently, through the use of technological tracking tools, online as well 
as mobile, is thus significant and ultimately places a strain on marketers who desire to 
collect this data for targeted marketing purposes.  In this light, we are led to wonder 
whether or not the definition of personal information held by both the PIPEDA and the 
ARPPIPS, which places a significant amount of data under the gambit of this term, may 
unnecessarily reduce the economic benefits presented by these laws.  This is due to the fact 
that the definitions upheld by the law neglect to distinguish between data that truly presents 
privacy risks and that which does not, and therefore forces marketers to spend their 
resources protecting information that may not necessarily require protection
359
.  From this 
perspective, it has been considered that  
“the definition of the notions of personal information in both the 
Quebec [and Canadian] laws is too general :  it prevents the 
circulation of information that has no effect on the privacy of 
individuals and ultimately results in a dilution of the protection of 
information that truly falls in the domain of privacy.   
[…] 
The notion of privacy does not cover all the information regarding a 
person.  Considering we live in society, there are elements of each 
person’s activities that possess a public characteristic.  By ignoring 
this and by persisting to promote a general definition, such as the 
notion of “personal information”, we expose ourselves to placing a 
hoard of information under protection (essentially, all the 
information that concerns a person and permits them to be identified) 
and we find ourselves under the obligation of multiplying the 
circumstances under which it would be necessary, in the name of 
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public welfare, to wave (by the multiplication of dispensatory 
provisions) certain protections that may be essential to the 
preservation of the privacy of each person.”360 (our translation) 
If the law were thus to limit its definition of personal information solely to that data 
which is truly private
361
, the obligation of marketers to protect the personal information of 
individuals would be less onerous, as this limitation would, in consequence, minimize the 
resources that they would be obliged to dedicate to the protection of this data.   This would, 
however, require an adjustment of privacy laws to prevent organizations from attempting to 
positively identify individuals by linking the private information that they have collected 
with data that is publicly available about these people
362
.  Such a modification would be 
much more economically sound than requiring that protection be afforded to any 
information that may potentially identify a person, which extends to numerous types of 
information, as exposed throughout this section in light of the case of targeted marketing.  
This in turn would reduce the costs associated with the implementation of privacy 
protection for marketers, while still allowing adequate protection for the personal 
information of individuals that is truly private.   
Regardless of the enlarged definition of personal information enshrined in both the 
PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS, and whether or not it may be economically sound, the fact 
remains that all the data identified in this section as falling under the definition of personal 
information must effectively be protected in the manner set forth by both the PIPEDA and 
the ARPPIPS.  In order to ensure that the private nature of this information is protected in 
the realm of cyberspace, both of these laws have emitted certain rules and principles that 
must be respected by all enterprises and organizations throughout their collection, use and 
retention of personal data, which will be discussed in further detail in the next subsection.   
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Subsection 2 Principles of Privacy Protection 
Since the data collected by marketers using both online and mobile tracking tools 
qualifies as personal information in the sense accorded to the term by both the PIPEDA and 
the ARPPIPS
363
, marketers are required to abide by these laws when they collect, use and 
retain such data for targeted marketing purposes.  While both these laws pose various 
principles
364
 that ensure the protection of the privacy of Canadian and Quebec citizens as a 
whole, this thesis will concentrate upon two principles that we believe present the greatest 
issues with regards to the practice of targeted marketing, namely those relating to (a) 
identifying the purposes for which personal information is collected and being transparent 
about the privacy practices of the entity collecting the information, and (b) acquiring the 
consent of the individual whose personal data is being collected, used and retained, both of 
which will be discussed in further detail heretofore.   
Paragraph 1 Identifying Purposes and Disclosure 
Both the PIPEDA
365
 and the ARPPIPS
366
 require that the purposes for which the 
personal information of an individual is being collected be identified.  While the PIPEDA 
specifies the point in time at which these purposes must be brought forth, namely upon the 
aggregation of that data or prior to that time, the ARPPIPS makes no such specification.  
According to the ARPPIPS, these purposes must be explained to the individual whose 
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information is being collected by outlining the subject of the file being created in his 
respect as well as the manner in which his data will be used and the categories of 
individuals who will have access to this information
367, essentially holding that “consent to 
the collection […] of personal information […] must be given for specific purposes”368.  
This therefore means that consent to the collection of such data can only exist when the 
purposes for such collection are exposed and thus that no collection can occur prior to the 
description of the reasons for which such compilation is taking place.  As such, this would 
lead us to believe that the point in time at which the purposes must be identified in light of 
the ARPPIPS is the same as that ordered by the PIPEDA – which in both cases is a 
requirement that serves as a prelude to ensure that, when the consent of the individual is 
ultimately acquired, it will be free and enlightened
369
.   
The requirement for the identification of the purposes for which an individual’s 
personal data is being aggregated, prior to the collection of that information, appears to be 
viable from an economic analysis perspective, particularly when it comes to the case of 
targeted marketing.  A study conducted in 2007 demonstrated that disclosure by websites as 
to their treatment of personal information induced more individuals to be forthcoming with 
the provision of this data
370
.  Interestingly enough, their willingness to communicate this 
information did not change regardless of whether or not they had actually read the 
disclosure statement provided
371
.  These findings are in accordance with the general 
standing that the disclosure of privacy practices by a company “help consumers make a 
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more accurate assessment of the risks of [providing] personal information to websites, and 
therefore displaying them should promote consumer [cooperation]”372.   
In this light, the economic benefit for marketers to provide adequate disclosure is 
rather significant as it will increase the amount of behavioural data available to them, while 
at the same time ensuring privacy protection and thus less of a risk of inhibited 
communications and preference falsification, as discussed above
373
.  However, in order for 
this goal to be achieved to its highest possible extent, disclosure must be provided to 
individuals at the precise moment at which their personal data is being collected.  If this 
data is collected without any prior notification and individuals are only sought out to 
provide consent once it has already been aggregated, they may feel blindsided, as if they 
have no control over their personal data, and may ultimately end up harbouring the outlook 
that their private information is collected without their knowledge, which may therefore 
result in the predicament that is striving to be avoided through disclosure in the first place.   
In order to affirm that the purposes for collection are properly identified it is crucial 
to determine both who should be responsible for providing such information as well as the 
form that it should take.  To begin with, both the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS state that the 
purposes for the collection of personal information must be exposed, but nowhere do these 
laws specifically state who should be the one to provide it
374
.  This complicates matters 
when it comes to online targeted advertising, as, while the entity who collects the 
information is generally the one who ultimately uses it, it often occurs that the data may be 
collected by one entity and sold to another who uses it for advertising purposes
375
.  Yet, 
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while this may be a common practice when it comes to targeted marketing
376
, and it is here 
that the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS differ, the Quebec law prohibits the acquisition of an 
individual’s personal data from a third-party but rather holds that such data must be directly 
acquired from the person in question
377
, whereas the PIPEDA implies that such data may be 
attained from third parties
378
.  Thus, for the intents and purposes of the ARPPIPS, although 
it does not specifically state who should be responsible for identifying the purposes of 
collection, due to the fact that data must always be collected directly from an individual and 
cannot be sold to third parties, the question of who should provide disclosure is moot.   
When it comes to the PIPEDA, however, determining who should be the one to 
provide disclosure in cases where the personal data of individuals is transmitted to third 
parties is not nearly so clear cut.  In such cases, it is crucial to establish whether or not it 
should be up to the entity that collects the information or the third-party who ultimately 
uses the data to identify the purposes for collection.  According to the PIPEDA, however, 
any entity who either collects, uses or discloses the personal data of an individual is faced 
with the obligation of identifying the purposes for collection
379
. 
This requirement makes a great deal of sense, as it is rather difficult to conceive the 
manner in which the entity collecting the data can provide information regarding the exact 
purposes for which the data is collected when they ultimately sell this data to a third-party 
and do not possess sufficient details regarding the manner in which this third-party will 
utilize that information.  Thus, the entity that aggregates the data for the purposes of selling 
it to a third-party must disclose this particular use to consumers.  In such cases, however, it 
would not be sufficient for this entity to state that they share this information with an 
“affiliate” or a “third-party” or a “partner”, as these vague terms are rather unclear and do 
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not really inform the individual as to who ultimately uses their personal data
380
.  The third-
party who acquires that data must then notify the individual in question and ultimately 
identify the manners in which they will be using that information for their own purposes.   
While this solution may be impractical, we believe that it is the only one that would 
make sense in light of the ultimate goals meant to be achieved.  Essentially, if one entity 
collects data for the purposes of selling it to a third-party, and the individual whose 
personal data was aggregated for this purpose is notified solely of the collector’s intention 
to sell, but receives no information regarding the manner in which the purchaser will utilize 
that data, this lack of knowledge will make it difficult for him to be able to assess the risks 
involved with providing these entities with access to his personal information, and may 
thus result in his refusal to consent to any use of his data.  This outcome would, however, 
not be beneficial to marketers.  As such, it would still be more advantageous for marketers 
to invest additional funds in providing adequate notification to individuals regarding 
precisely how their personal data will be utilized by each entity, whether it is the direct 
collector or the third-party that will eventually use that data, rather than risking an 
individual’s refusal to provide his consent due to lack of information in this respect and 
ultimately rendering it impossible for marketers to use this behavioural information for 
targeted advertising purposes.  
When it comes to targeted advertising on mobile telephones, on the other hand, the 
actors involved are much more numerous, and it is difficult to know whether the entity to 
provide disclosure should be the one who supplies the location-based advertising services, 
the telecommunications company with whom the owner of the cellular phone is subscribed, 
or the advertisers and content providers
381
.  While it has been considered that all of these 
entities are required to provide disclosure, such a view may not be practical and may serve 
                                                 
380
 J. LO, prev. cited, note 11, p. 51-52. 
381
 E. GRATTON, prev. cited, note 369, 63; Eloïse GRATTON, Wireless Privacy and Personalized Location-
based Services:  The Challenge of Translating the Legal Framework into Business Practices, Master’s thesis, 
Montreal, Faculté des études supérieures, University of Montreal, 2002, p. 58. 
  
 
80
to further confuse the user by overloading him with information
382
, as, differently from 
online targeted advertising where there will be a maximum of two actors involved in a 
particular collection, there are twice as many entities involved in mobile targeted 
marketing.  As such, it has been considered that it may be possible, and more effective, that 
disclosure by the wireless service provider at the time of the conclusion of the contract with 
the user is sufficient to adequately provide disclosure to the individual and render it 
unnecessary for any further disclosures by location-based service providers
383
.   
While we agree that this solution would ultimately be more effective from a 
practical point of view, we believe that its economic efficiency may not be so clear cut.  
Requiring each of the actors involved in mobile marketing to identify the purposes for their 
collection of the personal data of individuals would be quite costly – much more so than in 
the case of online targeted marketing as the number of actors implicated is doubled.  At the 
same time, however, such an all-global clause may be viewed by individuals as a lack of 
disclosure, which may result in their refusal to consent to use of their personal data for 
similar reasons as those outlined with regards to the case of the sale of personal data to 
third parties
384
.  As such an outcome would be undesirable, we believe that a possible 
solution to this issue would be for the telecommunications provider to include a clause in 
its contract with respect to the manner in which the mobile telephone holder’s location 
information will be used by each location-based service provider that the cellular telephone 
provider possesses agreements with, and each time a new contract is signed with such an 
entity, the client in question will be notified by the mobile telephone service provider of the 
use that this new entity will make of their personal information.  Such a solution would 
address the privacy concerns of individuals while not running the risk that they will refuse 
to provide their consent for such use of their data. 
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In addition to knowing who is required to provide disclosure, it is also important to 
determine the form that this disclosure must take.  The form of the disclosure entails two 
elements – the content of the disclosure and the manner in which it is presented.  In order to 
grant adequate disclosure, the information provided must be both detailed and 
comprehensible to Internet users.  This feat may be achieved by noting each form of data 
collected by the entity – whether it is name, birthday, email address, browsing habits, 
search queries performed, city of inhabitation and so on – and then describing the various 
precise manners in which this information is to be used in very simple terms.     
There has been a new initiative in this respect, meant to ensure the utmost disclosure 
and transparency, which consists of placing a small icon in the form of the letter “i”385 on 
each advertisement that was targeted to an individual online, upon which this person can 
click to inform himself about the targeted advertising practices of the entity who targeted 
that advertisement to him.  While this does provide a certain level of disclosure, the user 
only receives it after the information has already been collected, thus not entirely satisfying 
the requirement of identifying the purposes prior to or at the moment of collection.  Despite 
this, it has been recognized by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner as providing a level 
of transparency that follows the spirit of the disclosure requirement
386
.  
Thus, while this form of disclosure may be a step in the right direction it cannot be 
considered to be sufficient as it does not adequately fulfill the obligation required by law, 
and as such other solutions must be determined.  With regards to the use of cookies, the 
only form of disclosure that would follow the precise letter of the law would require that 
each time a cookie is placed on an individual’s computer by an entity, that entity inform the 
user of the purposes for which this cookie is being placed on his computer, the types of 
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information it will aggregate and the manner in which that data will be utilized.  This may 
not, however, be entirely practical and may in fact serve to annoy Internet users rather than 
make them grateful for the disclosure of privacy practices, as their use of the Internet will 
most probably constantly be interrupted by such pop ups.   
While it is true that users can alter the security settings of their Internet browser to 
refuse to accept that cookies be placed on their browser, it must be pointed that not all users 
are aware of how to properly alter the security settings to achieve this
387
.  Additionally, we 
cannot neglect to mention that some web pages may not function unless cookies are 
accepted
388
.  In such cases, rather than the actual website appearing, a notification requiring 
that the user alter his cookie acceptance settings will show up so that he may ultimately be 
able to view the site in question.  Thus, in the same manner as pop-ups informing users 
about the purposes for which their data is being collected through cookies may annoy them, 
their ability to limit the placement of cookies on their browser at the detriment of not being 
able to view websites would not be any more appealing.  As a result, and despite the fact 
that the “i” button does not completely satisfy the disclosure requirement, we do believe 
that such an initiative is probably the most practical and user friendly manner in which to 
adequately disclose targeted advertising practices to users.  
Furthermore, this may also be the only economically viable solution.  Disclosing the 
purposes for the collection and use of an individual’s personal information in such a 
manner that will negatively affect his experience of using the Internet will simply limit the 
use that individuals make of the Web, and ultimately the amount of behavioural 
information that will be available to marketers from this respect.  The use of the “i” button 
as a form of disclosure, on the other hand, presents very interesting possibilities from an 
economic perspective.  While it is true that there is a possibility that a person’s data will be 
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collected prior to the point in time where he may decide to click on the “i” button to inquire 
about the manner in which his personal data is used, which may cause him to feel a certain 
lack of control, the “i” button presents a level of transparency that may assuage his fears, as 
it is out in the open and easily accessible thus demonstrating that marketers have nothing to 
hide, and allow him to properly assess the risks involved with his use of such websites.   
Disclosure of the use of DPI practices, on the other hand, must come directly from 
ISPs.  The best manner in which to ensure adequate disclosure in this respect is to include 
information regarding these practices in the service agreement and to ensure that all the 
information related to the use of this practice is explicitly articulated prior to the moment 
the contract is signed by the user.   
When it comes to targeted advertising on mobile telephones, however, determining 
the form that such disclosure should take is even more complicated due to the fact that the 
screen of a cellular telephone is exponentially smaller than that of a desktop or laptop 
computer, and also presents certain limitations on the full functioning of websites
389
.  Due 
to this, it would be both difficult and impractical for users to view lengthy privacy policies 
on such an undersized screen
390
. The form such disclosure should take therefore still 
presents us with certain issues that remain unresolved at present
391
. 
It has been suggested that meaningful disclosure with regards to mobile advertising 
could be established by adding a voice based disclosure, either by sending the consumer a 
text message containing a toll free number that they can call and which will activate a 
recording serving to properly inform the user, or by sending a hyperlink along with the text 
message upon which the individual can click to hear the audio message
392
.  The problem 
with this solution, is that ever since the adoption of the new Canadian Anti-Spam 
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legislation
393
 the sending of any electronic message (which is a message sent by means of 
telecommunication
394
, including text, sound, voice or image messages) to an electronic 
address (which is any address used in connection with the transmission of an electronic 
message to any email, instant message or telephone account) is prohibited unless the person 
in question has consented to receiving it
395
.   
As such, the only solution that would both respect the laws in force while also 
allowing marketers to use the location data of individuals emanating from their mobile 
telephones is through disclosing the tracking practices used by each location-based 
advertiser the cellular telephone provider has agreements with, in the same manner as 
suggested above
396
.  This would provide a level of transparency that would render 
individuals more inclined to consent to the use of their location information for advertising 
purposes, while at the same time allotting them with sufficient control over their personal 
data that will allow them to feel secure, thus furthering the goals of online marketers. 
In order to ensure proper disclosure, several factors must therefore be taken into 
account, and these considerations are crucial to ensuring the complete enlightenment of the 
user with regards to the targeted advertising practices being used.  Disclosure is doubly 
important when one considers that, without the user being informed about the reasons for 
the collection of his personal information in sufficient detail, the consent that he may 
ultimately provide would be moot.  Thus, after having examined the element of disclosure 
in sufficient detail, we will now proceed to discuss the requirement of consent.   
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Paragraph 2 Consent 
Both the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS require that the consent of an individual must 
be acquired in order for his personal information to be validly used.  Consent is essentially 
the response received from a given person once they have analyzed the risks involved with 
the provision of their personal data based on the information disclosed to them and have 
deemed that they are minimal
397
.  This additional step of seeking an individual’s consent to 
use his personal information is, however, crucial for several reasons.  To begin with, 
acquiring their consent instills individuals with confidence in online marketers, which “is a 
necessary condition for their loyalty.  This is truer than ever on the Web, where business is 
conducted at a distance and uncertainties are bigger because of impersonality in business 
relations”398.  Loyalty directly translates into higher customer retention rates and makes it 
more likely for an individual to be forthcoming with his personal information
399
 by 
nurturing society’s inter-communication and ultimately ensuring that it is not impeded as a 
result of feelings of lack of safety arising from what individuals may view as invasions of 
privacy.  This in turn heightens the ability for marketers to target these individuals with 
relevant ads, ultimately resulting in a higher turnover rate
400
.   
While acquiring consent increases profit margins, neglecting to do so could cause 
irreparable harm to a company’s reputation that it may not be able to bounce back from, as 
is evidenced by the cases of Phorm and NebuAd
401
, who used DPI technology to amass 
consumer information without acquiring prior consent causing them to lose their investors 
and partners and ultimately shut down.  In other cases, failure to acquire consent may not 
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be as detrimental, but will still have dire effects revolving around loss of customers and 
difficulty in gaining new ones, which, due to its rapid growth, holds more significance in 
online markets than traditional ones
402
.  In these situations, companies will be required to 
invest more money into the acquisition of new customers, thus reducing their turnover rate.  
Furthermore, a loss of reputation could diminish the company’s value in the stock market, 
as is demonstrated in the example of DoubleClick
403
, where the enterprise used cookies to 
aggregate the personal data of individuals without their prior consent, who experienced a 
15.27% drop in share value following the Federal Trade Commission’s inquiry into their 
practices in February 2000
404
.   
On the other hand, there are those individuals that claim that the obligation to 
acquire an individual’s consent prior to collecting and using his personal data creates an 
unnecessary strain on the free flow of information which in turn harms commerce as “better 
information leads to better markets”405.  This position is often supported by the example of 
junk mail, which holds that if more data was known about an individual, the mail that 
would be sent to them would be tailored to their preferences and would in turn not be 
considered as “junk”.  Those who hold this position claim that it is privacy protection that 
inhibits this occurrence
406
. It is not, however, the protection itself that is the issue, but 
rather the general perception by the business sector of this protection, which  
“presumes that privacy necessarily entails information blockage.  But this is 
not so.  If individuals will truly benefit by releasing their personal data, e.g., 
by getting less junk […], they will rationally choose to do so.  Information 
privacy does not mandate information quarantine; it merely requires that the 
individual exercise control within reasonable constraints over whether, and 
what type of, quarantine should exist.  Accordingly, these arguments do not 
demonstrate that the individual should be deprived of information privacy.  
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At most, they suggest that individuals should be open to information 
processing in exchange for commercial benefit and that society should make 
such exchanges feasible.”407   
By acquiring individual consent for the collection and use of personal data, 
businesses would be informing users of the benefits they will enjoy, while at the same time 
maintaining a level of transparency that will instill trust and thus make people more willing 
to share their personal information.  It is therefore in this manner that the law “[makes] 
such exchanges feasible”408. In this light, the legal requirement that consent be acquired 
from individuals prior to the collection and use of their personal data is tremendously 
economically beneficial to marketers.    
According to the PIPEDA, the consent of the individual whose private information 
is being collected must be acquired
409
, the validity of which will be based upon the proper 
identification of the purposes for collection in such a manner that the person can reasonably 
understand how the data will be used
410
, as discussed above.  Furthermore, these people 
must have the choice of withdrawing their consent at any time subject to contractual or 
statutory limitations
411
.  While consent does not necessarily need to be acquired at the 
moment of collection, it must at least be secured prior to the use of that data
412
.   
The ARPPIPS, on the other hand, obliges entities to obtain the consent of the 
individual whose information is being collected, used or communicated – meaning that 
consent must have already been acquired for any collection of data to be able to take place.  
Additionally, in order for this consent to be valid, it “must be manifest, free, and 
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enlightened, and must be given for specific purposes”413.  Nevertheless, an individual’s 
consent may be implied when he provides certain personal information voluntarily
414
.  
Furthermore, the ARPPIPS describes certain exceptions to the consent provision in its 
sections 13 and 18 to 26, which permit an enterprise to disclose the personal information 
contained in a file on a person to a third-party, without the specific consent of the person, if 
it is for a reason which the person concerned has already consented to or for an object 
covered by the exceptions listed under those sections. 
Consent can present itself in one of two different forms, namely opt-in and opt-out.  
Opt-in is the form of consent that allows users the most control over their information as 
they must consciously and explicitly provide their permission so that their personal data 
may be used.  Opt-out consent, on the other hand, occurs in situations where an individual’s 
personal information is automatically collected, effectively requiring him to specifically 
express his lack of consent to this compilation for it to cease. 
In order for an enterprise to fulfill its obligation under the ARPPIPS, however, the 
only viable form of consent would be opt-in, as this law specifically requires that consent 
must be “manifest”415.  The PIPEDA, on the other hand, states that the form of consent 
utilized must depend on the sensitivity of the information being collected, such as data 
regarding medical history or income.  While opt-in consent is considered to be the form of 
consent that is most in harmony with the PIPEDA
416
, according to the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner, opt-out consent could be sufficient for an organization to fulfill its 
obligations under this Federal law
417
. Essentially, since behavioural information may not 
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necessarily be considered as highly sensitive data
418
, opt-out consent may be a legal option 
in such cases, even despite the preference for opt-in consent
419
.      
According to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, certain conditions must be 
satisfied when opt-out consent is utilized, and these conditions will differ depending on 
whether the marketing purposes for which the personal information of an individual is 
obtained is secondary or primary.  The use of opt-out consent for secondary marketing 
purposes, meaning that the information collected was aggregated for an initial reason but 
the use of that data for marketing is merely secondary, was examined by the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner
420
.  It was considered that certain requirements must be satisfied in 
order for opt-out consent to be legal in these situations, namely that the information in 
question cannot be considered to be sensitive in either its nature or context, the data being 
shared for secondary marketing purposes must be limited and the nature of the personal 
information used or disclosed as well as the extent of the intended use or disclosure must be 
clearly delineated, and finally the purposes for which this data is shared must be both 
limited and well-defined and described in clear and easily comprehensible language
421
.   
At the same time, however, it was considered by the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner, in its report regarding Facebook’s privacy practices, that due to the fact that 
Facebook offers its website freely to individuals, advertising is essential to its ability to 
provide these services, as without the revenue generated in such a fashion, it would be 
impossible to upkeep the site.  As such, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner considered 
Facebook’s targeted advertising practices to be a primary purpose and views it to be 
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“reasonable that users are required to consent to Facebook Ads as a condition of 
service”422.  By considering Facebook’s targeted advertising practices in such a manner, the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner is basically classifying primary marketing purposes as 
a legitimate purpose in light of the PIPEDA, thus preventing Facebook from being 
confronted with the violation set out in the PIPEDA
423
, as well as the ARPPIPS
424
, which 
prohibit organizations from refusing to supply an individual with a product or service 
simply because they have declined to consent to the collection, use or disclosure of their 
personal information, unless that data is essential to the transaction and is necessary to 
fulfill a legitimate purpose.  The form of consent required, and ultimately whether or not a 
particular marketing purpose will be considered as primary or secondary, is therefore not 
entirely clear.  
Despite this, we believe that the only viable solution rests in the form of opt-in 
consent.  As previously mentioned
425
, consumer trust is a necessary element in online 
marketing that will further promote the goals meant to be achieved. However, forcing these 
individuals to constantly seek the manner in which they may effectively demonstrate their 
lack of consent through opt-out procedures would place an onerous burden upon them that 
would not incite the confidence sought.  It is rather opt-in consent that would accomplish 
this feat.  Additionally, a company’s institution of opt-in consent could serve to set it apart 
from its competitors and provide it with an advantageous edge that would better satisfy 
customers wants and needs and therefore attract both their attention and business
426
.  While 
it is true that greater funds would need to be invested to employ an opt-in system of 
consent, this amount would be far less than what a company would lose should their 
method of acquiring consent inspire a lack of confidence in Internet users. 
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However, while opt-out consent may not be as viable a solution, it still remains a 
possibility in light of the PIPEDA and as such, consent must be achieved in one form or 
another when personal information is collected and used.  This requirement is not, however, 
always respected in the practice of targeted marketing and therefore requires particular 
examination when it comes to acquiring consent in light of the use of (a) cookies, (b) DPI 
and (c) mobile tracking tools for targeted marketing purposes. 
a. Cookies 
To begin with, when cookies are used to collect information about individuals, their 
consent is never sought at the moment of collection
427
.  The only form of consent acquired 
through the use of these tools, minimal as it may be, is opt-out, whereby a user can choose 
to delete the cookies stored on his browser – something which can only be considered as a 
form of consent in cases where the individual in question is actually knowledgeable about 
the practice whereby cookies are used to gather his personal data.  However, in cases where 
Flash cookies are used to regenerate Web cookies, even when a person deletes the cookies 
from his browser thereby refusing to consent to the gathering of his personal data, such 
recreation circumvents the individual’s refusal to provide his consent.   
While it is true that a browser can be configured to warn individuals when a website 
is attempting to share a cookie with them, thus allowing users to reject such cookies should 
they so wish, the default settings of browsers are generally set to accept all cookies and 
users are not often made aware of the rejection mechanism in question
428
.  Furthermore, it 
often occurs that sites require individuals to permit cookies to be stored on their browser so 
that they may be able to access the site in question, which violates the above discussed 
requirement of both the PIPEDA
429
 and the ARPPIPS
430
 that obliges organizations to have 
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a legitimate purpose in the event that they refuse to provide their services should a user 
decline to consent to any collection or use of his personal information. As mentioned 
above, the legitimacy of the purposes for which cookies aggregate data depends on whether 
the information is being collected for primary or secondary marketing purposes
431
, as 
unless it is used for the former it cannot be considered as necessary for the fulfillment of a 
legitimate
432
 purpose
433
.  As such, when cookies are used to collect data for secondary 
marketing purposes, even if a user would be made aware of the browser setting allowing 
them to be notified about cookies and reject them, their inability to view the site should 
they refuse these cookies ultimately robs them of their choice.   
The new Canadian Anti-Spam legislation
434
, however, sheds a new light on the 
consent requirement regarding the use of cookies on one’s computer, by stating that a 
person is considered to expressly consent to the installation of cookies on his computer if 
his conduct is such that it is reasonable to believe that he consents to the program’s 
installation
435
.  As such, acquiring the consent of individuals for the gathering of 
information through cookies may not be necessary for the purposes of Federal law.  
Regardless of this, however, their consent must still be procured prior to that information 
being used for any purposes whatsoever, in accordance with the PIPEDA.   
Imputing the consent of individuals when it comes to the placement of cookies on 
their electronic devices is neither here nor there from an economic perspective.  The 
manners in which the consent of individuals may be sought in this situation would all serve 
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to hinder their use of the Internet by constantly harassing them with pop-ups demanding if 
they accept cookies or by simply preventing them from being able to access websites 
should they choose to limit the presence of cookies on their devices.  These forms of 
seeking consent may therefore have the effect of limiting the use that people would make of 
the Internet as it would no longer be a simple and pleasant experience.  At the same time, 
simply imputing their consent under such circumstances would have the result of inciting 
distrust in consumers, as previously discussed
436
, which could lead to individuals being less 
forthcoming with their personal data.  Such an outcome is illustrated by a recent survey 
conducted by TRUSTe, which signals that 90% of individuals employ browser controls to 
protect their privacy, which includes the deletion of cookies
437
.  Such a limitation on the 
behavioural information available could thus be detrimental to the goals of marketers. 
Nevertheless, there may be a middle ground between these two solutions.  
Essentially, when accessing a website, it is possible for the landing page to consist of a 
notification to users regarding that site’s use of cookies and a demand of their acceptance.  
Once the user has made his choice, and whether or not he chooses to consent to the 
placement of a cookie on his computer, he will then be led to the home page of the site
438
.  
This solution would prevent the Internet from becoming a source of annoyance for 
individuals, thus ensuring that they do not cease using the Web, while at the same time 
instilling a certain level of trust that might cause them to be more open with their personal 
data.  Furthermore, such an approach would also shield businesses from being subjected to 
negative publicity as a result of not acquiring consent, as they would be providing users 
with additional means of controlling their personal information.   
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b. Deep Packet Inspection 
When the practice of DPI is used to collect personal information, on the other hand, 
the individuals affected by this practice generally remain uninformed and their consent is 
nearly never sought.  A large number of ISPs “bury notices of their inspection practices in 
densely worded privacy policies [thus making it so that] consumers cannot reasonably be 
expected to know about, and protect themselves from, opaque practices”439.  Furthermore, 
the only form of consent sought by such ISPs is in the form of an opt-out policy accessible 
online, but regarding which users are not clearly informed
440
. While this is not so for all 
ISPs, as some have pledged to the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee that they would only 
use DPI technology on their clients for targeted marketing purposes with their explicit 
consent
441
, it is still a rather common practice of a good number of ISPs that ultimately 
serves to violate the privacy rights of their clients.   
In the case of DPI, however, the lack of the acquisition of consent is not only a 
violation of both the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS, but it is also a criminal act according to 
the Canadian Criminal Code
442
.  In virtue of section 184(1) C.C., the willful interception, 
including listening to, recording or acquiring a communication or the substance, meaning or 
purport thereof
443, of a private communication, which consists of “any telecommunication 
[…] that is made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the originator to expect 
that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended by the originator 
to receive it”444, without the consent of the originator in question445, is an indictable offence 
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subject to an imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years
446
.  This section does not, 
however, apply to individuals providing communications services to the public who 
intercept private communications in cases where interception is necessary to provide the 
service, or in cases where the service provider executes random checks to perform 
necessary monitoring for the purposes of mechanical or service quality control checks, or if 
the interception is necessary to ensure the protection of a person’s rights or property 
directly related to providing the service
447
.   
Despite these exemptions, we do not believe that they could serve to protect ISPs 
exercising the practice of DPI.  While it is true that DPI was originally created to protect 
individuals from various threats on the Internet that could harm their computers, and could 
thus be said to be used as a tool to protect their right to property, the ISPs who use this 
technology to reassemble email messages as they are being typed out by users or to gather 
data about their personal preferences, cannot be said to accomplish the aforementioned 
purpose.  Furthermore, the collection of this type of information is not necessary for the 
provision of the service, especially since the Internet was constructed as an end-to-end 
service – meaning that any communications sent over the Internet are not meant to be 
intercepted until they reach their final destination.  As such, unless the interception of email 
messages occurs due to the ISP’s maintenance of services, it is an indictable offence.   
The same position was taken in the case of R. v. Weir
448
, where it was held that 
emails are deemed to be private communications for the purposes of section 184 C.C. and 
that any interception of such messages violates the reasonable expectance of privacy of the 
author of that message as well as his recipient.  Furthermore, it was considered that ISPs are 
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not permitted to access the contents of the email inbox of a client unless the consent of that 
person is obtained or if it is required by an officer who detains a warrant to this effect
449
.   
Considering the use of DPI as being a criminal offence is, we believe, an extremely 
economically viable solution.  If the use of cookies to gather private data without individual 
consent could incite distrust, DPI technology would exponentially increase this lack of 
confidence, causing people to be less forthcoming with their personal information.  
Furthermore, because DPI renders ISPs privy to all the data viewed, received and emitted 
by a given user, and in view of the fact that the Internet has become one of the primary 
sources of communication between individuals, sometimes even holding voice conversation 
between them, the use of this technology may even cause individuals to cease using the 
Internet for inter-personal communications as they may feel as if their privacy is being 
invaded.  While we might turn to the example of Facebook to counter this statement and 
demonstrate the number of individuals still using that SNW despite the privacy risks it may 
present, a recent survey conducted by the Princeton Survey Research Associates 
International demonstrated that 58% of individuals that use SNWs restrict access to their 
profiles
450
.  The possibility that individuals will utilize the Internet differently is thus a risk 
that does exist.  It is, however, upon the online interactions of individuals that Internet 
marketers depend for the success of their campaigns, and jeopardizing their ability to access 
such data would be detrimental to the achievement of their goals.  Prohibiting the practice 
of DPI in an outright fashion is therefore crucial to ensuring the protection of the economic 
objectives that marketers seek to attain through the use of this practice, and it may therefore 
be most beneficial to them not to use it at all.   
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c. Mobile Tracking Tools 
Mobile tracking tools also present their own issues with regards to the consent 
provisions of both the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS.  While it is true that Canadian mobile 
advertisers utilize opt-in consent prior to targeting individuals using location-based 
services
451
, the various positioning systems used to track these individuals serve to track all 
those who possess a cellular telephone
452
.  The only difference is that in the latter case, the 
location data aggregated is not used to target these individuals with location-based ads.  
While this does not change anything with regards to the obligation to acquire the consent of 
individuals in light of the ARPPIPS, which demands that an individual manifestly consent 
to the collection of his data
453
, such instances may be exempt from the principle of consent 
with respect to the PIPEDA.  While the PIPEDA states that consent should typically be 
acquired at the time of collection, it is possible for consent to be sought after the collection 
but prior to the use of the personal information
454
.  Thus, in the event that the location data 
collected through the signals emitted by mobile phones is not utilized for advertising 
purposes, consent may not be necessary.   
In cases where the information in question is used, however, the procurement of 
consent is necessary but may not be so easily obtained in the practice of mobile targeted 
marketing.  As mentioned above
455
, the new Canadian Anti-Spam legislation
456
  requires 
that consent be acquired prior to any message being sent to an individual.  At the same 
time, this law also considers any message sent requesting the consent of an individual to 
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send further messages to be an electronic message
457
.  This means that the consent of the 
individual must be achieved in some other manner prior to sending him any messages 
whatsoever on his cellular telephone.   
Furthermore, while this law considers that both explicit and implicit consent are 
acceptable
458
, consent can only be implicit in very specific situations, namely when a 
business relationship already exists between the individual and the entity sending him a 
message, and if the individual has published his email address or disclosed his business 
card.  In order to ensure express consent, on the other hand, the purposes for which consent 
is sought must be set out clearly and simply.  As such, the proposition that disclosure, and 
thus consent, of the individual be performed by the carrier at the moment the service 
contract is signed may therefore be efficient, not only to provide disclosure but also to 
ensure that the consent to both the collection and use of the individual’s personal 
information, and thus tracking data, be used to target him with advertisements
459
 as sending 
him a message on his cellular telephone for the purpose of obtaining such consent is no 
longer permissible in light of Canada’s new Anti-Spam legislation.  In such cases, however, 
he must have the option of refusing to consent, as the wireless services being offered cannot 
depend on his acceptance of such a clause
460
.  
We believe that protecting individuals against receiving undesired messages on their 
mobile phones is a very economically sound position.  If individuals were to receive 
messages from marketers with whom they have no relation, they are bound to feel a certain 
invasion of privacy and may even consider the receipt of such messages a nuisance.  In this 
light, should individuals find mobile advertisements invasive, they may simply refuse to 
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provide their consent to the sending of such messages so that they may live freely without 
such privacy invasions or may even limit the use they make of their cellular telephones to 
ensure that such data is unavailable to marketers.   
This potential outcome has been illustrated by a recent survey conducted by the Pew 
Research Center, which demonstrated that 30% of individuals who downloaded apps on 
their cellular phones have uninstalled certain apps due to the fact that it had come to their 
attention that they were collecting information that the individuals did not wish to share
461
 
and 19% of cell holders have disabled the location tracking feature for fear that this data 
would be accessed by third parties.  This sort of reaction on the part of individuals thus 
renders their personal information unavailable to marketers – an outcome which would be 
tremendously undesirable for them. Limiting the situations in which individuals can be 
contacted by businesses on their mobile telephones, in a manner that ensure that consent is 
properly acquired without invading an individual’s privacy, is thus the only manner in 
which to ensure that this end result is avoided.  While it may not be helpful to marketers 
immersed in the domain of mobile advertising, as it severely limits their ability to practice 
this form of marketing, this limit is far less than what they would suffer if consent was 
denied due to the invasiveness of their practices.  
* * * 
To conclude, it is clear that acquiring consent for the practice of targeted marketing 
presents many issues, regardless of which tracking tool is used to achieve this purpose.  
Several solutions have, however, been suggested with regards to the issue of consent, none 
of which have been implemented as of yet.  The first solution to be proposed is that of a 
“Do Not Track List”, which is similar to a “Do Not Call List” but applies to the use of 
technological tracking tools to aggregate information
462
.  It has been considered, however, 
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that such a solution would result in more privacy issues than it would be able to mend, as it 
would function by creating a national database of consumers that have opted-out
463
 which 
would allow the government to collect a significant amount of personally identifiable 
information to which they would not have otherwise had access and which they might 
misuse
464
.  Furthermore, the fact that consumers would be required to opt-out rather than 
opt-in may also impose certain issues, aside from the fact that such a registry would be 
extremely costly to create and implement
465
. 
Another solution that has been proposed, and one that seems to be more viable than 
a “Do Not Track List”, however, is one that would necessitate the creation of an opt-in 
program for targeted advertising
466
 – a solution similar to the one which the European 
Commission intends to implement
467
.  This solution would fundamentally attempt to 
protect consumers from the practice of targeted marketing by requiring marketers to 
develop a program, overseen by a government entity that would have the authority to 
impose significant fines should the enterprise not conform to its obligations, which would 
require consumers to choose to participate in targeted advertising strategies from a 
particular enterprise
468
.  This program would also provide consumers with the choice of 
which information they would like to share, but prohibit them from volunteering any 
sensitive information, while requiring enterprises to provide these individuals with 
sufficient notice prior to beginning the collection of the information in question
469
.  Finally, 
it is suggested that the data should only be used for the specific purposes for which it was 
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collected while limiting the period of time that enterprises may retain the information so as 
to prevent them from being in the position of creating very detailed consumer profiles
470
.   
For the reasons exposed above
471
, we believe that this opt-in program would be the 
most beneficial as it would incite the trust of individuals by allowing them to exercise 
control over their personal data.  However, regardless of whether or not such solutions are 
implemented, organizations are required to take steps to ensure that individual consent is 
acquired.  While it is true that the issue of consent in targeted marketing is not clear cut, it 
is crucial to take all the elements regarding each type of tracking tool into account to 
determine which form of consent would be most appropriate, as well as economically 
viable, under the circumstances.   
* * * 
The above examination of the various privacy laws effectively outlines the 
provisions that present the greatest issues in the domain of targeted marketing, and the 
manner in which these issues can be best remedied.  The protection of personal 
information, however, is merely one aspect of the right to privacy afforded to Canadian 
citizens.  This right also serves to protect these individuals against any form of intrusion 
that would put the private nature of their lives at risk.  The next section will therefore be 
dedicated to this second facet of privacy protection.   
Section 2 The Protection Against Intrusion on Privacy and Personal Property 
and Its Application to the Practice of Targeted Marketing 
In addition to protecting the personal information of individuals, as exposed in the 
previous section
472
, the general right to privacy afforded to Canadian and Quebec citizens 
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alike also serves to protect them against “intrusions upon [their] seclusion or solitude”473.  
Such a protection is provided in Quebec law through the action in civil liability enshrined 
in section 1457 C.C.Q.
474
 which requires evidence of a fault, which in this case would be 
the intrusion in question, damages and a causal link between the two in order to establish a 
claim.  This section will be dedicated to (1) outlining the fault arising from the act of 
intruding upon an individual’s seclusion through the use of technological tracking tools for 
targeted marketing purposes and (2) illustrating the damages that may arise directly as a 
result of this faulty behaviour.     
Subsection 1 The Fault of Intruding on Privacy and Personal Property 
According to section 1457 C.C.Q., a fault is considered to be another’s failure to 
“abide by the rules of conduct [...] according to the circumstances, usage or law”.  When it 
comes to privacy, the law holds that, not only do individuals have the right to the protection 
of their personal data, and therefore to their anonymity, as discussed above
475
, but they also 
have the right to be guarded against any unjustified intrusions into their solitude
476
 – a 
liberty which is accompanied by his right to physical isolation
477
.  From this perspective, 
                                                 
473
 Charles J. HARTMANN and Stephen M. RENAS, “Anglo-American Privacy Law:  An Economic Analysis”, 
(1985) 5 International Review of Law and Economics 133, 140; See also: Jean-Louis BAUDOUIN and 
Patrice DESLAURIERS, La Responsabilité Civile, 7
th
 ed., vol. 1, Cowansville, Les Éditions Yvon Blais, 
2007, p. 225. 
474
 Civil Code of Quebec, prev. cited, note 15. 
475
 Supra, p. 68-101. 
476
Cooperberg c. Buckam, [1958] C.S. 427; McIlwaine c. Equity Accounts Buyers Ltd., [1974] R.L. 115 
(C.P.); Auger c. Equity Account Buyers Ltd., [1976] C.S. 279; Beaudoin c. Beaudoin, [1986] R.R.A. 68 
(C.P.); Tousignant c. Bernier, J.E. 87-1211 (C.S.); Pasquale c. Descôteaux, [1990] R.R.A. 574 (C.S.); 
Pelletier c. Emery, J.E. 97-1360 (C.S.); Latreille c. Choptain, J.E. 97-1475 (C.S.); Savard c. All Tour 
Marketing, [1998] R.R.A. 649 (C.Q.); Olteanu c. Zellers inc., B.E. 99BE-1205 (Q.C.); Choueke c. 
Coopératived’habitation Jeanne-Mance, [2001] R.J.Q. 1441 (C.A.), infirmed J.E. 95-880 (C.S.) (leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court refused); Huot c. Martineau, [2005] J.L. 75 (C.S.); Wilkie c. Lapensée, J.E. 
2005-938 (C.S.); Gariépy c. Naud, EYB 2006-100784 (C.S.) (appeal refused EYB 2007-116806); J.-
L. BAUDOUIN and P. DESLAURIERS, prev. cited, note 473, p. 225; C. J. HARTMANN and S. M. RENAS, prev. 
cited, note 473, 140. 
477
 Édith DELEURY and Dominique GOUBAU, Le droit des personnes physiques, 4
th
 ed., Cowansville, Les 
Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008, par. 172. 
  
 
103
“the protection of an individual’s privacy takes on a geographic 
dimension.  It recognizes a particular territory at whose frontiers 
another’s power ends and at the heart of which reigns a small 
sovereignty.  Guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms, the inviolability of the domicile is, for the 
person whom it protects, the right to prevent another’s access to their 
home; more specifically, it is the right for each person to turn his 
domicile into a place of sanctuary and retreat where he can, if he 
desires, live alone and be protected from intrusions and 
interventions.   
[...] 
It is upon this basis that tribunals have sanctioned harassment, by 
telephone, to which certain individuals were victims […].”478 
The Courts therefore recognize that intrusions into an individual’s domicile need not 
necessarily be physical, but can consist of technological intrusions as well, such as through 
pestering an individual in his domicile by making constant telephone calls
479
. Considering 
that a telephone call consists of the sending of electronic signals, we believe that a parallel 
may be made when technological tracking tools are utilized to trace individuals throughout 
the Internet as the use of these tools inevitably implies the sending of an electronic signal to 
the devices of individuals so that they may effectively be tracked.   
Considering the fact that physical intrusions into a person’s home are no longer the 
only option of intruding upon his personal property in today’s modern age, this is a 
reasonable stance to take as a means to properly ensure the protection of privacy.  In 
essence, with the advent of the Internet, it is now possible to determine information about 
an individual’s private life through intruding upon his personal electronic devices utilizing 
various technological tools such as the ones adopted for targeted marketing purposes, as 
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discussed above
480
.  In this light, and considering that harassment by telephone was 
sanctioned by the court as an intrusion into one’s domicile, we believe that the use of such 
tools could potentially be considered as a form of intrusion as well.  
The adoption of such a point of view would be tremendously beneficial to online 
targeted marketers.  This is due to the fact that the protection of the solitude of individuals 
exists “not to bust people for trespass after it has been committed, [but] rather […] to 
encourage people to keep their doors relatively open in the first place”481 because “[if] the 
government did not enforce laws against physical trespass, more potential victims would 
probably buy locks for their doors”482.  Applying this perspective to our current situation, 
such a protection serves to promote a sense of safety that will allow individuals to feel 
sufficiently at ease to communicate openly and freely, rather than to erect barriers that 
would hinder communication because they are not properly protected against such privacy 
invasions.  The laws safeguarding the right of individuals to their solitude therefore serve to 
promote the continued openness of individuals in their dealings on the Internet, and it is 
upon this that marketers rely for their advertising campaigns, thus making it impossible to 
deny the benefit of this protection to their cause.   
While no Quebec court has ever been approached with a case regarding the 
possibility that the use of such tools may violate an individual’s right to solitude, a recent 
case decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal
483
 has chosen to recognize the collection of 
information in electronic format to be an intrusion into an individual’s seclusion as an 
extension of his privacy, essentially stating that:  
“It is within the capacity of the common law to evolve to respond to 
the problem posed by the routine collection and aggregation of 
highly personal information that is readily accessible in electronic 
form. Technological change poses a novel threat to a right of privacy 
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that has been protected for hundreds of years by the common law 
under various guises and that, since 1982 and the Charter, has been 
recognized as a right that is integral to our social and political 
order.”484 
We believe, however, that this outlook may be followed by Quebec courts should 
they be approached with such a matter. This belief is based on the opinion of the Superior 
Court of Quebec in the case of Canadian Real Estate Assoc./Assoc. Canadienne 
d’immeuble c. Sutton (Quebec) Real Estate Services Inc.485 where they were approached to 
issue an interlocutory injunction to prohibit the unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s website 
by the defendant.  A website being a form of personal property, and the unauthorized nature 
of the visits being viewed as an intrusion, we believe that a parallel may be made between 
the two situations.  As such, and despite the fact that the foundation of this case was 
ultimately never decided, the decision of the Court on this particular matter may shed some 
light on the manner in which Quebec Courts may treat the use of technological tracking 
tools for the purposes of intruding on an individual's solitude.  
In this case, CREA was suing Sutton for having used a particular technology known 
as spiders
486
, which are software agents that are designed to search, copy and retrieve 
elements on public websites
487
 through multiple automated successive requests
488
, to copy 
their real-estate listings, modify them slightly, and place them on their own site.  In this 
case, the Court considered that Sutton was in bad faith due to the fact that it attempted to 
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bypass every technological deterrent that CREA put in its way to prevent it from accessing 
the site and thus issued the interlocutory injunction. 
If we extend this reasoning to the use of technological tracking tools, the same logic 
could apply.  For example, presently, the only real power an individual has over the use of 
his personal data gathered through cookies is to delete those cookies – the deletion being 
the technological deterrent meant to prevent his data from being used for targeted 
marketing purposes.  Yet, as discussed above
489
, Flash cookies simply re-create those Web 
cookies that an individual has deleted.  Flash cookies are thus being used to overturn the 
technological deterrent meant to protect an individual’s personal information.  If we follow 
the logic of the case of CREA v. Sutton
490
, the use of Flash cookies in this manner would 
therefore be considered faulty due to its unauthorized nature. 
The same logic developed in CREA v. Sutton
491
 can extend to the practice of DPI.  It 
is common for individuals to take the pain to protect their computers from spyware by 
downloading software meant to detect such invasions and ultimately delete them.  The use 
of DPI by ISPs, however, simply allows these entities to achieve precisely what this anti-
spyware software is meant to protect individuals from by using technology that is 
undetected by the software in question.  ISPs thus overturn the only technological deterrent 
available to users that could keep them at bay, and such behaviour may be considered both 
faulty and unauthorized if we follow the logic of CREA v. Sutton
492
. 
While CREA v. Sutton
493
 could serve to exhibit the potentially illicit nature of the 
use of tracking tools, the Superior Court simply considers Sutton’s use of CREA’s website, 
despite CREA’s objections, as an act of bad faith without going into further detail regarding 
what precisely constitutes an intrusion in the online world.  Though it is evident that for the 
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use of another’s property to be considered an intrusion such use must be unauthorized, we 
possess no criteria outlining what would constitute such an intrusion in the virtual world.   
This element has, however, been extensively analyzed by the American courts in 
cases relating to trespass on technological devices
494
.  While we may not be bound by 
American decisions, the opinions of the American courts on the manner in which this 
element ought to be defined are intriguing and, considering that Canadian case law in this 
domain is lacking, the potential for the Canadian courts to adopt a similar position remains 
a possibility. Essentially, when analyzing the definition of an “unauthorized intrusion”, it is 
the approach taken by the Northern District Court of California in the case of eBay v. 
Bidder’s Edge495 that is most applicable to the issue at hand.  In this case, Bidder’s Edge 
possessed an auction site for which it would procure information regarding items available 
for auction by spidering other auction websites including eBay.  The Court concluded that 
the transmission of these spiders was unauthorized as this type of use of their site was not 
granted under their terms and conditions
496
.   Furthermore, eBay used certain technological 
barriers meant to stop spiders from accessing their site which were not heeded to by 
Bidder’s Edge, who persisted in the impugned behaviour497.  The Court thus concluded that 
the use of spiders on eBay’s site was both intentional and unauthorized, essentially taking it 
a step further than the court in CREA v. Sutton
498
 by taking eBay’s terms and conditions 
into account.   
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If we transpose this reasoning into the situation whereby an individual’s right to 
solitude is violated by the use of technological tracking tools, it can be said that through his 
use of various websites, an individual is aware that certain cookies must be placed on his 
computer for the site to work and could thus be said to accept this form of intrusion into his 
solitude.  Such an authorization is, however, limited to the placement of these cookies on 
his browser so that he may utilize the site in question, and does not extend to permit the use 
of cookies to track his behaviour online.  The use of cookies in such a manner goes beyond 
what was, in fact, permitted by the individual and could thus be considered unauthorized.   
Similarly, in the case of DPI, individuals allow ISPs to send electronic signals to 
their personal devices to provide them with an Internet connection.  Individuals do not, 
however, allow ISPs trace their behaviour online through these signals.  The use of DPI to 
track individuals could therefore also be considered an unauthorized intrusion in this 
respect as the actions taken by ISPs exceed the authorization that was provided to them. 
A similar logic could apply in the case of mobile tracking tools.  Individuals permit 
their cellular telephone providers to send satellite signals to their mobile phones so that they 
may be able to have voice conversations and send text messages and so on.  They do not, 
however, allow these signals to be sent so that their mobile service providers can track their 
geographic position and target them with ads based on this data.  Thus, if we take the 
criterion established in the case of eBay v. Bidder’s Edge499, the use of technological 
tracking tools would consist of a use other than what was authorized by the individuals 
involved, and may therefore ultimately be considered an intrusion.   
Establishing the unauthorized nature of the use of tracking tools through such an 
approach is intriguing. While this stance was taken in the case of eBay v. Bidder’s Edge500 
with regards to trespass resulting from the unauthorized use of spiders, we believe that this 
logic should be extended to protect the right to solitude.  If the courts were to hold that the 
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simple use by individuals of the Internet or their cell phones establish their consent to the 
use of tracking tools to trace their behaviour, these individuals may behave in a manner that 
would serve to limit their use of these devices due to a lack of protection afforded to their 
right to solitude, as exposed above
501
.  However, such an outcome may be avoided by 
holding that the use of technological tracking tools exceeds the extent of the authorization 
that individuals provided by allowing them to feel as if their consent was not merely 
imputed by their use of the Internet or their mobile phones, and would thus serve to ensure 
their continued use of these elements in a free and open manner.   
Considering the economic benefits of such an outlook, we believe that it may be a 
practicable one for the intents and purposes of Quebec law.  In view of the fact that an 
individual’s right to privacy is a fundamental one, we do not believe that its protection 
would be properly assured by requiring an individual to act in order to exhibit a lack of 
consent that would establish the bad faith of the entity utilizing technological tracking tools, 
as would be required if we followed the approach developed in the case of CREA v. 
Sutton
502
.  That case took place between two companies and we do not believe that 
adopting this position in the case of individuals whose privacy is being violated would be 
viable.  While it may be useful in establishing the further bad faith of companies that may 
use technological tracking tools to trace individuals despite their lack of consent, it should 
not be the only criterion required to demonstrate the element of fault resulting from such 
unauthorized intrusions.   
We therefore believe that the criterion established in eBay v. Bidder’s Edge503 
would better serve to protect the right to solitude of individuals as it actually requires that 
the consent of individuals be acquired rather than merely imputed as a result of their use of 
the Internet or their mobile telephones.  While this does place a greater obligation upon 
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marketers to ensure that they receive authorization for the use of such tools, their respect of 
this requirement will ultimately benefit them, as exposed above
504
.   
While we are unsure as to whether or not Quebec law requires the establishment of 
any criteria other than an unauthorized intrusion, it is interesting to point out that American 
case law goes even further, essentially requiring a certain level of interference with another 
individual’s possessory interest to establish the existence of an intrusion.  There is, 
however, no consensus as to the degree of interference required.  A certain trend in case 
law merely necessitates a level of interference that consist of simple intermeddling
505
, while 
another demands a more substantial interference to establish such a claim
506
.  
The question of the degree of interference required, or whether such an element 
must be established at all, is an important one simply due to the fact that when it comes to 
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technological tracking tools, the only tool that interferes per se in an individual’s personal 
property are cookies as they are stored on the computer of an individual and are used to 
track them throughout the Internet.  DPI and mobile positioning systems, on the other hand, 
do not interact with the device itself, but only with the electronic signals emitted from the 
device in question and such signals could only be a basis for an action in intrusion if the 
individual has possessory interest in said signals.   
In the case of DPI, the packets of information emanating from an individual’s 
computer are intercepted and, inasmuch as these packets contain data generated by this 
person, we believe that he could hold a possessory interest in these packets.  While it is true 
that the ISP enables the sending of these packets, the individual in question pays for these 
services and, as such, we are of the opinion that it may be possible to consider any 
electronic signals originating directly from his computer as belonging to him. 
With regards to mobile devices, on the other hand, it is not by any manifest action 
on the part of the owner of the cellular phone that signals are emitted and tracked, but rather 
as an inherent part of the technology in question.  Whether the signals produced by a 
person’s cellular phone can be considered as an extension of his possessory interest in the 
mobile device itself, as these signals originate from an item he owns and are necessary to 
his ability to use that item for its required purposes, on the other hand, is debatable. 
This being said, we are not convinced that Quebec law would require any particular 
level of interference to establish the existence of a fault in light of an unauthorized intrusion 
on the right to solitude of individuals.  The moment an unauthorized intrusion is 
established, the element of fault has been successfully proven as said intrusion violates the 
law, thus not requiring any further demonstration. However, we do foresee that a change in 
perspective may be necessary when it comes to intrusions of a technological nature.   
If no threshold is emitted for the level of interference required to institute a claim of 
technological intrusion, such claims may be instituted by individuals in the event that an 
electronic signal is sent to their personal device for potentially frivolous reasons and 
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regardless of whether or not their right to solitude and the inviolability of their domicile is 
truly affected.  Let us take, for example, the case of an individual who had a terrible 
argument with a friend that put an end to their relationship and this friend decides to send 
that person an e-mail.  While, if we adopt the definition of intrusion that we have developed 
throughout this subsection, we would come to the conclusion that the act of sending this e-
mail was an intrusion per se, we do not believe that this form of intrusion ought to be 
actionable.  This is simply due to the fact that this would present an undue strain on the use 
of the Internet, causing every e-mail sent by a regular individual to be scrutinized and 
present the potential threat of legal action each time the “send” button is clicked.  While it 
is true that the sending of an e-mail in this example would ultimately have to result in 
damages for it to be actionable, there are various reasons for which an individual can put 
forth that he or she has experienced suffering from the e-mail in question. 
Thus, when viewing the level of interference required from a targeted marketing 
perspective it would not necessarily seem wise to have a threshold, as the use of 
technological tracking tools by marketers without the consent of the individual who are 
being traced may not always surpass the established threshold and would therefore render 
such privacy violations un-actionable, we cannot neglect the fact that the Internet is a tool 
used by nearly everyone and as such, any legal rules developed to regulate it must take the 
varying uses that are made of the Internet into account.  We therefore believe that it would 
be wise to place a threshold on the level of interference required to establish a technological 
intrusion essentially making it high enough to exclude any claims that may arise from an 
intrusion that does not necessarily violate an individual’s privacy and would ultimately 
result in a petty lawsuit that would waste both the time and money of the court system, 
while making it sufficiently low to ensure that their right to privacy is still adequately 
protected from true invasions thus maintaining their free and liberal use of the Internet for 
inter-personal communications
507
.   
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In light of the above analysis, we believe that it may be possible to consider the use 
of technological tools to track and target individuals with ads without their prior consent, as 
required by the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS
508
, as being an intrusion into their seclusion as 
well as their personal property, and therefore ultimately a fault.  While it is true that the 
simple violation of the ARPPIPS by neglecting to acquire an individual’s consent prior to 
collecting his personal information could constitute a fault in and of itself, and thus give 
rise to an action in civil liability, we believe that the analysis demonstrating that the use of 
technological tracking tools in Internet marketing could constitute an intrusion into one’s 
solitude and personal property was necessary, simply so as to illustrate the various manners 
in which the use of such tools could violate an individual’s right to privacy.  What remains 
is therefore to determine whether or not said intrusion ultimately results in damages, in 
order to be capable of establishing an action under section 1457 C.C.Q. for these purposes.   
Subsection 2 Damages Resulting From Intrusions on Privacy and Personal 
Property 
In addition to demonstrating fault, it is also necessary to demonstrate the existence 
of damages to be successful in an action in civil liability in Quebec law.  In this respect, 
damages need not be limited to an injury inflicted on the personal property that was 
intruded upon, but can extend to any form of damage that is a direct result of the fault that 
was committed.  This makes a great deal of sense, because while the use of technological 
tracking tools to trespass onto someone’s property to intrude into his private life could 
result in an injury onto that property – which would be actionable in Quebec law – this is 
not the only damage that is susceptible to occur and it is crucial for the law to recognize this 
fact.  Under such circumstances, damages may also arise under the form of any 
consequences that may occur directly as a result of the acquisition and use of an 
individual’s personal data that was aggregated at the moment of this trespass, which may 
result in distress, humiliation or anguish. 
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The use of such tools renders a person’s life an opened book, without it necessarily 
being desired, and makes it possible for others to discover facts about an individual’s 
lifestyle and personality that he may rather keep confidential.  The personal repercussions 
suffered as a result of this intrusion could therefore qualify as damages sufficient for the 
establishment of an action in civil liability, as it is a direct consequence of the violation of 
an individual’s privacy achieved by intruding into his private life through trespassing onto 
his personal property. 
* * * 
This form of privacy protection follows the same grain as the protection afforded to 
the personal information of individuals by requiring their consent before their private lives 
are intruded upon.  Intrusions on the solitude of individuals would, in fact, be non-existent 
if the requirements of both the PIPEDA and ARPPIPS regarding consent are respected.  
The existence of the fault of intrusion is based upon an individual intruding upon the 
solitude and personal property of another person without authorization.  This means that a 
claim in civil liability for intrusion could no longer exist should the interference in question 
be consented to, as there could be no fault of trespass should the individual consent to 
intrusions into his personal life. As such, when it comes to using technological tools to 
intrude on the private lives of individuals, the proper respect of the requirement of both the 
PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS
509
, obliging organizations to acquire the consent of individuals 
when such tools are utilized to gather their personal information, would ultimately serve to 
circumvent any claim a person could have with respect to trespass under such 
circumstances.   
While the privacy issues that abound in the practice of targeted marketing are rather 
abundant, and the solutions to these problems are not always evident, consent is often times 
the key in such situations; it is the free and enlightened consent of individuals that will 
protect Internet marketers against pursuits for either the violation of personal information or 
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for trespass.  Relying on the consent of individuals and respecting all the rules and 
regulations meant to protect both the personal information and personal property of 
individuals is the only economically sound position for marketers to take, as demonstrated 
throughout this chapter.  Any other approach would ultimately circumvent the goal meant 
to be achieved by marketers by limiting the amount of behavioural information available to 
them, and it is upon their ability to aggregate this data that marketers depend to successfully 
target individuals with online or mobile advertisements.   
While privacy law is very significant when it comes to targeted marketing, and it is 
crucial for marketers to pay sufficient heed to this area of the law in order to maintain their 
ability to perform this practice, this is not the only domain of law which may affect the 
practice of online marketing.  There are certain other practices utilized in Internet 
marketing that may serve to violate competition law, trademark law and consumer 
protection law – issues which will all be discussed in further detail in the next chapter.   
Chapter 2  Unfair Business Practices In Internet Marketing  
SEM, the practice of using various techniques to increase a website’s position in the 
search results appearing in online search engines
510
, and SMM, the use of social media by 
companies to maintain a conversation with its consumers
511
, are two forms of online 
marketing that sometimes utilize illicit methods to promote a company’s product or 
service
512
.  The use of such methods threatens both competitors, whose position in the 
market may be decreased as a result, as well as consumers, who tend to be deceived by 
these underhanded practices.  As such, these practices present issues in three areas of the 
law that are meant to protect both competitors and consumers alike, namely competition 
law, trademark law and consumer protection law.  This chapter will therefore be dedicated 
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to discussing the legal implications of both SEM and SMM (1) from a competition law and 
trademark law perspective, and (2) from a consumer protection law perspective.   
Section 1 The Implications of Search Engine Marketing and Social Media 
Marketing From a Competition Law and Trademark Law 
Perspective 
Both SEM and SMM present certain issues with respect to the areas of competition 
law and trademark law.  To begin with, (1) both of these forms of marketing are sometimes 
used in a manner that may consist of unfair competition.  Additionally, there are times 
when (2) these forms of marketing make use of the trademarks of other companies that 
could ultimately fall under the gambit of trademark infringement.   
Subsection 1 Unfair Competition in Search Engine Marketing and Social Media 
Marketing 
The forms of unfair competition that are prominent in SEM and SMM surround (1) 
the use of certain SEM techniques to dishonestly diminish competition, and (2) the use of 
SMM to denigrate competitors in the hopes of adversely affecting their business – two 
issues which will be discussed in further detail below.    
Paragraph 1 Unfair Trade Practices in Search Engine Marketing  
The Competition Act
513
 states its purpose to revolve around the “[maintenance] and 
[encouragement of] competition in Canada”514 – a purpose which follows the economic 
basis for competition law, which holds that “the essential factor ensuring competition is the 
possibility for an entrepreneur to enter the market so as to compete against those that are 
already a part of it”515 (our translation).  In order to ensure this possibility, however, 
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enterprises must exercise honest business practices that render it possible for new 
companies to enter the market.  As a result, the maintenance of competition depends on the 
use of such business practices while explicitly rejecting any form of behaviour that would, 
in any manner, diminish competition.   
As discussed above, however, black hat SEM tactics
516
, which are underhanded 
techniques used by companies to increase the ranking of a website, could be considered as 
an unfair trade practice.  While no Canadian court of law has, up until the present, been 
approached with a case regarding this subject matter, an interesting parallel could be made 
with the case of Chocolat Lamontagne Inc. v. Humeur Groupe Conseil Inc.
517
, which was 
decided regarding the use of the trademarks of competitors in the Google AdWords 
program
518
.  The Superior Court judge in this case held that the use of trademarks in such a 
manner is acceptable and cannot be considered as constituting unfair competition because 
“[w]hen such an offer does not contain anything unfair [...] the advertiser cannot be held 
liable for having created the opportunity to be reached”519.  The use of black hat SEM 
tactics is, however, considered to be “unfair” in the cyber-world.  The analysis emitted by 
the Court in this case, while not prohibiting the Google AdWords program, may therefore 
possibly be extended to reason that the use of black hat techniques is illicit as such types of 
offers do contain unfair elements.   
In this light, we believe that there is a strong likelihood that Canadian courts will 
consider this form of behaviour to consist of an unfair trade practice, more particularly 
because the use of such tactics violates the purpose of the CA.  This is due to the fact that 
the ultimate goal of black hat SEM techniques is to attempt to unjustly and dishonestly 
exclude a competitor from the online market by lowering their position in the list of results 
and thus diminishing competition. 
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The CA, however, confines itself to the regulation of a limited number of practices 
that may serve to diminish or eliminate competition, none of which could be viewed as 
including the type of unfair trade practice presented by black hat SEM techniques.  It is 
rather the Trade-marks Act
520
, at its section 7(e), that serves to regulate such behaviour by 
prohibiting companies from “[doing] any other act or [adopting] any other business practice 
contrary to honest industrial commercial usage in Canada”521.  As such, individuals who 
use dishonest practices to negatively affect their competitors businesses can be sued for 
their actions.  This section was, however, determined to be ultra vires by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the case of Macdonald et al. v. Vapor Canada Ltd.
522
, where the judges 
determined that the regulation of such forms of behaviour falls to provincial competence.  
As such, each province possesses its own system for regulating unfair trade practices
523
, but 
we will concentrate solely on the one established in Quebec.  
In Quebec, unfair trade practices are regulated by the action in disloyal competition 
which is based on the general regime of civil liability
524
 engrained in section 1457 
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C.C.Q.
525
, as outlined above
526
. In such cases, the fault would be the use of an unfair trade 
practice, but the question remains as to what exactly this constitutes.  While such practices 
evidently consist of those which are explicitly prohibited by the law, unfair trade practices 
also consist of those behaviours “that are contrary to the “honest customs” of the industry 
and of commerce”527 (our translation) regardless of the intention of the individual 
committing such acts
528
.   
In the case of SEM, the honest norms and customs solely permit the use of white hat 
techniques to increase ones ranking – all black hat techniques are severely frowned upon.  
Thus, in such cases, a fault could reasonably consist of the use of any black hat tactics as 
they cannot be considered to be honest practices.  A similar position was upheld in the case 
of Convectair NMT inc. v. Ouellet Canada
529
, where the issue at hand was the abusive use 
of meta-tags by the defendant to increase his rankings in online search engines.  The 
Superior Court Judge in this case considered that the use of such underhanded methods by 
companies to appear higher up on the list of search results is both “dishonest and 
insidious”530. 
The consideration of dishonest commercial practices, and in this case the use of 
black hat SEM techniques to increase one’s position in search results, as a fault for the 
intents and purposes of an action in disloyal competition makes complete sense from an 
economic analysis perspective as it serves to protect both components of the market, 
namely businesses as well as consumers.  It protects businesses by obliging them to use 
honest practices and not manipulate their position in the market, while at the same time 
protecting consumers against being provided with false information by companies simply 
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to attract their business.  In the latter case, the use of black hat SEM tactics could lead a 
consumer to believe that the company that appears prior to another on the list of search 
results due to their use of these dishonest practices is more popular or comes more highly 
recommended when this may not necessarily be true.   
In addition to demonstrating the existence of a fault, damages must also be proven 
to establish an action in disloyal competition.  In these types of cases, however, judges 
often conclude that, once a fault is proven, there is a reasonable probability that damages 
will follow
531
.  This is the only solution that would make sense from an economic analysis 
perspective as, rather than disturbing the market further by requiring actual evidence of 
damages, the faulty behaviour will have been stopped prior to its negatively affecting a 
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business thus avoiding any further affectation thereof.  This approach serves to minimize 
the ultimate effect on the market and allow for the pursuit of honest business to continue.   
* * * 
Thus, when it comes to the use of black hat techniques in SEM, it is very likely that 
an action in disloyal competition could exist.  SEM is not, however, the only form of online 
marketing in which an action in disloyal competition is an option; SMM also presents this 
possibility when social media forums are utilized to denigrate competitors – a practice 
commonly referred to as trade libel.  The next paragraph will thus be dedicated to an in-
depth discussion of the action in disloyal competition as a result of trade libel. 
Paragraph 2 Trade Libel in Social Media Marketing 
Various forms of social media, such as SNWs or blogs, are often used by companies 
to defame their competitors and harm their reputation
532
 – behaviour which gives rise to a 
cause of action in trade libel.  Trade libel, also referred to as denigration, is a tactic used to 
discredit one’s competitor in the public eye by attacking either his reputation or his wares 
and services in the hopes of negatively affecting his business
533
.  As discussed above
534
, 
there are many instances in SMM where such actions are committed and tend to result in 
the plummeting of the competitor’s sales.  Such behaviour is, however, forbidden by the 
law – a prohibition which is enshrined in (a) section 7(a) of the TMA at federal law, as well 
as in (b) the action in disloyal competition for denigration at Quebec civil law, both of 
which will be discussed in further detail heretofore and applied to the occurrence of trade 
libel in SMM.   
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a.  Section 7(a) of the Trade-marks Act 
To begin with, section 7(a) of the TMA
535
 is rather specific in its prohibition and 
states that “[n]o person shall […] make a false or misleading statement tending to discredit 
the business, wares or services of a competitor”.  According to the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the case of S. & S. Industries Inc. v. Rowell
536
, this section requires the 
establishment of 3 criteria, namely (1) that the statement be false or misleading, (2) that it 
concern the business, wares or services of a competitor, and (3) that this competitor incur 
damages as a result, evidence of lost revenue being sufficient to fulfill this criterion
537
.   
An action under section 7(a)
538
 presents a rather significant benefit
539
 for businesses 
as, rather than solely being permitted to pursue if the statement in question is false, they 
may institute an action for any statement that is either false
540
 or misleading
541
.  The 
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advantage that lies therein is twofold as, not only does it provide businesses with further 
opportunities to protect themselves against dishonest forms of competition and allow them 
to maintain their position in the market, but it also serves to preserve a healthy competitive 
environment that protects the market against any adverse effects it may suffer due to 
potentially dishonest trade practices.  
Another possible benefit of an action under section 7(a) of the TMA
542
 is that the 
malice or knowledge of the false nature of the statement by the individual from whom it 
emanates is not necessarily required.  Unfortunately, however, while the Court in the case 
of S. & S. Industries Inc. v. Rowell
543
 distinguished section 7(a) from this respect, future 
judgments on this section are divided as to whether or not such a distinction should be 
maintained
544
.  Despite this division of the courts, we believe that the interpretation 
afforded to section 7(a) of the TMA by the Supreme Court in S. & S. Industries Inc. v. 
Rowell
545
 is the correct one as nowhere does this section require that malicious intent or 
knowledge of falsehood be established, and as such, such a requirement should not merely 
be imputed.  Furthermore, due to the fact that the TMA
546
 is meant to protect trademarks 
and maintain competition, no other solution would be economically sound.  Essentially, 
regardless of whether or not intent exists in the emission of such false or misleading 
statements, their effect on the market is often undeniable, and it is precisely against this 
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effect that section 7(a)
547
 is meant to protect businesses.  Additionally, obliging companies 
to demonstrate the existence of malice would simply place an added burden upon them that 
would make it much more difficult for them to ultimately protect their reputation – an 
occurrence which would also not be sustainable from an economic perspective. 
Thus, if we follow the three criteria established in the case of S. & S. Industries Inc. 
v. Rowell
548
 and apply them to the various examples provided above
549
 regarding the use of 
social media forums to discredit the business of competitors, we will reach varying results.  
To begin with, there is no doubt that the company Yili, the victim of the rumours spread by 
its direct competitor, Mengniu, regarding the fact that their children’s milk products cause 
adolescents to go through puberty prematurely
550
, would be successful in an action under 
section 7(a) of the TMA
551
 against Mengniu as well as against the marketers this company 
paid to spread these falsehoods.  Yili is one of Mengniu’s largest competitors, and it was 
established that the rumours were both false and misleading and caused Yili’s sales of that 
specific product to plummet almost immediately.   
It may, however, be questionable if an action under section 7(a) of the TMA
552
 
would be available to Wild Oats Markets, for the attacking comments made by the CEO of 
its competitor, Whole Foods, in an online forum
553
.  While the comments made by the CEO 
in question may have caused Wild Oats shares to decrease, if Wild Oats’ business was, in 
fact, in trouble, then the comments at issue are not necessarily false.  However, depending 
on the extent of the issues from which Wild Oats was suffering, the comments made by 
Whole Food’s CEO could be considered to be misleading.  It is therefore evident that such 
a situation requires an in-depth analysis of all the facts in question, and whether or not the 
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Courts would consider an action under section 7(a)
554
 to be possible would be based on 
their examination of all the elements at hand.    
The same concerns arise with the possible application of section 7(a)
555
 to the 
situation in which Facebook hired a public relations firm to expose the privacy issues of 
Google’s new feature, as discussed above556.  Although Google can definitely be 
considered as one of Facebook’s competitors, especially since Google has created its own 
social network for its users, the actual falsity or misleading nature of Facebook’s claims 
against Google is questionable, in addition to the fact that it does not appear as if Google 
suffered any adverse effects as a result of Facebook’s comments.  Thus, while section 
7(a)
557
 does protect companies from being denigrated by their competitors, the application 
of this section is limited and the success of any action instituted under this section will be 
based wholly on the Court’s interpretation of the facts of the case with which it is 
approached.   
b. An Action in Disloyal Competition for Denigration Versus an Action 
in Defamation 
The act of denigration is similar to the type of behaviour discussed in the previous 
section.  Though no precise definition of the term has ever been provided in 
jurisprudence
558
, it is generally considered to consist of comments being made to discredit 
the wares or services of a competitor so as to negatively affect his business
559
.  There are 
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two actions that serve as a basis of protection against such maligning comments, namely 
the actions in denigration or defamation.   
However, whether or not the latter action could, in fact, be used to protect legal 
persons from such maligning comments, is unclear.  Some implicitly maintain a distinction 
between the two actions
560
, essentially holding that the only one available to legal persons 
for such purposes is an action in denigration, while others sustain the position that legal 
persons possess a right to a reputation and, as such, an action in defamation should be 
available to them
561
.  The reason for which this second position is supported is due to the 
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fact that sections 3 and 35 C.C.Q.
562
 and section 4 of the Quebec Charter
563
 accord the right 
of reputation to “every person” and section 301 C.C.Q.564 further holds that “[l]egal persons 
have full enjoyment of civil rights”.  Since an action in defamation is a corollary to the 
protection of a right to reputation, many come to the conclusion that this action should be 
available to legal persons as this right is a civil one that they therefore also enjoy.    
In the event that both the actions in denigration and defamation would be available 
to legal persons, the benefit that such a choice would provide them with is undeniable, and 
this is for several reasons that on the one hand favour an action in defamation, and on the 
other hand support an action in denigration.  To begin with, while no Canadian court has 
ever been approached with a case of online denigration, decisions have been rendered in 
cases of online defamation and it has been held that defamation is considered to exist 
regardless of the medium used to diffuse defamatory comments
565
, including SNWs
566
 and 
blogs
567
, where the Courts have considered the same criteria of defamation to apply
568
.  It 
was considered that defamatory comments made on SNWs such as Facebook are 
injurious
569
 and “[attack] the dignity and integrity”570 of the individual about whom such 
comments are made.   
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Similarly, when the Superior Court of Quebec was approached with a case relative 
to defamatory comments made on blogs
571
, not only did they conclude that the civil liability 
of the defendant was engaged, but they also noted “the distinctive capacity of the Internet to 
cause instantaneous, and irreparable, damage to the business reputation of an individual or 
corporation by reason of its interactive and globally all-pervasive nature of the 
characteristics of Internet communications”572.  While, considering the general similarity 
between the two actions, it may be possible to create a parallel between online defamation 
and online denigration to establish that the courts would treat cases regarding the latter in 
the same manner as traditional denigration cases as well, it is impossible to be sure that the 
courts would establish the same parallel until they are approached with such a case. 
Further benefits arising out of the possibility for legal persons to pursue in 
defamation as well as denigration revolve around the fact that the burden of proof placed 
upon them differs between the two actions, and depending on the evidence that they have at 
their disposal, it may be simpler for them to establish one action over the other.  While both 
actions are governed by the general principles of civil liability
573
, the manner in which the 
requisite elements that must be demonstrated to establish a case will differ between actions 
in denigration and actions in defamation.   
To begin with, the action in denigration requires that bad faith be established on the 
part of the individual being pursued to successfully prove the element of fault
574
 – a 
criterion which is meant to ensure the protection of the freedom of expression
575
 but that is 
not easily proven nor makes much sense when applied to competitive environments.  
Essentially,  
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“every merchant is animated with the desire to acquire the largest possible 
clientele at the detriment of his competitors.  The intention of competitors 
should therefore not be a criterion used to judge whether or not an act is 
disloyal. Only the means used to attract the clients of a competitor should be 
judged.”576 (our translation) 
In the case of defamation, a similar stance is taken.  Fault is considered to have 
occurred in the event that an individual voluntarily and with the intention to harm another 
person attacks the latter’s reputation, causing a loss of respect towards that person and 
exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or when an individual behaves negligently 
and in his recklessness harms the reputation of another, thus leading to the same result, 
without necessarily intending on doing so
577
.  It is much simpler to establish such a burden 
of proof than it is to illustrate the existence of bad faith.  Essentially, all that would have to 
be demonstrated is that a maligning comment was made that ultimately harmed another’s 
reputation to establish the element of fault.  Superimposed into the case of denigration, such 
logic would require that a truly harmful comment be at cause, rather than one that is simply 
of an ungenerous nature, and such an outlook would ultimately lead to similar results 
without the difficult burden of proving bad faith
578
.     
From an economic analysis perspective, such a solution would be the most viable, 
simply due to the fact that a company’s business options are generally based on its 
reputation.  As such, companies should be provided with the tools that enable the protection 
of their reputation to the highest possible extent; requiring that the presence of bad faith be 
demonstrated when one of their competitors maligns them entirely defeats this purpose.  
The end result of any attack on a company’s reputation, whether it be intentional or not, 
will still ultimately be the same and as such the legal recourses available to them ought to 
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properly convey this fact and ensure protection and adequate remedies regardless of the 
intention of their competitor in such cases.   
If we apply this obligation to demonstrate bad faith to the examples we provided 
above
579
, we would be confronted with varying results.  To begin with, in the case of 
Whole Foods, where the CEO of that company attacked its competitor, Wild Oats, in an 
online forum, we are not entirely positive that an action in denigration can be established.  
While it is true that the CEO in question did make comments that ultimately resulted in the 
devaluation of Wild Oats’ shares, it may be difficult to prove bad faith in that, for all intents 
and purposes, considering the market at the time, the comments merely reiterated 
information that was already public.  While bad faith may be able to be inferred in light of 
Whole Foods subsequent offer to purchase Wild Oats later on that year, this offer could 
only imply bad faith in the event that the decision to purchase Wild Oats was made prior to 
Whole Foods’ CEO’s comments being made online.  Thus, considering the obligation to 
prove bad faith, a judge might not necessarily conclude denigration in such a case.  Yet, in 
the same light, regardless of whether or not bad faith played a factor in these statements 
being made, Wild Oats’ reputation still suffered a grave injustice that did ultimately have 
an effect on their placement in the market.  It is thus clear that, in such cases, requiring 
proof of bad faith is not the most economically viable option as it inhibits companies from 
mending their reputation and ultimately repositioning themselves within the market. 
The cases of Mengniu and Facebook, on the other hand, are both very similar to a 
case that was tried in the Superiour Court of Quebec entitled Ferland c. Larose
580
.  In this 
case, the defendant, an ambulance group, published denigrating comments in a brochure 
stating that the plaintiff refused to join their group and that this refusal can amount to a 
refusal to provide a better service, thus disadvantaging the population.  Considering these 
facts, the judge concluded to the existence of bad faith, noting that the behaviour of the 
defendant consisted of an act of disloyal competition in the form of denigration.  Applied to 
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the cases of Mengniu, where the aforementioned company spread abhorrent rumours about 
its competitor, and Facebook, where it simply exposed certain privacy issues that Google 
was experiencing with its new feature, we would reach the same results as the judge did in 
the case of Ferland v. Larose.  This is mainly due to the fact that, regardless of whether or 
not the rumours Mengniu spread were false and the ones Facebook spread may have had 
some truth to them, both companies made such comments to  
“keep their competitor’s clients at bay in the hopes that these consumers will 
resort to purchasing their own products or services.  The means utilized are 
meant to create a doubt in the minds of consumers with regards to the 
quality of the products or services offered.”581 (our translation) 
We therefore see that the requirement to prove bad faith has diverse results in different 
circumstances.   
Another benefit of an action in defamation is that it may be taken against any person 
that is involved in its communication, whereas an action in denigration may only be taken 
against a competitor.  At the same time, however, while a case in defamation may allow 
publishers of such comments to be pursued as well, the same might not necessarily be said 
in cases of online defamation.  Contrary to traditional forms of communication of 
information, online publishers, known as intermediaries, simply harbor information, often 
without monitoring it or controlling it.  As such, it is rather difficult to maintain the liability 
of an intermediary who does not possess the knowledge that defamatory comments may 
have been made on his website.  It is precisely this position that was taken by the Superior 
Court of Quebec in the case of Vaillancourt c. Lagacé
582, where the judge stated that “none 
of the evidence indicates that one or several of the defendants possessed control over the 
information thereon, nor that they possess the technical capabilities to delete certain 
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comments”583 (our translation).  This therefore demonstrates that the control of the 
information in question is necessary for an intermediary’s liability to be engaged584. 
While not quoting the AELFIT
585
, this case follows the regime of liability adopted 
by that law with regards to which actors may be held liable online, which differs slightly 
from the one established in virtue of section 1457 C.C.Q.
586
 The regime of liability 
applicable to actors on the Internet in virtue of the AELFIT
587
 will vary depending on the 
degree of control these individuals possess with regards to the content they disseminate.  
Those individuals that act as intermediaries and merely publish information without having 
any control over the content thereof will find themselves exempt from liability, unless there 
is evidence that the impugned content has somehow come to their attention
588
. This content 
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respectively.  These paragraphs state that, although a web host or an intermediary providing referencing 
services cannot be considered liable for the activities engaged in by others who utilize their services, the 
moment they become aware of the illicit nature of the information in their possession, they could potentially 
engage their liability.  Thus, according to this section, for web hosts or referencing intermediaries to be placed 
in the position of possibly incurring their liability, they must become aware that the documents in their 
possession are being used for an illicit activity.   
      However, due to the fact that these intermediaries are not obliged to actively monitor the information in 
their possession, the manners in which they can be made aware of the illicit content in their possession are 
minimal, and essentially limited to three circumstances.  To begin with, if the illicit information emanates 
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must, however, first and foremost be considered to be illicit, meaning that it must 
contravene the law or constitute a fault
589
, for their liability to potentially be engaged, and 
there is no doubt that defamatory comments fall under this category
590
.   
                                                                                                                                                    
from the web host or the referencing intermediary itself, there can be no doubt as to their knowledge of this 
data and it will thus be imputed.  Second, though these types of intermediaries are not obliged to actively 
monitor the documents in their possession, if they choose to do so then they will be presumed to have known 
that certain illicit information was in their possession.  Finally, both a web host and a referencing intermediary 
will be considered to possess the knowledge that they are harbouring illicit content in the event that they are 
notified of this fact by a third person, thus rendering it impossible for them to ignore the existence of this 
information.  In the case of a web host, however, section 22(2) of the AELFIT holds that it is also possible for 
him to incur his liability if he becomes aware of circumstances that make such a use apparent.  This could 
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immediate nature of these intermediaries’ actions to this effect will be judged based on the amount of time it 
took them to act from the moment they were assured of the illicit nature of the information.  They must, 
during this time, take the appropriate actions necessary to block all access to the documents or services in 
question and if they do not act accordingly their liability is very likely to be engaged (Pierre TRUDEL, “La 
responsabilité civile sur Internet selon la Loi concernant le cadre juridique des technologies de l’information”, 
Id., p. 17).  Thus, when it comes to online defamation, the benefit of being in the position of pursuing 
publishers as well is lost unless the publisher is aware of the defamatory comments on his website and 
chooses to do nothing about it.   
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Limiting the liability of intermediaries online is, effectively, the only solution that 
would make sense from an economic analysis perspective, especially considering the nature 
of the Internet.  It was best said by Justice Abella in the case of Crookes v. Newton
591
, 
where she stated that holding web hosts liable for information that does not originate from 
them and that they have no knowledge of would create a “potential “chill” in how the 
Internet functions [that] could be devastating”592 not only to the Internet itself as a device, 
but also to the market which is beginning to rely more heavily upon the Internet as a mode 
of effective communication which would be stifled should individuals be held liable for 
statements that they have no knowledge of. Furthermore, “[if] ISPs were liable for [all the 
data] on their networks, they might more vigilantly police subscribers to the point where 
privacy would be eroded”593 thus causing users to limit their use of this cyberarena and 
ultimately limit the behavioural data available to marketers, as exposed above
594
. Thus, 
limiting ISP liability is the only solution that would not hinder the Internet’s use, and, while 
protecting those individuals who have had no active hand in diffusing the message, it does 
not prevent the pursuit of those that are truly responsible for the acts of defamation. 
In light of this, however, the inability for companies to pursue any non-competitor 
for denigration would, in some circumstances, prevent them from being able to pursue 
entities that do hold a certain level of liability for the denigration in question.  For example, 
in the cases of Mengniu and Facebook discussed above
595
, where marketing firms were 
hired by these companies to spread rumours about their competitors, it would be unfair to 
the competitors affected by these rumours to only be able to pursue their direct competitors 
and not the marketing companies responsible for spreading these falsehoods.  It is precisely 
for situations like these, where companies are denigrated by non-competitors, that we 
believe they should be entitled to pursue for defamation as well, as otherwise they would 
have no venue of protection under such circumstances.   
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At the same time, however, there is a benefit to the action in denigration that is not 
present in the action in defamation, namely that the impugned comment or statement is not 
required to be publicized, whereas publication is considered to be the causal link between 
the fault and the damages in cases of defamation
596
.  However, while it is crucial to identify 
at least one third person who has heard or read the impugned comment to establish a case in 
defamation, this may take less of an effort when it comes to online defamation rendering 
the absence of this requirement for the establishment of an action in denigration less 
beneficial under such circumstances.  Essentially, this element may be established by 
turning to the statistics generated by websites to establish that the comments at issue have 
been viewed
597
.   
The possibility of using these statistics as evidence that the comments in question 
have, in fact, been read was brought forth by the dissenting judge in the case of Crookes v. 
Newton
598
.  In this case, what was at issue was an article that contained certain hyperlinks 
leading to defamatory material.  In light of this situation, the judge in question stated that, 
while proof regarding the number of times the article that contained the hyperlinks leading 
to the defamatory content had been read was established, there was no information 
demonstrating the number of times the actual defamatory content was read and whether or 
not it was accessed through the hyperlinks in question. 
Thus, while the facts in this case do not establish the required evidentiary elements 
therein, this logic can be used to potentially employ website statistics and establish that the 
libelous comments published on a given website have, in fact, been read by a member of 
the public.  As a result, when it comes to online defamation, the burden of proving that the 
impugned statements have been viewed by a third person may be much simpler.  Thus, 
while the obligation to prove this element may be one that would normally, in cases of 
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traditional defamation, lean in favour of instating an action in denigration, the same cannot 
necessarily be said when it comes to cases of online defamation.   
It must, however, be pointed out that while all that is required to be demonstrated in 
cases of denigration is that a statement was made by a competitor with the intention of 
ruining a company’s reputation, thus not technically obliging proof that a third person had 
viewed the impugned comments, in order for the affected company to have suffered 
damages, the comment must have reached a third person and caused them to take their 
business elsewhere as a result of these statements.  The action in denigration therefore does 
ultimately indirectly require that the comments at issue be viewed by another person so as 
to be successful.   
It is at this point that the differences existing between the actions of denigration and 
defamation end.  There are, however, certain similarities between the two actions that also 
play a role in the establishment of each type of claim.  To begin with, it is crucial that the 
denigratory or defamatory comments in question be aimed at a specific business or entity, 
as denigration or defamation cannot exist if the statement at issue is a general one that is 
aimed at a large group of enterprises, none of which are individually criticized
599
. 
Furthermore, in order to be able to pursue an individual in either denigration or 
defamation, it is crucial to establish the identity of the defendant as the one who emitted the 
maligning statements at issue as it would be impossible to pursue an unknown defendant.  
When it comes to the publishing of such comments online, however, such a demonstration 
is not always so easily made.  This is due to the fact that it may not be simple to identify the 
individual from whom the statements emanated as they often use pseudonyms or hire 
marketers or public relations firms to write them in their place.  In the few examples we 
provided above
600
, the identities of all the individuals who made defamatory comments 
were discovered.  In the case of Mengniu, their identity was discovered due to a police 
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investigation; in the case of Whole Foods Market, the identity of their CEO was determined 
by tracking the IP address to which his pseudonym was linked; and in the case of 
Facebook, their identity was discovered due to the fact that their publishing firm contacted 
many bloggers resulting in the issue ultimately going public.  While it is true that 
determining the identity of an individual using a pseudonym is much simpler than 
determining the identity of an individual who hires other individuals to leak the defamatory 
comments, there is still no doubt that there are certain difficulties with the identification of 
individuals who initiate libelous comments online.   
While we have, up until this point, exposed the various benefits that lean in favour 
of instating either an action in denigration or an action in defamation depending on the 
circumstances at hand, we cannot neglect the fact that a controversy still exists with regards 
to whether or not legal persons should be permitted to institute an action in defamation in 
the first place.  If, however, we look at both the action in denigration and the action in 
defamation from an economic perspective, it may be possible to hold that legal persons 
should be in the position of instituting both.   
As outlined above, it is much more difficult to establish an action in denigration, as 
the plaintiff must prove financial damages as well as malice, both of which are not required 
to be proven in cases of defamation, thus rendering the latter much easier to establish.  The 
reason for the relative simplicity of instituting an action in defamation as opposed to an 
action in denigration can be explained using Economic Analysis of Law, which would hold 
that the adverse economic effects suffered by a company due to denigration will be 
significantly less than they would be in cases of defamation.   Take the following example: 
“If firm A claims that firm B is owned by a devil worshipper, this 
will cost firm B money (in forgone sales) if customers believe the 
claim and prefer not to do business with devil worshippers. There 
may be no efficient way for consumers to ascertain the truth of the 
devil-worshipper claim, for it is a credence characteristic. In 
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contrast, if firm A claims that the product of firm B will not work 
well, then consumers can presumably determine the truth of this 
claim for themselves. Thus the relative ease with which a plaintiff 
may make out a case for defamation as compared with making out a 
case of [denigration], which appears mysterious when considered in 
terms used by courts, may be explicable in terms of the ability of 
consumers to determine truth and, hence, discount [denigration] 
more than defamation.”601 
As such, considering the relative effect defamation would have on a company’s reputation 
and thus its economic stability, it is difficult for us to come to any conclusion that would 
not maintain the possibility for companies to pursue for defamation.   
However, in light of the existing controversy, and considering that the action in 
denigration was created specifically for situations in which legal persons are defamed by 
their competitors, it might be wisest to simply opt for this course of action in cases where 
all the evidentiary elements required to establish such a case are present.  Despite the fact 
that, under certain circumstances, an action in defamation might be more beneficial than an 
action in denigration, the latter still serves to adequately protect legal persons against any 
harm imposed upon their reputation by an unscrupulous competitor.  However, in cases 
where an action in denigration may not be available to a business, as the entity from whom 
the maligning comments emanated is not a competitor or they are unable to establish one of 
the required evidentiary elements, the institution of an action in defamation remains a 
possibility.  Whether or not such an action will be accepted by a court of law, however, will 
depend upon the position adopted by the court in question. 
* * * 
There are thus several different manners in which enterprises can protect themselves 
against trade libel at both federal and civil law, and all these actions can be successfully 
adapted to apply to the issue of trade libel online.  While companies place a great deal of 
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importance on protecting their reputation from harmful and false statements, their work at 
maintaining their company’s image does not end there.  They must also ensure the 
maintenance of any goodwill associated with their trademarks by preventing them from 
being infringed upon by third parties, which is a common eventuality online, as we will 
discuss in further detail in the next section.   
Subsection 2  Trademark Infringement in Search Engine Marketing 
Canadian law provides trademark protection for distinctive marks, certification 
marks, distinguishing guises, and proposed marks against those who appropriate the 
goodwill of the mark or create confusion between different vendors’ wares and services or 
both
602
, essentially considering any unauthorized use of such trademarks as a form of unfair 
competition.  Such protection is provided statutorily under the Canadian TMA
603
 by 
protecting a trademark against infringement or depreciation of goodwill, if the trademark in 
question is registered, and also at common law and civil law, through the action in passing 
off, whether the trademark is registered or not
604
, and through the action in civil liability 
respectively. 
Despite the protection afforded to trademarks in both Canadian and Quebec law, 
there are certain online practices whereby individuals utilize the trademarks of other entities 
for their own purposes.  One such practice that has become very well-known is referred to 
as cybersquatting, which occurs when the domain name of a company’s trademark is 
purchased by another individual.  The legal implications of this practice have, however, 
been thoroughly analyzed by doctrine
605
 and we will therefore concentrate on a topic that 
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has not been as widely discussed:  the use of the trademarks of other companies in certain 
SEM practices by individuals to further promote their own business online, namely with 
regards to the practice of using trademarks in doorway pages or in keyword advertising, as 
discussed above
606
.  The question of the hour is thus to determine whether or not this use of 
trademarks can be considered as infringement in light of both Canadian and Quebec law.   
For trademark infringement to exist in the practice of SEM, however, an individual 
must utilize his competitor’s trademark to “profit from the notoriety of this competitor to 
deceive consumers and invite them to frequent their site as a result of false 
representations”607 (our translation).  The elements that must be proven to establish a case 
in infringement will differ depending on whether the trademark in question is (1) registered 
or (2) unregistered.  We will therefore set out the requirements for both causes of action 
heretofore.   
Paragraph 1 Registered Trademarks 
In order for the use of registered trademarks to be considered as infringement, an 
individual must (a) use the trademark of a competitor, and either (b) cause confusion in the 
minds of consumers, or (c) profit from this competitor’s goodwill – conditions which will 
heretofore be explained in light of the use of trademarks for the purposes of SEM.   
a. Use of a Competitor’s Trademark 
Sections 19, 20 and 22 of the TMA
608
 all revolve around the “use” of an 
individual’s trademark. The term “use” is defined by the TMA as “any use [...] in 
association with wares or services”609 where the trademark “is marked on the wares 
themselves or on the packages in which they are distributed”610 or where “it is displayed in 
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the performance or advertising of [...] services”611.  In light of this definition afforded to the 
term “use”, the question that must be answered is whether or not using a competitor’s 
trademark for the purposes of doorway pages or keyword advertising can be considered as 
“use” with regards to the TMA612.   
There are two points of view regarding the manner in which the term “use” for the 
purposes of the TMA ought to be interpreted in light of trademark use on the Internet.  One 
point of view holds that a very literal interpretation should be afforded to the term, and thus 
considers that only the reproduction of trademarks on wares or their packaging when they 
are sold from a site could be considering use, thus not taking into account the use of a mark 
in keyword advertising or doorway pages
613
.  We find such an interpretation of the term 
“use” to be very limitative614, especially since the Internet is increasingly being used to 
both promote and purchase products.  If we maintain such a restrictive interpretation, the 
protection of trademarks in the online environment would be confined as all other use of a 
trademark on the Internet, aside from the affixation of a mark on the wares or their 
packaging, would fall into a legal void.  
It is for this reason that we are of the opinion that it is the second interpretation 
generally held of the term “use” that ought to be retained for the purposes of online 
trademark infringement.  In the case of Playboy Enterprises v. Germain
615
, the Federal 
Court stated that it is possible for a “‘mark’ [to] be associated with the wares (and still be 
visible) otherwise than by being marked on the wares themselves or on the packages in 
which the wares are distributed”616.  This interpretation suggests that the use of a trademark 
for the purposes of keyword advertising or doorway pages could consist of “use” in light of 
the definition afforded to the term by the TMA as, when an Internet user types in a 
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particular trademark, he will associate the search engine results that appear thereof with the 
mark in question
617
.   
We believe that such a definition of the term “use” follows the spirit of the law and 
serves to ensure that the TMA is economically efficient. In essence, the creation of a 
trademark relies heavily on the investment of a large sum of money to develop both the 
trademark as well as the reputation surrounding it.  If another entity would be permitted to 
make use of a trademark in such a manner that may create confusion as to the origin of a 
ware or service, companies would not see the incentive of investing significant amounts of 
money into the creation of trademarks
618
. Thus, in order for companies to harbour a desire 
to invest such high sums of money into the formation of trademarks, they must be 
guaranteed a certain level of return which would not be able to be ensured should the 
trademark in question be “used” freely by another entity.  As a result, preventing such 
unauthorized “use” serves to preserve the economic benefits of the TMA.   
The form of “use” required to be established will, however, differ for the purposes 
of sections 19, 20 and 22 of the TMA
619
.   To begin with, section 19
620
 entitles the 
registered owner of a trademark to the exclusive right to use that trademark in respect to 
any wares or services to which their trademark is associated.  This right is considered to 
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have been violated in the event that this mark is used by another party, for the purposes of 
similar wares and services, on the wares themselves, or on the packaging thereof, or if it is 
used or displayed in the performance or advertising of a service
621
.  Inasmuch as keyword 
advertising is a form of advertising, regardless of the fact that it differs from traditional 
forms of advertising at which the TMA was aimed, the use of trademarks identical to the 
one registered
622
 for such purposes could be considered as a violation of section 19
623
.  
It has, however, been considered by the Exchequer Court in the case of Clairol 
International Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equipment Co.
624
 that confusion must also be 
established for the purposes of section 19.  In this case, the Court stated that a trademark is 
generally “used by a person for the purposes of distinguishing [...] wares or services [...] 
sold [...] by him from those [...] sold [...] by others”625.  The adoption of such a definition 
therefore requires that the wares and services at issue be undistinguishable, thus demanding 
proof of confusion, for the use of another’s trademark to be considered infringement626.  
Thus, while the use of a registered trademark for the purposes of keyword advertising may 
be considered as a use or display of the said trademark in the performance or advertising of 
a service, infringement for the purposes of section 19 of the TMA
627
 will only exist if there 
is a likelihood of confusion – an element which will be discussed in further detail below628. 
According to the Federal Court
629
, the definition of the term “use” applicable to 
section 20 of the TMA
630
, on the other hand, is similar to the one adopted by the Court in 
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Clairol
631
.  This is due to the fact that this section deals with the use of identical and similar 
trademarks with respect to any wares and services, rather than just registered ones as is 
required by section 19
632
, in a manner that is likely to confuse consumers as to their 
origin
633
.  This section thus also requires the existence of confusion for such “use” to be 
considered as infringement.   
Differently from sections 19 and 20 of the TMA
634
, section 22 of the TMA
635
 
protects the owners of registered trademarks against the depreciation of goodwill
636
, rather 
than confusion, arising from the infringement of their mark in the event that it was used in a 
commercial context
637
. Though section 22 of the TMA
638
 has not yet been brought before 
any Court of Appeal in Canada, and the manner in which it may apply to the Internet has 
not yet been entirely established
639
, the definition upheld of the term “use” by the Courts in 
relation to this section may prove to aid us in determining the direction the Courts would 
take in this regard. 
In the case of Clairol
640
, the Court took the opportunity to state that, while it is 
prohibited to use a competitor’s trademark on one’s wares for the purposes of comparative 
advertising, it is possible to use their trademarks on other elements, such as brochures, for 
such purposes – an interpretation which was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal in both 
the case of Syntex Inc. v. Apotex Inc.
641
 and the case of Michelin
642
.  Thus, it stands to 
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reason that any commercial use of a competitor’s trademark on items other than wares or 
services for the purposes of comparative advertising would not fall under the ambit of 
section 22 of the TMA
643
 as it would not be considered to ultimately depreciate the 
goodwill of a competitor
644
.  Considering the fact that keywords and doorway pages are 
neither wares nor services, this approach may render it difficult to establish a case under 
section 22
645
 for these purposes.  At the same time, however, this does not change the fact 
that the use of trademarks in the virtual world may depreciate goodwill, as will be discussed 
in further detail below
646
.     
Thus, with regards to sections 19 and 20
647
, whether or not the use of trademarks in 
keyword advertising and doorway pages consists of infringement will depend on the 
existence of a likelihood of confusion, whereas, with regards to section 22
648
, it will be 
based upon whether or not the use of trademarks in such manners can be considered as 
comparative advertising and, if not, whether the goodwill of one’s competitor is depreciated 
as a result.  We will therefore examine each of these elements in the following two sections.   
b. Likelihood of Confusion  
Confusion is a behaviour whereby a person, through his presentation of a product, 
creation of a similar trademark, and so on, creates confusion in the minds of consumers 
between his merchandise and that of another person
649
.  As exposed above
650
, the existence 
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of confusion would entirely circumvent the purposes meant to be achieved by enterprises 
when they invest in the creation of a trademark.  Thus, in protecting trademark holders 
from situations in which confusion could be rendered possible, the TMA
651
 is ensuring that 
companies continue to harbour the incentive to invest in the creation of trademarks and 
therefore in the ultimate flourishing of the market.     
In order to continue in this economic spirit of the TMA
652
, the definition of 
confusion must be interpreted broadly in its application to the Internet.  In this grain, while 
confusion can generally only exist when the trademark in question is used in association 
with the same industry in the same geographic region, it has been held by the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia in the case of British Columbia Automobile Association v. Office 
and Professional Employees International Union, Local 378
653
 that “the use of similar meta 
tags unconnected to a defendant’s business or operation might indicate deception and might 
be a significant factor in determining if there is [confusion]”654.  Meta-tags being the 
predecessor of keyword advertising, the same logic could apply in this case.  Since it has 
been established by the Courts that there is a possibility of confusion in such cases, we 
must determine whether or not, based upon the criteria required for confusion to exist, this 
element can be established in light of keyword advertising.   
The criteria upon which the existence of confusion is based are outlined in section 
6(5) of the TMA
655
 and include  
“(a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks [...] and the 
extent to which they have become known; 
(b) the length of time the trade-marks [...] have been in use; 
(c) the nature of the wares, services or business; 
(d) the nature of the trade; and 
                                                                                                                                                    
650
 Supra, p. 142-143. 
651
 prev. cited, note 521. 
652
 Id. 
653
 2001 BCSC 156. 
654
 Id., par. 129. 
655
 prev. cited, note 521. 
  
 
147
(e) the degree of resemblance between the trade-marks [...] in 
appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them.”656 
While other factors may also be utilized to establish the existence of confusion
657
, 
we will limit our analysis of the likelihood of confusion with regards to the use of 
trademarks in keyword advertising and doorway pages to the ones listed in section 6(5) of 
the TMA
658
 aside from the last one, as the visual appearance of a trademark is not at issue 
when it comes to keyword advertising or doorway pages and this criterion is therefore not 
relevant to the topic at hand.   
The first criterion of section 6(5) of the TMA
659
 requires a determination of the 
extent to which the mark has become known – the more well-known a trademark is, the 
higher the likelihood of confusion
660
.  When it comes to keyword advertising or doorway 
pages, the use of a trademark for these purposes will require a well-known mark that will 
often be queried by Internet users, as the goal meant to be achieved by such use is to obtain 
a higher placement in the search results
661
.  One need merely observe the case law 
regarding the use of trademarks in keyword advertising to support this position. A few 
examples are the use of the Playboy trademark to promote other pornography websites
662
, 
or the use of the Louis Vuitton trademark to promote the sale of counterfeit Louis Vuitton 
merchandise
663
.  It can thus be considered that most cases in which a competitor’s 
trademark will be used for the purposes of keyword advertising or doorway pages will 
fulfill the first criterion outlined in section 6(5) of the TMA
664
.   
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The second criterion outlined in section 6(5) of the TMA
665
 demands that the mark 
have been in use for a lengthy period of time.  This criterion correlates with the first one, as 
the longer the mark has been integrated within the market, the more well-known that mark 
will be and the greater the chances are of establishing a likelihood of confusion
666
.  Thus, in 
the event that the first factor is established, the chances that this second element will be 
fulfilled are quite high.   
The third and fourth criteria outlined in section 6(5) of the TMA
667
, regarding the 
nature of the wares, services, business or trade, can be treated together as both require a 
similarity between the products being offered, since the likelihood of confusion is 
significantly reduced when the wares or services in question are in wholly different 
categories
668
.  The existence of this factor in the use of trademarks for the purposes of 
keyword advertising and doorway pages will differ with the facts of each case, but it “will 
generally lean towards a finding of likelihood of confusion because [it has been] 
affirmatively [suggested] that direct competitors use competitors’ trademarks as 
keywords”669 so that when an individual searches a business’s name, a link to his 
competitor’s site will appear in the list of results.  At the same time, companies often also 
use the trademarks of businesses that are complimentary to their own, such as utilizing the 
trademark of an infamous camera company when the product being sold is camera cases
670
.  
The degree of similarity will therefore differ between cases, and as such, the examination of 
this element will depend greatly on the facts of the case being presented
671
. 
Thus, while it is true that the facts of each case will determine whether or not 
confusion exists when the trademark of a competitor is used for the purposes of keyword 
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advertising or doorway pages, there is a strong likelihood that it would.  This would 
therefore render it possible for trademark owners to pursue in virtue of sections 19 and 
20
672
, while also opening up an action in passing off, either in virtue of section 7 of the 
TMA
673
 for registered marks or at common law for unregistered ones, as well as an action 
in civil liability, as will be discussed in further detail below
674
.   
This is the position that was indirectly adopted by the Superior Court in the case of 
Convectair NMT inc. v. Ouellet Canada
675
.  While this case dealt with the use of a direct 
competitor’s trademark in the meta-tags of a website, ultimately allowing this company to 
precede the competitor in question in the online search results, we have already established 
that meta-tags and keyword advertising are similar in nature and outcome
676
, and we thus 
believe that a direct parallel may be made.   The Superior Court in this case was, however, 
only called upon for the purpose of changing the district in which the case is tried, but the 
judge in question took this opportunity to make some interesting comments in this regard.  
To begin with, the judge considered this practice to be “dishonest and insidious [as 
it] made Ouellet’s website appear in the search results of the query “Convectair” with that 
company’s right to do so”677 and that this use of another’s trademark was, in fact, illegal678.  
The judge then goes on to quote the sections of the TMA relative to the prohibition of 
causing confusion between the wares and services of a competitor, namely section 7(b) and 
section 20, and, while outlining the plaintiff’s cause of action for confusion in order to 
decide upon which district the case arises from, the judge exudes his opinion that confusion 
does, in fact, exist in this case
679
. 
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In contrast to this decision, however, the more recent case of Chocolat Lamontagne 
Inc. v. Humeur Groupe Conseil Inc.
680
 decided in regards to the use of Google AdWords 
maintains the opposite position.  According to the Superior Court in this case  
“[t]he concept of competition must take into account the existence of 
new ways of interacting with consumers.  There is nothing 
reprehensible with regard to Quebec civil law in the search method 
proposed by Google. 
According to the system used by consumers, [...] the response to the 
consumer’s search request is such that it is up to the consumer to use 
or not use the information obtained in the results of a search. 
[...] 
In an economy of open competition, information meant to provide an 
alternative to other business cannot be prohibited. 
[...] 
In the Court’s opinion, the use of Google Adwords, as the defendant 
did, to bill itself as the plaintiff’s competitor to Web users looking 
for the plaintiff’s site does not constitute unfair competition or 
passing off [...].”681 
 While it is true that the Google AdWords program is a new form of competition in 
the online market, and we believe that it is crucial to maintain an open spirit when it comes 
to regulating the Internet, we cannot support the position held by the Court in this case.  
Although a consumer does click on a link appearing in Google’s search results of their own 
volition, it remains that it is highly possible that the fact that that particular link appears 
first in the list of search results may cause consumers to believe that the website to which 
that link leads is associated with the entity they were searching for
682
.  It would ultimately 
be from this impression given to consumers that these consumers would end up on the 
website of the competitor of the company they initially searched for.  Furthermore, while it 
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is true that information meant to provide consumers with an alternative cannot be 
prohibited, it is the manner in which such information is sought to be provided that is in 
question in the case of the use of a competitor’s trademark in keyword advertising683.  
There are other SEM tactics that could be used to provide this alternative information 
without necessarily utilizing the trademark of a competitor, as exposed above
684
.   
We therefore believe that, despite the decision in the case of Chocolat Lamontagne 
inc. c. Humeur Group-conseil inc.
685
, and considering the above analysis, there may be a 
possibility of success in the event that actions under sections 19 or 20 of the TMA
686
 are 
taken against the use of trademarks in keyword advertising. In the event, however, that a 
company wishes to invoke section 22 of the TMA
687
 rather than sections 19 or 20
688
, they 
must be in the position of demonstrating the deterioration of goodwill rather than confusion 
between wares or services, as will be illustrated in the next section.   
c. Appropriating a Competitor’s Goodwill 
As previously exposed, the development of a company’s goodwill is what provides 
companies with the incentive to invest in the creation of a trademark.  If the ability to 
increase their goodwill and market value was non-existent, they would find no benefit in 
establishing trademarks.  Thus, not only is it crucial to protect trademarks against the 
eventuality of confusion, but it is also important to ensure that their goodwill is protected as 
well, which is effectively what the TMA achieves through its section 22
689
.  
In order to establish an action under this section, an individual must prove 
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 “(1) that its registered trade-mark was used by the defendant in 
connection with wares or services; (2) that its mark is sufficiently 
well known to have significant goodwill attached to it; (3) that its 
mark was used in a manner likely to have an effect on that goodwill 
(linkage); and (4) that the likely effect would be to depreciate the 
value of its goodwill (damage).”690 
Thus, to determine whether or not an action under section 22
691
 would be successful 
where a competitor’s trademark is used in keyword advertising or doorway pages, it is 
crucial to establish that such use fulfills these four criteria.  The criteria regarding the use of 
the registered trademark as well as the notoriety thereof have already been discussed 
above
692
, so we will therefore concentrate on the latter two criteria which can, in light of the 
circumstances relating to SEM, be treated simultaneously.   
The use of a competitors trademark in keyword advertising or doorway pages will, 
in most cases, affect the goodwill associated with that mark simply because, rather than the 
true owner of the mark appearing first in the list of search results, it is his competitor who 
will hold this position.  It often occurs that consumers do not realize that the primary search 
result they receive is not necessarily linked to the product or service they are searching for, 
and those who do perceive that the products or services are not identical, are likely to be 
under the impression that they are related or that the owner of the trademark they searched 
for is endorsing the entity who appeared first on the list of results and will ultimately be 
deceived into clicking on the competitor’s listing693.  Thus, by steering consumers towards 
their own products or services in such a manner, it can be said that they are utilizing the 
trademark of a competitor in a manner that is likely to have an effect on their goodwill and 
will, in such a manner, depreciate the value of that goodwill.  In this light, it is very likely 
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that an action under section 22 of the TMA
694
 with regards to the use of a competitor’s 
trademark in keyword advertising or in doorway pages would be successful.   
Paragraph 2 Unregistered Trademarks 
Considering the fact that the market relies heavily on trademarks to both increase 
competition and provide companies with the incentive to invest money in the creation of a 
trademark, the law extends its protection not only to registered trademarks, but to 
unregistered ones as well.  The recourses available to individuals who possess unregistered 
trademarks are (a) the action in passing off at common law and (b) the action in civil 
liability for either confusion or ambush marketing at civil law.   
a. The Tort of Passing Off 
The elements required to be proven for the common law action in passing off are 
very similar to the ones exposed above for the purposes of sections 19, 20 and 22 of the 
TMA
695
.  To begin with, the common law protection against passing off, “occurs when a 
person passes off their wares or services as those of another so as to take advantage of the 
goodwill of the other party”696.  Thus, as opposed to protecting the trademark in and of 
itself, the action in passing off serves only to protect the goodwill associated with that 
trademark
697
.  The elements required to prove a common law action in passing off are “the 
existence of goodwill, deception of the public due to a misrepresentation and actual or 
potential damage to the plaintiff”698, in a similar manner as exposed above699, the 
intentional nature of the misrepresentation not being required
700
. A similar action is 
available to owners of registered trademarks under section 7(b) and (c) of the TMA
701
, 
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however in such cases no damages are required to be proven as the simple violation of their 
rights under the TMA is sufficient to establish a cause of action. 
b. The Action in Civil Liability for Confusion or Ambush Marketing 
In civil law, on the other hand, an action for trademark infringement is available 
under section 1457 C.C.Q.
702
.  With respect to trademark infringement claims based on this 
section, a fault is considered to exist when one of two behaviours are present: confusion or 
ambush marketing.  Confusion has already been exposed above
703
.  The behaviour that goes 
by the name of ambush marketing, on the other hand, only recently emerged in doctrine
704
.  
It is essentially a type of behaviour whereby a company attempts to create a link between 
themselves and another company with a greater reputation with the goal of enticing people 
to purchase their products
705
.  Ambush marketing is different from confusion in that there is 
clearly a distinction made between the two products, but, like a parasite, the link between 
the two permits one company to live off of the reputation of another
706
.  
In the event that confusion resulting from the use of trademarks in keyword 
advertising is not upheld, the possibility that it may consist of ambush marketing may be an 
interesting position to uphold.  The use of a competitor’s mark by a company for such 
purposes could be viewed as an attempt by that company to create a link between itself and 
its more infamous competitor in the hopes that this may attract consumers towards its own 
products or services.  In such cases, there is clearly no existence of confusion in the minds 
of consumers, as a distinction is made between both companies, but it could still amount to 
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a loss of goodwill on the part of the trademark owner.  This would establish the element of 
damages necessary for such an action, which is analogous to what is required for a case in 
unfair competition
707
, and can be proven in a similar manner as in an action under section 
22 of the TMA
708
. 
The protection of companies against the advent of ambush marketing serves to 
guard the economic benefits of trademark development, similarly to the sections of the 
TMA that safeguard companies against confusion and insure their goodwill.  In this case, 
however, what companies are being preserved from is the possibility that another entity 
could free-ride on both the mark and reputation in whose development they have invested 
significant funds.  Protecting companies against ambush marketing will serve to ensure that 
they will continue to divest their money for the creation of marks, ultimately increasing 
competition and ensuring that the economic benefits of trademark law are maintained.  
* * * 
The protection of trademarks online is thus not nearly as clear cut as might be 
desirable, nor is it obvious as to the manner in which existing trademark laws ought to be 
interpreted in light of new technology.  Despite this, if analyzed in an open minded manner, 
current trademark protection could serve to adequately protect trademark holders in this 
new virtual world. While trademark protection is a serious consideration for companies 
when it comes to online marketing, this same issue is also confronted with problems from a 
consumer protection perspective, and will be addressed in the next section.    
Section 2 The Implications of Social Media Marketing From a Consumer 
Protection Law Perspective 
Consumer protection laws, as a whole, are meant to shield consumers from the 
harsh nature of the market and ensure that they are not taken advantage of.  One of the 
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manners in which the law achieves this feat is by enacting protections meant to ensure that 
consumers are not subjected to false advertising.  False or “[m]isleading advertising occurs 
when a claim about a product or service is materially false or misleading, in an attempt to 
persuade the consumer to buy it”709.  The Internet, however, presents several opportunities 
for such backhanded forms of advertisements, many companies using blogs and SNWs to 
create false testimonials to attempt to engage a larger consumer audience, as discussed 
above in the cases of L’Oreal, Wal-Mart, Sony and Kohl’s710.  In doing so, not only are 
they deceiving and misleading consumers, but they are also serving to divert consumer 
purchases away from other competitors that deign to utilize honest business practices.  The 
use of false advertising thus negatively affects the market, and as such, laws have been 
created to protect both consumers and competitors against this occurrence.    
The only Canadian law that deals specifically with false advertising online, 
however, is the Anti-Spam Act which only covers false representations that are made by 
sending electronic messages to individuals or by including a false representation in a 
URL
711
, therefore not covering the situation of false advertising in social media.  As such, 
we must depend on already existing laws in the domain of false advertising in the 
traditional sense and extend their application to the case of the creation of false testimonials 
online. While many laws were enacted to protect consumers from false advertising
712
, the 
principle ones are (1) the CA, on a Canadian level, and (2) the Consumer Protection Act, on 
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a Quebec level, both of which we will discuss heretofore in light of their possible 
application to the situation of false advertising in social media.   
Subsection 1 The Competition Act 
While the CA
713
 protects consumers against several forbidden behaviours, it is the 
prohibition against making “a representation to the public that is false or misleading in a 
material respect”714 regarding a particular product for the purposes of promoting any 
business interest that most applies to the situation of the creation of false testimonials by 
enterprises in online social media.  The deceptive nature of the advertisement must be 
established by taking into account both “the general impression conveyed by a 
representation as well as its literal meaning”715. The general impression exuded by the 
creation of false testimonials by companies on online social media forums is that the 
testimonials in question were created by average consumers.  In such cases, regardless of 
whether or not the testimonial literally makes the false statement that it is created by a 
consumer or not, the general impression would suffice to establish a claim.   
Furthermore, the consideration that a representation is false or misleading in a 
material respect will be based on whether or not “the context in which it is made […] 
readily conveys an impression to the ordinary citizen which is, in fact, false or misleading 
and if that ordinary citizen would likely be influenced by that impression in deciding 
whether or not he would purchase the product being offered”716.  Consumers will frequently 
turn to other individuals in their situation to acquire their opinion about a specific product 
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or service.  The power of recommendation in the consumer world has long been known to 
be very influential, and as such, reading a false testimonial that is believed to emanate from 
a consumer will often influence another consumer to purchase the product in question.  
While this power of one consumer to influence another may very well be a reason 
for which a company may create false testimonials, it is very difficult to support an 
enterprise’s use of false advertising from an economic analysis perspective.  The economic 
support for the purposes of advertising stems from the fact that “[n]o matter what kind of 
goods or services are involved, a decision to advertise conveys information:  that the 
advertiser is willing to invest in his reputation and stands to lose if the customer is 
unhappy”717.  When a significant investment is made by a company for advertising 
purposes, it also becomes clear that “[t]he seller who has invested in his reputation has 
more to lose by practicing deception than one which has not”718.  In this light, it is very 
difficult to comprehend the reason for which a company would invest in advertising, with 
the ultimate goal of increasing its reputation, only to emit false ads which may only serve to 
hinder its reputation.  Yet, regardless of whether or not the emission of false advertisements 
by enterprises makes economic sense or not, the reality of the matter is that companies do, 
as is evidenced by the examples we provided in the cases of L’Oreal, Wal-Mart, Sony and 
Kohl’s719, and as such, the law serves to protect both consumers and competitors against 
such an eventuality. 
Once it has been established that an advertisement is false or misleading, an inquiry 
is instituted by the Commissioner of Competition.  Such inquiries can result from 
“[complaints] against any organization that adopts business practices which may be in 
violation with the [CA]”720 or from the Commissioner’s own choice to investigate a matter 
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due to his reason to believe that the CA
721
 has been or will be violated
722
.  It is ultimately 
based on this inquiry that the Commissioner of Competition will decide whether to pursue 
the company from whom the false advertisement emanated or not.  At the same time, 
however, the CA does not eliminate the possibility for any individual affected by a 
violation of the CA to pursue in civil liability
723
.  
From an economic perspective, the system set up by the CA appears to be viable.  
While it is true that false advertising serves to mislead consumers into purchasing a product 
or service which may not live up to the advertisement in question, and such advertising also 
serves to harm competitors in that they will have experienced a loss of business as a result 
of the false advertisement that served to increase the flow of customers to the enterprise 
from whom the advertisement originated, it still remains that it may not be economically 
beneficial for either consumers or competitors to pursue for such purposes.  In the case of 
consumers, the product or service they may have purchased will not often implicate enough 
of a loss for it to be beneficial for them to pay the legal fees of pursuit, whether this means 
simply paying the court fees in cases where a small claims pursuit is possible or paying 
both the court fees as well as for the services of a lawyer in other cases
724
.  In the case of 
competitors, on the other hand, it is rare that any one company will lose a sufficient amount 
of profit for it to be economically beneficial for them to invest in a pursuit either, thus 
resulting in a lack of incentive to pursue under such circumstances
725
.   
Regardless of the lack of benefit such pursuits may provide in most cases, however, 
it is true that there are evidently certain situations in which the economic benefit of pursuit 
will be beneficial as the loss in question will have been high
726
.  Despite this, these cases 
are not numerous enough to justify pursuit being the only option in cases of false 
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advertisement as it would not often be used by consumers and competitors alike and thus 
would not provide a sufficient level of protection against such underhanded forms of 
advertising
727
.  As such, the creation of the system enshrined in the CA
728
 serves to ensure 
that companies do not take advantage of the knowledge that they will often not be pursued 
when the amounts lost by consumers or competitors are minimal so as to emit false 
advertising, as they know that they will ultimately face the wrath of the law regardless of 
whether or not a consumer or competitor chooses to pursue them.  Furthermore, while 
ensuring this protection, such a system does not exclude the possibility for those consumers 
or competitors who have directly been affected by a violation of the CA and have 
experienced a heavy loss to pursue in civil liability, thus allowing for the possibility of 
pursuit should an individual wish it
729
.   
Not only does the system provide the benefits outlined above, but it also possesses 
two separate regimes between which the Commissioner of Competition has a choice of 
pursuing:  the civil regime
730
 and the criminal regime
731
.  While both the civil and criminal 
regimes prohibit the making of false or misleading representations in a material respect, 
they differ slightly in the consequences they foresee. The civil regime enables the court to 
order the enterprise to cease distributing false ads, to disseminate a notice to those 
individuals affected by the false or misleading representation notifying them of its existence 
and other details in that respect, and to oblige them to pay an amount of money not 
exceeding that which the enterprise amassed as a result of the advertisement in question
732
.  
The criminal regime, on the other hand, provides that the affected enterprise will be opened 
to severe sanctions which, when it is a conviction on indictment, includes a fine left up to 
the discretion of the Court or a prison sentence of up to 14 years, or both, and when it is on 
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summary conviction, includes a fine not exceeding 200,000$ or a prison sentence of up to 1 
year, or both.  
Considering the severe nature of the sanctions outlined in the criminal regime, the 
establishment of a cause of action under this system will require that the false or misleading 
representation in question be made knowingly or recklessly, thus demanding proof of the 
required element of mens rea for all criminal acts
733
.  As such, it is considered by the 
Competition Bureau that this regime only applies in the most serious of cases
734
, especially 
because it is often very difficult to establish the true intention of the enterprise that emitted 
the false advertisement
735
, even though all that is required to demonstrate intent in such 
cases is that the ad in question had the ultimate effect of deceiving consumers
736
.   
As a result, certain criteria were developed by the Competition Bureau to determine 
the serious nature of a case, namely whether or not the prejudice suffered by both 
consumers and competitors is so substantial that the civil regime would not be sufficient to 
remedy it, the vulnerability and exploitation of the group of people subjected to the false 
advertisement such as children and the elderly, that no steps were taken to remedy the 
situation quickly and the false advertising persisted even after they discovered the falsity of 
its nature, and that this behaviour contravened either a previous engagement, a promise to 
take corrective measures against such forms of advertising, or an order of prohibition
737
.  At 
the same time, however, the bureau will take certain attenuating factors into account
738
 such 
as whether or not a criminal pursuit or a guilty sentence would be too severe considering 
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the circumstances or whether or not the enterprise concerned had established an efficient 
program to ensure its conformity to the law
739
.   
Requiring such conditions to be met prior to pursuing under the criminal regime is 
the only solution that ensures economic protection.  If each time a different company 
caught emitting false advertisements were to be pursued under the criminal regime, it 
would be difficult for such companies to sustain themselves given the heavy consequences 
with which they would be faced.  As such, competition would inevitably lessen and the 
market would suffer in turn.  If, however, the Commissioner of Competition pursues under 
the civil regime, the consequences suffered by the company at fault would serve to both 
make amends for its error as well as allow the company enough latitude to rise in the 
market once again.  Furthermore, considering the value of a reputation in a competitive 
market, the consequences foreseen under the civil regime, namely the requirement that a 
public statement be made regarding their violation of the CA
740
, would appear to be a 
sufficient deterrent for companies.  It therefore makes a great deal of sense from an 
economic perspective to limit criminal pursuits to only the most serious of cases. 
Thus, while the creation of false testimonials on social media forums definitely falls 
under the description provided in the CA
741
, the question is whether or not this form of 
false advertisement fulfills the criteria emitted by the Competition Bureau to be able to 
establish a criminal case in this respect.   Unfortunately, it is impossible for us to provide a 
definitive answer with regards to this matter, as the establishment of the criteria provided 
by the Competition Bureau will differ on a case by case basis, but the possibility that the 
Competition Bureau will allow the criminal pursuit of enterprises who create false 
testimonials online most definitely exists.   
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Subsection 2 The Consumer Protection Act 
On the Quebec level, the Consumer Protection Act
742
 holds that “[n]o merchant, 
manufacturer or advertiser may, by any means whatever, make false or misleading 
representations to a consumer”743.  While the prohibitions under the heading of false 
advertisements are extensive and varied so as to cover several specific situations in which 
deceptive publicity might be an issue
744
, the case of the creation of false testimonials would 
fall under the general prohibition against false representations which holds that a 
“representation includes an affirmation, a behaviour or an omission”745.  In most cases of 
false testimonials, the individuals creating them on behalf of companies omit to point out 
that they are not the consumers that they give off the impression of being, but are rather 
representatives of the company being supported in the testimonial.   
Furthermore, these testimonials make certain affirmations as to the general good 
quality of the product or service being offered by the company in question and, regardless 
of whether or not such affirmations may be true, they are made in light of the 
aforementioned omission thus causing them to be false representations by nature.  Thus, in 
the examples we provided above
746
 regarding the false testimonials created by L’Oreal 
Paris, Wal-Mart, Sony and Kohl’s wherein company representatives provided positive 
comments regarding their products and services, we find ourselves in a situation of false 
representations as covered by the CPA
747
. 
In cases where false representations exist, it is not required to demonstrate that a 
consumer was, in fact, deceived, but simply rather that the possibility of deception exists
748
.  
Furthermore, considering that the creation of the testimonial by a company representative 
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could be considered an important fact
749
, the consumer benefits from a presumption of 
fraud as “it is presumed that had the consumer been aware of such practice, he would not 
have agreed to the contract or would not have paid such a high price”750.  When it comes to 
false testimonials, it is true that often times the recommendation of another consumer will 
steer an person towards purchasing a particular product or service.  As such, in cases where 
the testimonial was created by a company representative, it can be presumed that a 
consumer would not have purchased that specific product or service had he been aware that 
the testimonial was, in fact, not created by a fellow consumer.  
It is crucial to point out, however, that the CPA
751
 only “applies to every contract 
for goods or services entered into between a consumer and a merchant in the course of his 
business,”752 meaning that any action taken against a merchant in virtue of the CPA may 
only be taken by a consumer and not another merchant.  As mentioned above
753
, however, 
it is rare that a consumer will have suffered such a significant loss from false advertising 
that it would be economically viable for him to pursue.  As such, and with analogous 
economic results, the Quebec CPA
754
 has developed a solution similar to the one 
established in the CA
755
.  The CPA essentially creates the Office de la protection du 
consommateur that is charged with ensuring that the provisions of the CPA are respected 
and whose president, or any consumer advocacy group that has existed as a legal person for 
a year or longer, “may apply to the court for an injunction ordering the person to cease 
engaging in the practice”756 if a person has engaged or engages in false advertising or other 
practices prohibited by the second title of the CPA
757
.  In such a manner, the law continues 
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to protect consumers without necessarily expecting them to make an investment in a pursuit 
that may not ultimately be economically beneficial for them. 
Ultimately, when a case for false representations is established against a company,  
the CPA foresees three different types of sanctions which entities guilty of false 
representations may suffer, namely ordinary contractual sanctions offered in civil law, 
administrative sanctions proffered by the Office de la protection du consommateur and 
penal sanctions against the advertiser or his directors
758
.  
* * * 
The protection of consumers against the creation of online false testimonials by 
company representatives is therefore ample and serves to ensure that consumers are not 
taken advantage of, even in the event that it may not be economically reasonable for them 
to pursue the emitter of false advertising themselves.  While leaving it up to the 
Commissioner of Competition or the President of the Office de la protection du 
consommateur to pursue for such contraventions may not have the ultimate result of 
reimbursing the consumers or competitors for their loss,  such a solution serves to ensure 
that the corporations which emit false advertising ultimately face the wrath of the law in 
cases where they will not be pursued by consumers or competitors, so that they may cease 
to continue in both their deception of consumers as well as their diversion of business 
towards themselves due to false representations.  In such a manner, negative effects on the 
market are reduced and an economic balance is maintained. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Internet is an environment that is ripe with marketing opportunities and 
essentially facilitates the ability of marketers to appeal to consumers.  It enables marketers 
to aggregate a significant amount of behavioural data regarding individuals with very little 
effort, while at the same time providing a forum upon which they may interact with 
consumers as well as be approached by them.   
Prior to the emergence of the cyber world, the ability for marketers to achieve these 
feats required a great deal of effort on their part and, even then, did not allow them to attain 
their goals as easily and efficiently as is rendered possible by the advent of the Internet.  
The simplicity with which this virtual environment allows marketers to accomplish their 
objectives is thus undeniable, and the temptation of marketers to take advantage of these 
tools to their fullest possible extent is therefore entirely comprehensible.   
At the same time, however, and as exposed throughout this thesis, often times, 
utilizing these tools to their maximum capacity, to ultimately increase the turnover rate of 
businesses as much as possible, does not necessarily take the legal rules protecting both 
individuals and businesses into account.  While the Internet may be, for all intents and 
purposes, a marketing goldmine, utilizing it without paying heed to legal rules can prove to 
be tremendously destructive to both marketers as well as the market in general.  This is true 
with regards to the use of technological tracking tools to invade the privacy of individuals 
without acquiring their consent, as while it allows for the aggregation of unprecedented 
amounts of behavioural data, neglecting to seek the approval of these individuals prior to 
the use of such tools could ultimately serve to limit their communications which would thus 
destroy the vast mine of data available to marketers.   
This is also true when black hat SEM tactics are used to increase a business’s 
visibility in online search engines as well as when businesses denigrate their competitors in 
online social media forums.  Such behaviour would create a market founded on falsehoods 
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which would make it difficult for businesses to compete based on their true merits.  This 
may ultimately result in the creation of a market that is not competitively proficient and 
may thus render it impossible for the pursuit of honest business to ensue.  Furthermore, the 
knowledge that enterprises behave dishonestly and lie about their value or the worth of their 
competitors would ultimately create a doubt in the mind of consumers when they interact 
with businesses.  This may place a strain on consumer-business relations and cause them to 
question the veracity of the information provided to them by companies – an outlook which 
could severely affect the efficiency of the market which depends greatly on consumers.   
Finally, the use of the trademarks of competitors to increase a company’s online 
presence would also present a strain on the market by eliminating the benefits for 
enterprises to invest in the creation of trademarks thus causing them to devote less of their 
budget to the conception of such marks and ultimately diverting this monetary influx from 
the market thus reducing its efficiency.  
The destructive capability that may exist by using Internet marketing tools to their 
greatest capacity, without taking legal rules into consideration, can thus not be denied.  
However, as we have demonstrated throughout this thesis, it is neither necessary nor 
recommended for marketers to throw caution to the wind by utilizing this newfound 
playground of opportunities in any which way.  It is possible for marketers to remain within 
the boundaries of the law and fulfill the purposes they seek – an approach which may, in 
fact, aid them in achieving their desired goals rather than hinder them in the process.   
To begin with, the proper respect of privacy laws when aggregating consumer 
information, both online and in the physical world, for targeted marketing purposes would 
negate the destructive capacity of this form of marketing by making individuals feel safe in 
this virtual environment and thus not inhibiting their communications.   
Similarly, ensuring the respect of competition laws and consumer protection laws 
would both serve to ascertain that the market remains efficient.  Avoiding any behaviour 
that may consist of unfair competition would serve to maintain honest competition and 
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therefore guarantee the ability of new competitors to enter the market as well as require 
those already present to compete in a truthful manner.  This flows with the respect of 
consumer protection laws, as it is only the respect of these laws as well as the use of honest 
business practices that would establish an honest market and thus ensure that consumers 
continue to have faith in businesses and the advertisements that are issued to them – an 
element upon which marketing efficiency depends. 
In this light, it is evident that it is always the tactic that serves to respect the laws in 
force that will steer marketers in the right direction and ultimately allow them to achieve 
their goals to the utmost of their capacity.  In essence, the nature of marketing requires 
marketers to strive for the most economically sound option, but it is not always the simplest 
route that will result in an immediate influx of revenue that is the best choice from an 
economic perspective. There are elements other than monetary incursions that must be 
taken into account to ensure that an approach is, in fact, truly beneficial from an economic 
perspective – one of these elements being the observance of legal rules and regulations.   
While respecting the laws in force may require a certain investment that would 
otherwise be unnecessary, as we have exposed throughout this thesis, devoting a certain 
budget to this end would present marketers with significant long term benefits that may 
even surpass the immediate advantages they may experience by not observing the law.  The 
consideration that must steer marketers is therefore whether or not their approach in 
marketing to individuals respects the laws in force – a consideration that we would stress 
going forward, as it is only such a perspective that would shed an epiphanic light on the 
best possible approach to be taken when it comes to marketing in both the virtual and 
physical worlds.   
Keeping this consideration in mind is tremendously crucial.  While this thesis 
outlines the legal implications of the use of various technologically enhanced marketing 
tools, the nature of the Internet is such that the relevance of these situations will lessen over 
time and it is only this consideration that will continue to serve marketers as well as legal 
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professionals by aiding them in adopting the most economically and legally sound 
approaches possible. 
In this grain, there is already a relatively new virtual environment in which this 
consideration may prove useful: that of media sharing websites which are becoming very 
prominent in the online world.  Such sites “[empower] users to upload multimedia content 
[such as] videos, images, podcasts and other forms of media”759 the most popular one of 
which is YouTube, a video sharing site.  This website unites all of the elements outlined 
throughout this thesis that allows for proficient online marketing.  It enables marketers to 
aggregate a significant amount of information about users regarding their preferences by 
keeping track of the types of videos viewed by individuals.  At the same time, it serves to 
publicize businesses, by allowing them to create their own channels “where a company can 
post and share content that is its own on its own customizable page [where users] can then 
watch the videos, rate them, and leave comments on them”760, thus also providing them 
with a discussion forum upon which enterprises may converse with their clients.  
Furthermore, they may advertise their company as well, as when a user requests a video on 
YouTube, an advertisement will sometimes be imposed upon the user prior to the video 
beginning.   
This one website is therefore a platform that allows for the combined 
accomplishment of Online Behavioural Advertising, SMM and SEM, effectively creating a 
prime marketing venue whose potential is only now beginning to be tapped into.  In the 
same manner as this platform unites all the various forms of Internet marketing into one 
particular website, however, it is also accompanied by a combination of all the legal issues 
presented by the different types of Web marketing.  It is the interaction of these legal issues 
on a single website that we believe to be an element of interest as, while it is entirely 
possible that the legal effects would be the same should the various forms of marketing 
remain separate, it is also a possibility that the common interaction of these legal issues in a 
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single environment may serve to create a greater aura of complexity that could provide an 
interesting basis of analysis and may serve to raise more questions as to the manner in 
which such an environment ought to be treated.   
Regardless of what ultimately ensues, however, what was true throughout this thesis 
and will continue to be true going forward is that foresight is never an asset in the business 
world and limiting one’s goals to the achievement of immediate gratification may present 
dire consequences in future.  This statement rings true particularly with respect to the 
practice of online marketing as, while the greatest monetary influx would result from the 
use of Internet marketing tools to their highest possible capacity, the failure to assume a 
global outlook that takes the law into account would ultimately serve to achieve less in the 
long run, as exposed throughout this thesis.  It is thus crucial to adopt an approach that 
takes economic viability into account – both from a monetary as well as a legal perspective 
– which would serve to increase the turnover rate of a company, not just in the immediate 
future, but in the distant one as well.   
While the future may be unforeseeable to us, we are of the belief that this will 
always remain true simply due to the fact that human interaction is the basis for marketing, 
and it is thus this interaction that must be encouraged to maintain a fruitful market.  In order 
to efficiently promote such inter-personal relations, one must cater to human nature which 
disposes people to only trust what they know and balk at what they do not.  The only 
manner in which to acquire and maintain the trust of individuals, however, is by respecting 
the laws in force – laws that were created to rule the society in which we live by protecting 
all the people that reside in it and ultimately promoting trust as a basis for societal 
interactions.  
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